Firearm Rights Restoration by State

By Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., and Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA

When does state restoration of gun rights matter under federal law?

State restoration of firearm rights matters to the federal bar only for state convictions. Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), the effect of a pardon, expungement, or civil-rights restoration is judged by the law of the jurisdiction that convicted you. Beecham v. United States holds that a state cannot cure a federal conviction — only federal relief can.

Key takeaways on two-sovereign firearm disabilities

• Two sovereigns, two locks. A federal conviction and a state conviction each create their own firearm disability. Clearing one does nothing to the other. Most people with a federal conviction who “get their rights back” from a state have cleared a lock that was never on the door.
• The federal exemption clause is a choice-of-law rule, not a grant of relief. § 921(a)(20) says what counts as a conviction, and it says the answer comes from “the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” For a federal conviction, that jurisdiction is the United States.
• Restoration must be complete to count. Under Caron v. United States, if the restoring state still forbids the person any category of firearm, the restoration does not lift the federal bar at all. Partial restoration is, for federal purposes, no restoration.
• Rights you never lost cannot be restored. Logan v. United States holds that a person whose civil rights were never taken away gets no benefit from the exemption clause — a trap in states that do not strip civil rights on a misdemeanor or a low-grade felony.
• State law is a separate, independently enforceable bar. Federal relief under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) relieves, by its own terms, only “disabilities imposed by Federal laws.” If your state independently prohibits you, you are still prohibited in your state.
• Seven states’ statutes give express effect to federal § 925(c) relief; several others expressly do not. That distinction, verified below, is the single most useful thing in this table for anyone watching the Department of Justice’s new relief program.

Why “which sovereign” is the only question that matters first

The federal bar, in one sentence

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to ship, transport, possess, or receive any firearm or ammunition that has moved in interstate commerce. Two words in that sentence do most of the work. Any court means any domestic court — federal, state, territorial, or tribal; foreign convictions do not count. And punishable by means the exposure the offense carried, not the sentence actually imposed. A person who served no custody at all on a five-year-maximum offense is inside § 922(g)(1).

The penalty for violating it is now up to fifteen years, raised from ten by the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act in 2022. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). If the person has three qualifying prior convictions, the Armed Career Criminal Act at § 924(e) converts the offense into a fifteen-year mandatory minimum. This is not a technical violation. It is one of the most heavily prosecuted federal offenses in the country, and it is the reason a wrong answer on this page is not survivable.

What § 921(a)(20) actually says — and what it does not

Congress did not leave § 922(g)(1) to swallow every old conviction forever. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) contains two distinct instructions, and reading them as one instruction is the origin of most of the bad advice on this subject.

The first is a choice-of-law rule: “What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” That sentence tells a federal court where to look. It does not tell the federal court to look at the defendant’s home state, or the state where the gun was found, or the state whose law is most generous. It says: look to the jurisdiction that ran the proceedings.

The second is the exemption clause: “Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”

Put together, they mean this. If your conviction was in Ohio, Ohio law decides whether an Ohio expungement, an Ohio pardon, or an Ohio restoration of civil rights wiped the conviction out for federal purposes — subject to the unless-clause. If your conviction was in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, then federal law decides, and no act of Ohio’s is relevant at all.

Congress wrote § 921(a)(20) in response to Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983), where the Supreme Court had held that a state expungement did not remove the federal firearms disability because federal law, not state law, controlled the question. The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 overrode that result — but only in one direction. It made state law relevant to state convictions. It did nothing to make state law relevant to federal ones.

Beecham: the case that decides this

Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994), is a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court and it is the hinge on which this entire page turns. The petitioners had federal felony convictions. Their civil rights had been restored under the law of their states. They argued that the choice-of-law sentence in § 921(a)(20) pointed to the state of restoration, so their restored rights should count.

The Court disagreed, unanimously. The “jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held” is the jurisdiction that convicted you. For a federal conviction, that jurisdiction is the United States, and the question becomes whether federal law has expunged, set aside, pardoned, or restored civil rights. A state’s decision to give a federal felon back the vote, the jury box, and the right to hold office is a state’s decision about state citizenship. It is not federal relief and it does not touch § 922(g)(1).

The practical consequence is severe and it catches people constantly. A person with a 2009 federal conviction moves to a state where civil rights are restored automatically on discharge. The state believes his rights are restored. His state’s own statute may say he can possess a firearm. He buys a rifle. He has committed a federal felony, and the fact that his state told him otherwise is not a defense — not to the element, and, after Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), not to knowledge either, because the knowledge element requires only that he knew he had been convicted of a qualifying offense, not that he knew he was barred.

This is why the table below is organized around the federal question first. It is also why the first thing to establish in any consultation is which court entered the judgment.

Caron: restoration has to be complete

Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998), takes the second half of § 921(a)(20) — the unless-clause — and gives it what the Court called an “all-or-nothing” reading. Caron’s Massachusetts convictions carried a restoration of civil rights, but Massachusetts law still forbade him to carry handguns outside his home or business. The government argued that this residual restriction meant the restoration “expressly provides that the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms,” so the federal bar survived.

The Court agreed. If the restoring jurisdiction still forbids the person any firearms — even a subset, even in a narrow context — the unless-clause is triggered and the conviction still counts federally. There is no partial credit. A state restoration that gives back long guns but not handguns leaves the person federally prohibited as to everything, long guns included.

Caron is the reason several rows in the table below are more dangerous than they look. A state whose statute restores “the right to bear arms” but attaches any residual limitation is, for federal purposes, a state that restored nothing.

Logan: rights never lost are not rights restored

Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007), closes the other end. Logan had Wisconsin misdemeanor convictions that carried more than a year of exposure but did not strip him of the vote, of office-holding, or of jury service. He argued that having retained his civil rights should count at least as much as having them restored.

A unanimous Court said no. The exemption clause speaks of rights “restored,” and restoration presupposes loss. A person who never lost civil rights has nothing to restore and gets no benefit from the clause.

The trap is real and it is spreading, because states have steadily narrowed felony disenfranchisement. Maine and Vermont do not disenfranchise at all. A growing number of states restore the vote on release rather than on completion of supervision. Each of those reforms is good policy and each of them removes a person from the shelter of the § 921(a)(20) exemption clause — because the shelter only opens for people whose rights were taken and given back.

Five questions this table cannot answer for you

A statutory table is a map, not a permission slip. Before anyone acts on a row below, five things have to be established that no chart can establish:

1. Which sovereign convicted you, and for what. The judgment controls. Not the arrest, not the charge, not what the plea “was really about.”
2. Whether your particular offense was punishable by more than one year. State grading changes over time and some states let misdemeanors carry more than a year. The exposure on the date of the offense is what matters.
3. Whether your civil rights were actually lost. Logan makes this determinative, and the answer varies by state, by offense grade, and by year.
4. Whether the restoring instrument carries a firearms rider. Caron makes a single residual restriction fatal. Certificates of discharge in several states carry exactly such a rider — Minnesota’s, by statute, must.
5. Whether some other subsection of § 922(g) applies independently. A misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under § 922(g)(9), an unlawful-user status under § 922(g)(3), or an active protective order under § 922(g)(8) each creates its own bar that a felony-focused analysis will miss entirely. Our page on the misdemeanor domestic violence gun rights restoration route covers the § 922(g)(9) analysis, including the 2022 dating-partner amendment and the five-year automatic restoration Congress built into § 921(a)(33)(C).

If any of those five is unsettled, the row in the table is background reading and nothing more.

How to read the table

What each column means

Possession statute. The state’s principal criminal prohibition on firearm possession by a person with a disqualifying conviction, cited as the primary-law database returns it. Where the caption of the statute is misleading — South Carolina and Kansas are the two worst offenders — the note column says so.

Reaches a conviction from another sovereign? This column answers a narrow question: does the text of the state statute, on its face, apply to a conviction entered by a court other than that state’s own? Three values appear.

• Express (federal named) — the statute names the United States or federal courts. Only a minority of states do this.
• Express (other jurisdictions) — the statute reaches convictions “in this state or elsewhere,” “in any court,” or “another jurisdiction,” language that plainly captures a federal conviction without naming it.
• Not stated — the statute is silent, or reaches other jurisdictions only by an equivalence test that a court would have to apply. This is not a finding that the statute does not reach federal convictions; it is a finding that the text does not say, and that case law we have not surveyed would decide it.

That distinction matters more than it looks. A reader in an “express” state knows the answer from the statute. A reader in a “not stated” state has a research question, not an answer.

Scope and carve-outs. Whether the bar reaches all felonies or only enumerated offenses; whether it ends on its own after a period of years; and any category the statute expressly excludes.

Restoration inside the statute. Whether the possession statute itself contains a pardon, expungement, or restoration exception — and, critically, whether that exception carries a § 921(a)(20)-style unless-clause. Where it does, the state has essentially imported the federal rule into its own law.

Effective / source date. The effective date the database reports for the version read, and where none is reported, the date through which the source was current. A blank in this column is not sloppiness; several states publish no per-section effective date.

Verified. The date the statutory text was opened and read. Every row below says 2026-09-01 because the whole table was built in one pass.

Verification method, and the schedule that keeps it honest

A fifty-state table is worth exactly as much as its maintenance schedule, and most published ones have none. Here is ours.

Every row was built by opening the statute in a primary-law database and reading the operative text — not by reading a summary, a chart, a treatise, or another firm’s page. Where a starting citation did not resolve, the section was located by search and then re-opened by its canonical citation or document identifier. Where the statutory text could not be obtained from a primary-law source, the row says not verified and the notes say what was tried.

Fourteen cells in an earlier compilation turned out to be wrong or materially incomplete; each is corrected in the rows. That error rate — roughly one jurisdiction in four carrying at least one defect — is the argument for the schedule rather than against the table.

Re-verification cadence. The table is re-read in full every six months, and any single row is re-read on demand before it is relied on in a matter. Legislative sessions are the risk: a state that amends its possession statute in March will have a stale row here in April. Six rows below already carry 2026 effective dates, which tells you how much movement there is in this area.

What we do not do. We do not extend a row by inference. If the statute is silent on federal convictions, the column says “not stated” even where the answer is probably yes. We do not import a conclusion from a state attorney general opinion, a court of appeals decision, or an agency FAQ into a column that describes statutory text. And we do not fill a row we could not verify, however confident anyone is about the answer.

What “not verified” means, and why no row says it now

Four jurisdictions — Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee — held out the longest. None publishes its statutory code through a free official portal; each licenses it to a commercial vendor, and searches returned regulations and session laws that reference the sections by number and title without reproducing their text.

A regulation’s cross-reference to a statute confirms that the section exists. It does not tell you what the section says, and it certainly does not tell you whether it reaches a federal conviction or what it carves out. So those four rows said “not verified,” named the section number the cross-references confirmed, and stopped there — until the code text was obtained and each was read in full.

That was the right answer while it lasted, and it is the state any row here returns to the moment its source stops being readable. We do not fill a row we could not verify, however confident anyone is about the answer.

Firearm rights restoration by state

Every row verified against primary statutory text on 2026-09-01. Citations link to the jurisdiction’s official code where a government-hosted source was returned.

Jurisdiction	Possession statute	Reaches another sovereign’s conviction?	Scope and carve-outs	Restoration inside the statute	Effective / source date	Verified
Alabama	Ala. Code § 13A-11-72	Express (other jurisdictions) — “in this state or elsewhere”	Five-year bar for a single felony; lifetime for three or more felonies, a crime of violence, or a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence	Yes — a full § 921(a)(20)-style clause: not “convicted” if expunged, set aside, pardoned, or civil rights restored, “unless” the instrument bars firearms	Current through 2026-08-17	2026-09-01
Alaska	Alaska Stat. § 11.61.200	Express (federal named) — “a court of this state, a court of the United States, or a court of another state or territory”	All felonies; bar lapses ten years after unconditional discharge, except where the prior was under AS 11.41 or a similar federal or state law	Ten-year lapse; no separate pardon clause in the section	Not stated	2026-09-01
Arizona	Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3102 (via the “prohibited possessor” definition at § 13-3101(A)(7)(b))	Express (other jurisdictions) — “convicted within or without this state of a felony”	All felonies; juvenile felony adjudications included; no time lapse	In the definition, not the offense: applies only where “civil right to possess or carry a firearm has not been restored.” Restoration runs through §§ 13-905, 13-907, 13-908, 13-910, with firearm carve-outs for dangerous and serious offenses	Current through 2025-09-19	2026-09-01
Arkansas	Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-103	Express (federal named) — (e) defines “felony” as “any state or federal felony,” excluding completed-sentence antitrust, unfair-trade-practice, restraint-of-trade and business-regulation offenses	All felonies; no time lapse. A suspended imposition of sentence or probation still counts as a conviction under (b)(1); a case dismissed and expunged under § 16-93-301 et seq. or § 16-98-303(g) does not	Two routes. (b)(3) a pardon explicitly restoring the ability to possess a firearm; and (d) the Governor may restore firearm rights without a pardon, on the recommendation of the local chief law enforcement officer, if the felony did not involve a weapon and occurred more than eight years ago	Acts 2023, No. 659, § 48; current through the 2026 First Extraordinary Session	2026-09-01
California	Cal. Penal Code § 29800	Conditional — § 29800(c) exempts a federal conviction unless a comparable California offense could only be a felony, or the person served more than 30 days in a federal facility, or paid a fine over $1,000	All felonies plus enumerated misdemeanors; subsections (d) and (e) create out-of-state non-violent-felony exceptions	None in the section for felonies	Effective 2026-01-01	2026-09-01
Colorado	Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108	Express (federal named) — “pursuant to Colorado or any other state’s law or pursuant to federal law”	All felonies; no general time lapse	Petition relief limited to juvenile adjudications and first-degree motor vehicle theft	Effective 2025-05-19	2026-09-01
Connecticut	Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217	Not stated as to “federal”; “convicted” means judgment by “a court of competent jurisdiction.” The section separately and expressly incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2), (4), and (9)	All felonies plus enumerated misdemeanors and order categories	None in the section	Effective 2022-06-01	2026-09-01
Delaware	Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448	Express (other jurisdictions) — “convicted in this State or other jurisdiction of a felony”	All felonies and crimes of violence; juvenile felony adjudications bar until age 25. The five-year lapse at (d) applies only to “an offense which is not a felony”	None for felonies; § 1448A(l) relief for the mental-health categories	Current through 2026-07-21	2026-09-01
District of Columbia	D.C. Code § 22-4503	Express (other jurisdictions) — “convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”	Any crime over one year; separate five-year bar for intrafamily offenses and stalking, including “any similar provision in the law of another jurisdiction”	None in the section	Effective 2024-06-08; current through 2026-08-20	2026-09-01
Florida	Fla. Stat. § 790.23	Express (federal named) — “a crime against the United States which is designated as a felony”	All felonies; no time lapse	Yes, but demanding: (2)(a) requires that both “civil rights and firearm authority” have been restored	Publication 2025-01-01	2026-09-01
Georgia	Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-131	Express (federal named) — (b) reaches a felony conviction “by a court of this state or any other state; by a court of the United States including its territories, possessions, and dominions; or by a court of any foreign nation”	All felonies, plus first-offender and conditional-discharge probationers. Enhanced terms for forcible felonies; (b.1) also bars attempting to purchase	Yes, and it credits federal relief. (c) a pardon that expressly authorizes firearms; and (d) a person granted federal relief under 18 U.S.C. § 925 may present that proof to the Board of Public Safety and be relieved of the Georgia disability	Ga. L. 2022, p. 103, § 1/SB 479; current through the 2026 Special Session	2026-09-01
Hawaii	Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-7	Express (federal named) — subsection (a) bars anyone “prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition under title 18 United States Code section 922 or any other provision of federal law”; subsection (b) reaches convictions “in this State or elsewhere”	Felonies, crimes of violence, firearms offenses, and illegal drug sale or distribution. Twenty-year lapse applies only to non-felony convictions	Medical-documentation relief for mental-health categories only	Current through 2024-01-01	2026-09-01
Idaho	Idaho Code § 18-3316	Express (other jurisdictions) — “another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States”	Enumerated offenses (those listed in § 18-310) or a comparable felony elsewhere	Yes — does not apply where the conviction is “nullified by expungement, pardon, setting aside the conviction or other comparable procedure by the jurisdiction where the felony conviction occurred,” or where the right to bear arms is restored by Idaho law	Current through 2025-07-01	2026-09-01
Illinois	720 ILCS 5/24-1.1	Express (other jurisdictions) — “a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction”	All felonies; reaches ammunition and reaches possession “on his land or in his own abode”; no time lapse	Yes — does not apply if relieved by the Director of the Illinois State Police under § 10 of the FOID Card Act. That relief is conditioned on “granting relief would not be contrary to federal law”	Effective 2025-01-01	2026-09-01
Indiana	Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5	Not stated — the 32 enumerated predicates are all Indiana Code sections	Enumerated offenses only, not all felonies. Several predicates carry felony-level qualifiers	None in the section	Current through 2025-12-31	2026-09-01
Iowa	Iowa Code § 724.26	Express (federal named) — “convicted of a felony in a state or federal court”	All felonies; juvenile delinquency adjudications included; escalating mandatory minimums	Cross-reference to § 724.27, which recognizes a presidential or state-executive pardon, restoration of civil rights, or expungement — subject to a § 921(a)(20)-style unless-clause and to § 914.7, which permanently withholds firearm rights for forcible felonies and certain drug and weapons felonies	Iowa Code 2026	2026-09-01
Kansas	Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6304	Not stated as to “federal” — reaches “a crime under a law of another jurisdiction that is substantially the same.” A substantial-similarity test, not a categorical bar	Tiered, and several tiers expire: no stated limit where the court found firearm use; three years for other person felonies; eight years for enumerated serious felonies; three months for any other non-person felony. Caption says “firearm”; text bars any “weapon,” defined to include knives	Yes for tiers (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(4) — expungement or pardon. The eight-year (a)(3) tier is omitted from that exception. § 21-6614 restores firearm rights on expungement	Effective 2021-07-01	2026-09-01
Kentucky	Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.040	Express (federal named) — “convicted of a felony, as defined by the laws of the jurisdiction in which he was convicted, in any state or federal court”	All felonies; handgun bar applies to convictions after 1975-01-01, other firearms after 1994-07-15	Yes, in the elements: a full pardon by the Governor or by the President, or relief under the federal Gun Control Act. But § 196.045(3) says restored civil rights “[do] not include the right to bear arms”	Effective 2018-07-14	2026-09-01
Louisiana	La. Stat. Ann. § 14:95.1	Express (federal named) — “under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country”	Enumerated offenses only — crimes of violence, burglary offenses, felony weapons and drug offenses, sex offenses	Ten-year cleansing period from completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension	Effective 2024-08-01	2026-09-01
Maine	Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 393	Express (federal named) — “a crime under the laws of the United States that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”	In-state trigger is one year or more; federal trigger is exceeding one year. Out-of-state misdemeanors punishable by two years or less are excluded. Domestic-violence bar expires after five clean years	Yes — application to the Office of the Governor for a permit after five years; the permit does not authorize a concealed handgun and lasts four years	Current through 2025-10-01	2026-09-01
Maryland	Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133	Split. Subsection (c) is express as to “an offense under the laws of another state or the United States.” Subsection (b)(1), the broad “disqualifying crime” bar, defines that term in in-state language only — uncertain as to federal reach	(c) reaches crimes of violence and enumerated drug offenses; (b) reaches disqualifying crimes, common-law crimes over two years, and § 4-104 violations. Probation before judgment is excluded in defined circumstances. Five-year bar for post-2023 § 4-104 convictions	Both (b) and (c) open “Subject to § 5-133.3” — that section was not retrieved and is not verified here	Effective 2025-10-01; current through 2026-06-01	2026-09-01
Massachusetts	Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 121F	Express (federal named) — “in a court of the commonwealth or in any other state or federal jurisdiction”	Licensing disqualification, not a standalone possession offense. Felony, crime of violence, and § 921(a)(33) domestic-violence convictions are lifetime; misdemeanors over two years, firearms offenses, and controlled-substance offenses disqualify for five years and only as to the FID card	None found for criminal convictions in this section	Current through 2026-01-06	2026-09-01
Michigan	Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f	Express (federal named) — “a violation of a law of this state, or of another state, or of the United States that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year”	Ordinary felony: three years after fines paid, custody served, and supervision completed — automatic. Specified felony: five years plus an affirmative circuit-court restoration order under MCL 28.424. Domestic-violence misdemeanor: eight years	Yes — does not apply to a conviction expunged, set aside, or pardoned, “unless” the instrument bars firearms	Effective 2024-02-13	2026-09-01
Minnesota	Minn. Stat. § 624.713	Express (other jurisdictions) — clause (10)(i), “convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”; clause (2) reaches crimes of violence “in this state or elsewhere”	Crime-of-violence bar is lifetime; drug misdemeanor bar lapses after three clean years. The bar reaches ammunition, pistols, and semiautomatic military-style assault weapons — and, except for clause (1), any other firearm	Judicial restoration for commitment-based bars only. For convictions, the section points outward to § 925(c) relief or to § 609.165, subd. 1d. § 609.165 requires the discharge order to state that a crime-of-violence offender may not possess firearms for life — a Caron problem by statutory design	Not stated	2026-09-01
Mississippi	Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-5	Express (federal named) — (1) reaches a felony “under the laws of this state, any other state, or of the United States”	All felonies. The bar also covers bowie/dirk/butcher/switchblade knives, metallic knuckles, blackjacks and silencers — not firearms alone	Yes, and § 925(c) is named in the statute. (1) excepts a person who has received a pardon, “has received a relief from disability pursuant to Section 925(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code,” or holds a certificate of rehabilitation under (3). A person with a federal conviction applies for that certificate in their county of residence	Laws 2021, ch. 430, § 4, eff. July 1, 2021; current through the 2026 Regular and First Extraordinary Sessions	2026-09-01
Missouri	Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.070	Express (federal named) — “a crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony”	All felonies; no time lapse; antique firearms excepted	None	Effective 2024-08-28	2026-09-01
Montana	Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-313	Express (federal named) — “an offense under the law of another state or of the United States that is equivalent to an offense that when committed in Montana is subject to an additional sentence under 46-18-221”	Far narrower than all felonies. Only felonies that drew the dangerous-weapon enhancement, their federal or out-of-state equivalents, and registry-triggering felonies	A § 45-8-314 permit is a defense; § 45-8-314 imposes “life supervision by the state” with a district-court good-cause permit	Current through 2025-01-01	2026-09-01
Nebraska	Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1206	Express (federal named) — “in any court in the United States, the several states, territories, or possessions, or the District of Columbia”	All felonies; seven-year bar for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; knife and knuckle carve-outs for hunting and licensed harvesting	None in the statutory text. Restoration runs through a Board of Pardons warrant of discharge under § 29-112	Effective 2026-07-18	2026-09-01
Nevada	Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.360	Express (federal named) — “a felony in violation of the laws of the United States of America”	All felonies; no time lapse; separate categories for domestic battery, stalking, protective orders, fugitives, unlawful drug users, and anyone “otherwise prohibited by federal law”	Pardon only, and only a pardon that “does not restrict his or her right to bear arms”	Effective 2023-10-01	2026-09-01
New Hampshire	N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:3	Express (federal named) — “in either a state or federal court in this or any other state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession”	Enumerated only — a felony against the person or property of another, or a controlled-drug felony under RSA 318-B or its equivalent. Affirmative defense where the out-of-state felony would not have been a New Hampshire felony	None	Effective 2002-01-01	2026-09-01
New Jersey	N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-7	Express (other jurisdictions) — “in another state, territory, commonwealth or other jurisdiction of the United States, or any country in the world . . . comparable to one of the crimes enumerated”	Enumerated only — a long list running from aggravated assault and arson through robbery, carjacking, racketeering, and unlawful weapons possession, plus stalking and domestic-violence offenses	None found in the section. § 2C:51-1 supplies the general rule that conviction imposes no disqualification except as provided by law	Not stated	2026-09-01
New Mexico	N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-16	Express (federal named) — “convicted of a felony offense by a court of the United States or of any state or political subdivision”	All felonies, but the bar self-terminates: the definition of “felon” requires that “less than ten years have passed since the person completed serving a sentence or period of probation . . . whichever is later”	Built into the definition — ten-year lapse, a pardon, or a deferred sentence each takes the person outside “felon”	Current through 2026-08-18	2026-09-01
New York	N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01(4); handguns via § 400.00(1)(c)	Not stated in § 265.01(4). § 400.00 is express as to “convicted anywhere of a felony or a serious offense” and reaches “an offense in any jurisdiction . . . that includes all of the essential elements of a serious offense”	§ 265.01(4) reaches long guns only — rifles, shotguns, antique firearms, black powder arms, and muzzle-loaders. Handguns are controlled through licensing	None in § 265.01. N.Y. Correct. Law § 701 certificates of relief carry an express carve-out for § 400.00 licenses where the conviction was a class A-I felony or a violent felony offense	Effective 2024-11-29	2026-09-01
North Carolina	N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1	Express (federal named) — “criminal laws of other states or of the United States . . . substantially similar to the crimes covered in subdivision (1)”	All felonies. Antitrust, unfair trade practice, and restraint of trade convictions are excluded; antique firearms excluded	Yes — does not apply where the person “has been pardoned or has had his or her firearms rights restored” under the law of the convicting jurisdiction, if such restoration could also be granted under North Carolina law. § 14-415.4 adds a twenty-year petition route	Not stated	2026-09-01
North Dakota	N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-02-01	Express (federal named) — “an equivalent felony offense of another state or the federal government”	Both tiers expire. Ten years for violent or intimidation felonies; five years for every other felony, including non-violent federal felonies, and for certain armed Class A misdemeanors	No conviction-based restoration clause — relief comes by lapse of time. Mental-health relief at § 62.1-02-01.2. Felons not sentenced under § 12.1-32-09.1 may possess long guns of specified barrel length	Not stated	2026-09-01
Ohio	Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13	Not stated in the section. The incorporated “offense of violence” definition at § 2901.01(A)(9) does reach “any other state or the United States.” Federal reach of the drug prong is uncertain	Enumerated only — felony offenses of violence and felony drug offenses, plus fugitive, dependency, and mental-health categories. No time lapse	“Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal process,” and § 2923.13(C) says that phrase “shall not itself include mere completion, termination, or expiration of a sentence.” Relief is by common-pleas petition under § 2923.14, which restores “all civil firearm rights”	Effective 2023-04-06	2026-09-01
Oklahoma	Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1283	Express (federal named) — “any felony in any court of this state or of another state or of the United States”	All felonies; also reaches persons serving felony probation, juvenile adjudications for ten years, and unlawfully present aliens	Yes — a “full and complete pardon” for a non-violent felony, with no other unpardoned felony, restores firearm rights and handgun-carry eligibility	Effective 2026-01-01	2026-09-01
Oregon	Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.270	Express (federal named) — “convicted of a felony under the laws of the Government of the United States”	All felonies, with two definitional exclusions (conviction declared a misdemeanor at judgment; pre-1972 marijuana possession). The fifteen-year escape is narrow: a single felony, not homicide, not involving a firearm or spring-blade knife, and fifteen years since discharge	Yes — expressly credits federal relief. The bar does not apply to a person “[g]ranted relief from the disability under 18 U.S.C. 925(c) or ORS 166.274,” or whose record was expunged here or under equivalent laws elsewhere	Current through 2025-01-01	2026-09-01
Pennsylvania	18 Pa.C.S. § 6105	Express (federal named) — subsection (b) closes with “any offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the statutes of any other state or of the United States”	Enumerated only, and expressly “regardless of the length of sentence.” Subsection (c) adds drug offenses “punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years,” three DUIs in five years, and several status categories	Yes, but only by petition. § 6105(d) directs that the court of common pleas “shall grant” relief on a vacated conviction, a full gubernatorial pardon, or federal relief plus ten years. § 6123 provides that federal relief and a pardon remove other disabilities in the subchapter but not the § 6105 disability — so neither is self-executing	Publication 2019-07-02; current through 2026-02-11	2026-09-01
Rhode Island	R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-5	Not stated as to “federal” — “convicted in this state or elsewhere of a crime of violence”	Not all felonies — the bar keys to “a crime of violence” plus enumerated domestic-violence offenses. A disorderly conduct conviction disqualifies “if and only if the offense involves the use or attempted use of force or the threatened use of a dangerous weapon”	Only for the domestic-violence prongs — expungement, completion of a one-year filing, or the end of a one-year probationary period. No restoration clause for the crime-of-violence bar	Current through 2026-08-29	2026-09-01
South Carolina	S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-500	Not stated in § 16-23-500 — “another jurisdiction” appears only in the definitional carve-out. § 16-23-30 is the South Carolina statute that expressly reaches “any court of the United States”	Caption says “violent offense”; the operative threshold is any “crime punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year,” excluding antitrust and business-regulation offenses and out-of-state misdemeanors punishable by five years or less	Yes — a full § 921(a)(20)-style clause at (F)(3): expunged, set aside, pardoned, or civil rights restored, “unless” the instrument bars firearms	Effective 2024-03-07	2026-09-01
South Dakota	S.D. Codified Laws § 22-14-15	Not stated as to “federal” — “convicted in this state or elsewhere of a crime of violence” or the enumerated drug felonies	Not all felonies. Crimes of violence plus eight enumerated drug felonies. Bar does not apply to a person “last discharged from prison, jail, probation, or parole more than fifteen years prior to the commission of the principal offense.” The companion § 22-14-15.1 drug bar reaches “another state” only — it does not name the United States — with a five-year exception	None beyond the fifteen-year exception	Current through 2026-07-29	2026-09-01
Tennessee	Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307	Not stated in the operative subsections. (b) and (c) say “convicted of a felony” without naming another sovereign; the part’s express out-of-state language sits in the dangerous-felony definition, not the possession bar. Treat federal reach as unresolved on the face of the statute	Two tiers. (b): felony crime of violence, attempt, felony involving a deadly weapon, or felony drug offense — bars any firearm or ammunition. (c): any felony — bars handguns and handgun ammunition	Yes, three ways, express in (c)(1). A pardon; expungement; or civil rights restored under Title 40, Chapter 29, provided the restoration order does not specifically prohibit firearm possession. Note the asymmetry: (c)(1) lists these exceptions, (b)(1) does not	Acts 2025, ch. 513, §§ 6, 7; current through the 2026 Regular and 2nd Extraordinary Sessions	2026-09-01
Texas	Tex. Penal Code § 46.04	Express (federal named) — “an offense under the laws of this state, another state, or the United States is . . . a felony if” it is so designated, contains all the elements of a Texas felony, or is punishable by a year or more in a penitentiary	All felonies. The five-year mark narrows the bar; it does not end it. Before five years from release, possession anywhere is an offense; after five years, possession is an offense “at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.” Subsection (g) excludes a federal or out-of-state offense that is not and does not contain the elements of a Texas felony. Separate five-year bar for Class A family-violence misdemeanors	None	Effective 2021-09-01	2026-09-01
Utah	Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-11-305, 76-11-306 (definitions at §§ 76-11-302, 76-11-303)	Not stated — the offense and definitional sections are silent; § 76-11-304 presupposes other jurisdictions by referring to “the law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction or adjudication occurred”	Category I: violent felony, current felony supervision, ten years post-adjudication, unlawful presence, or Schedule I/II probation. Category II: felony domestic violence, multiple felonies not in a single episode, or — time-limited — seven years after completing a sentence for any other felony. Archery equipment excepted in both	Yes, at § 76-11-304 — expungement, set-aside, reduction to a misdemeanor, pardon, or restoration of civil rights “in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction,” with a full § 921(a)(20)-style unless-clause	Effective 2025-05-07 (2026-05-06 for § 76-11-302)	2026-09-01
Vermont	13 V.S.A. § 4017	Not stated as to “federal” — reaches “a comparable offense and sentence in another jurisdiction if the offense prohibits the person from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) or 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)”	Enumerated “violent crimes” only — listed crimes under § 5301(7) with six express exclusions, child sexual exploitation, and enumerated drug sale and trafficking offenses. Antique firearms excluded	Yes — expressly credits federal relief: “This section shall not apply to a person who is exempt from federal firearms restrictions under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)”	Current through 2026-08-16	2026-09-01
Virginia	Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.2	Express (federal named) — “whether such conviction or adjudication occurred under the laws of the Commonwealth, or any other state, the District of Columbia, the United States or any territory thereof”	All felonies, two juvenile-adjudication classes, and — new, effective 2026-07-01 — a three-year bar following a misdemeanor family-assault conviction	Yes, by circuit-court petition under subsection (C), but gated: “no person who has been convicted of a felony shall be qualified to petition for such an order unless his civil rights have been restored by the Governor or other appropriate authority.” Subsection (B)(iv) also exempts a person whose firearm rights were restored under another state’s law	Effective 2026-07-01	2026-09-01
Washington	Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.040	Not stated as to “federal” — “convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity in this state or elsewhere”	Two tiers. First degree: “any serious offense.” Second degree: any felony not listed in the first-degree tier, plus enumerated domestic-violence and other misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors, with date triggers of 1993-07-01, 2018-06-07, and 2023-07-23	Yes — a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or equivalent based on rehabilitation or innocence; and a separate path for certain probationary dismissals. Petition route at § 9.41.041, barred outright for a felony sex offense, a class A felony, or a felony with a maximum of at least twenty years	Current through 2026-07-15	2026-09-01
West Virginia	W. Va. Code § 61-7-7	Express (other jurisdictions) — “convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”; the enhanced tier uses “in this state or any other jurisdiction”	Any crime over one year. Enhanced felony tier for felony crimes of violence, felony sex offenses, and certain Schedule I, II, and III drug felonies	Yes — circuit-court petition at subsection (f), requiring clear and convincing evidence and an order that “would not violate any federal law.” Subsection (f) is unavailable to persons in the enhanced (b) tier. Subsection (g) exempts expunged, set-aside, and unconditionally pardoned convictions	Current through 2026-08-30	2026-09-01
Wisconsin	Wis. Stat. § 941.29	Not stated as to “federal” — “convicted of a crime elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in this state”	All felonies and felony-equivalents; delinquency adjudications for acts on or after 1994-04-21; NGI findings and enumerated injunctions. No time lapse	Yes — expressly credits federal relief: the section does not apply to a person who “[h]as obtained relief from disabilities under 18 USC 925 (c),” or who has a pardon and “has been expressly authorized to possess a firearm under 18 USC app. 1203”	Current through 2026-08-05	2026-09-01
Wyoming	Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102	Not stated directly; addressed through the restoration reference to “the laws of the jurisdiction in which the conviction was entered”	All felonies, graded by predicate: a violent felony makes possession a felony; a non-violent felony makes it a misdemeanor. Antique firearms excluded	Yes, in the elements — pardon, or rights restored under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-105(a) or (f) “or the laws of the jurisdiction in which the conviction was entered.” But § 7-13-105(j)(ii) limits the automatic five-year firearm restoration to non-violent felonies “under the laws of the state of Wyoming”	Not stated	2026-09-01

Applied Insight: The column readers skip is the one that decides cases. “Reaches another sovereign’s conviction?” looks like trivia until you are the person with a 2011 federal wire-fraud conviction living in Arizona, where the bar attaches to anyone “convicted within or without this state” and applies only where the “civil right to possess or carry a firearm has not been restored.” Arizona will restore your Arizona civil rights. Arizona cannot restore a federal firearm right, and Arizona’s own restoration route for out-of-state and federal convictions is an application under § 13-908 — one the court must grant, without a response or hearing, for a first-time felony offender who has paid all victim restitution (§ 13-907(B)), and that is otherwise in the judge’s discretion. Two separate locks, two separate keys, and only one of them is in Phoenix.

The Georgia Board rule on federal convictions

One verified item belongs with the Georgia row, and it is a hard one. The Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles’ own rule — a regulation, separate from the statute — provides that a person convicted under another state’s law or under federal law who resides in Georgia may apply for a Restoration of Civil and Political Rights, and then states: “the Board will not consider restoring firearm rights to any former offender convicted of a federal offense.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 475-3-.10. So a Georgia resident with a federal conviction who is hoping the state board will help has a written answer, and the answer is no.

The categories of state approach

Read across the table and the fifty-one jurisdictions sort into five patterns. Knowing which pattern your state follows tells you what kind of work is in front of you — and, just as importantly, whether that work will do anything for a federal conviction. (For a federal conviction, the answer is no in every one of these five categories, which is why the pattern matters mainly for people with state convictions.)

1. Automatic restoration on discharge

The largest group. Civil rights come back by operation of law when the sentence is fully served, with no petition, no filing fee, and often no document beyond a certificate of discharge. Montana’s is the cleanest example: under Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-801(2), a person whose sentence has expired “is restored to all civil rights and full citizenship, the same as if the conviction had not occurred.” Wisconsin’s § 304.078(2) is similar — “every person who is convicted of a crime obtains a restoration of his or her civil rights by serving out his or her term of imprisonment or otherwise satisfying his or her sentence.”

The federal question in an automatic-restoration state is entirely about the paperwork. Caron asks whether the restoration is complete, and the answer usually lives in a sentence of the certificate rather than in the statute. Wisconsin’s statute requires the department to “list in the person’s certificate rights which have been restored and which have not been restored” — which means the certificate can, and often does, carve firearms out.

2. Bars that expire on their own

A distinct and underappreciated category: states whose possession bar simply runs out. There is no petition and no restoration event, because after a stated period the statute stops applying. Verified in this pass:

State	Statute	The bar ends	Applies to
Alabama	Ala. Code § 13A-11-72	5 years	A single felony conviction; lifetime for three or more, a crime of violence, or an MCDV
Alaska	Alaska Stat. § 11.61.200	10 years after unconditional discharge	All except priors under AS 11.41 or similar federal or state law
Kansas	Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6304	3 years, 8 years, or 3 months	By tier; no stated limit where the court found firearm use
Louisiana	La. Stat. Ann. § 14:95.1	10 years from completion of sentence	The enumerated offenses only
Michigan	Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f	3 years (ordinary) / 5 years plus a court order (specified)	All felonies, split by “specified felony” definition
New Mexico	N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-16	10 years after sentence or probation, whichever is later	All felonies — built into the definition of “felon”
North Dakota	N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-02-01	10 years (violent) / 5 years (every other felony)	All felonies, both tiers
Oregon	Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.270	15 years after discharge	A single felony only, not homicide, not firearm- or spring-blade-related
South Dakota	S.D. Codified Laws § 22-14-15	15 years since last discharge (5 under § 22-14-15.1)	Crimes of violence and enumerated drug felonies
Utah	Utah Code Ann. § 76-11-306(3)	7 years after completing the sentence	Felonies that are neither violent nor domestic violence

Two warnings about this table-within-a-table. First, a lapsed state bar does nothing to a federal conviction, and it does nothing to the federal bar arising from the state conviction either — the lapse of a state prohibition is not a “restoration of civil rights” within § 921(a)(20), and Logan forecloses the argument that keeping rights is as good as regaining them. The person is free of the state charge and still exposed federally. Second, Texas looks like it belongs on this list and does not: after five years the Texas bar narrows to everywhere except the person’s residence. It never ends.

3. Petition-based restoration

Several states require an affirmative filing and a judicial or administrative finding. These are the states where a lawyer’s involvement changes outcomes, because the standard is discretionary and the record is what carries it.

• Ohio — common-pleas relief from disability under § 2923.14, which on its face “restores the applicant to all civil firearm rights to the full extent enjoyed by any citizen,” conditioned on full discharge, a law-abiding life, and the applicant not being “otherwise prohibited by law.”
• Pennsylvania — a § 6105(d) petition to the court of common pleas, on which relief is mandatory (“shall grant”) if the conviction was vacated, the Governor granted a full pardon, or federal relief issued and ten non-custodial years have passed.
• West Virginia — a § 61-7-7(f) circuit-court petition requiring clear and convincing evidence of competence and an order that “would not violate any federal law,” and unavailable to anyone in the enhanced (b) tier.
• Washington — a § 9.41.041 superior-court petition, with a five-year clean period for felonies and three years for the qualifying non-felonies, and an absolute bar for a felony sex offense, a class A felony, or any felony carrying a maximum of at least twenty years.
• Oregon — an ORS 166.274 circuit-court petition requiring clear and convincing evidence that “the petitioner does not pose a threat to the safety of the public or the petitioner,” and unavailable for armed person felonies and ORS 137.700 offenses.
• North Carolina — a § 14-415.4 petition available only after civil rights have been restored under Chapter 13 “for a period of at least 20 years,” for a person with a single non-violent felony, after a year of residency.
• Michigan — for a “specified felony,” the MCL 28.424 circuit-court petition, which the court grants only on clear and convincing evidence including that “[t]he individual’s record and reputation are such that the individual is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to the safety of other individuals,” and which may be filed no more than once in twelve months.
• Illinois — relief from the Firearm Owner’s Identification Card Review Board or the circuit court under 430 ILCS 65/10, expressly conditioned on relief that “would not be contrary to federal law,” with the court directed not to issue the order “if the petitioner is otherwise prohibited from obtaining, possessing, or using a firearm under federal law.”

Note what several of those have in common: the state court is instructed to check federal law before granting. Illinois and West Virginia say so in terms. That is a state legislature acknowledging the very division this page is about — a state order cannot make a federally prohibited person lawful, and a well-drafted state statute refuses to pretend otherwise.

4. Governor-only, or pardon-only

A smaller group conditions firearm rights on executive action and nothing else.

Nevada is the purest: the § 202.360(1)(b) bar applies “unless the person has received a pardon and the pardon does not restrict his or her right to bear arms.” That last clause is Caron written into state law.

Oklahoma restores firearm rights only on “a full and complete pardon” for a non-violent felony, with no other unpardoned felony — § 1283(B). Maine routes the application to the Office of the Governor for a four-year permit that expressly does not authorize a concealed handgun, and lets any notified official veto the initial issuance by written objection within thirty days — Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 393(2). Nebraska restores civil rights by a Board of Pardons “warrant of discharge,” and § 29-112 restores only “such civil rights and privileges as enumerated or limited by the Board” — an open invitation to a firearms carve-out.

5. No mechanism in the statute

Several states’ possession statutes contain no restoration clause at all. Missouri’s § 571.070 has none. New Hampshire’s § 159:3 has none. Indiana’s § 35-47-4-5 has none. Rhode Island has one only for the domestic-violence prongs and none for the crime-of-violence bar. New Jersey’s § 2C:39-7 contains none in the operative text.

The absence of a clause is not the absence of a route — expungement statutes, pardon powers, and general civil-rights statutes sit outside the criminal code and may still do the work. But it does mean that a person in one of these states cannot find the answer by reading the statute that charges them, which is a fair description of why this area produces so much confident, wrong advice.

The seven statutes that give express effect to federal § 925(c) relief

This is, for anyone tracking the Department of Justice’s new relief program, the most operationally useful thing on this page — and it is the part every general chart omits, because it requires reading the state statute rather than summarizing it.

Two states’ possession statutes say, in terms, that federal relief under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) takes the person out of the state bar. Both were read directly:

• Vermont, 13 V.S.A. § 4017(c): “This section shall not apply to a person who is exempt from federal firearms restrictions under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).”
• Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 941.29(5)(b): the section does not apply to a person who “[h]as obtained relief from disabilities under 18 USC 925 (c).”

Oregon does the same thing inside its definition of who is covered: the bar does not apply to a person “[g]ranted relief from the disability under 18 U.S.C. 925(c) or ORS 166.274,” or whose record has been expunged here or under equivalent laws elsewhere. Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.270(4)(b).

Kentucky builds federal relief into the elements of the offense: a person is guilty only if he “has not . . . [b]een granted relief by the United States Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.040(1)(b). The reference to the Secretary of the Treasury is a historical artifact — the relief function moved with ATF to the Department of Justice in 2003 — and it is a live question whether a Kentucky court would read the clause functionally. It is a good question to have the answer to before, not after.

Pennsylvania treats federal relief as a mandatory ground for a state court order rather than as a self-executing exemption. Under § 6105(d)(3), the court of common pleas “shall grant” relief where the federal disability has been lifted and ten non-custodial years have run. Section 6123, read alone, is misleading: it says a federal § 925 waiver “shall remove any corresponding disability under this subchapter except the disability under section 6105.” Read with § 6105(d), the accurate statement is that federal relief has no automatic effect in Pennsylvania but is a ground on which a Pennsylvania court must grant relief if asked.

Mississippi names it in the statute itself. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-5(1) excepts a person who “has received a relief from disability pursuant to Section 925(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code.” The annotated code text confirms it.

Georgia credits federal relief through a procedure rather than an exemption, and it is the most demanding of the group. Under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(d), a person granted relief “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 925” may present that proof to the Board of Public Safety, which may then relieve the Georgia disability — but only on a further showing that firearm possession by that person “would not present a threat to the safety of the citizens of Georgia” and that relief “would not be contrary to the public interest.” Federal relief opens the door; it does not walk you through it.

The counterexamples matter as much. Illinois and West Virginia condition state relief on federal law not being violated — the mirror image of crediting § 925(c). Minnesota points a conviction-based petitioner outward to § 925(c) relief or to § 609.165, subd. 1d, rather than granting relief itself. And several states’ statutes are simply silent, which means a person who obtains federal relief in one of them has cleared the federal lock and left the state lock exactly where it was.

Applied Insight: The Department of Justice’s relief program has produced a wave of “gun rights restored” marketing that quietly conflates two things. Federal relief under § 925(c) relieves, by the statute’s own words and by the title of the rule implementing it, “disabilities imposed by Federal laws.” That is the whole scope. If you live in Illinois with an Illinois felony, a grant from the Attorney General does not touch 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 — you would still need FOID relief under 430 ILCS 65/10, and that statute directs the decisionmaker to confirm that relief “would not be contrary to federal law,” which is now satisfied, but does not make it automatic. Two applications, in the right order. Anyone who tells you the federal grant is the end of the process has not read the state statute.

When restoration comes with a firearms rider

Caron makes a single residual restriction fatal to the federal exemption, and § 921(a)(20)’s unless-clause makes an express firearms rider fatal on its face. Both traps are live in specific, verified statutes, and this is where a person who has done everything right still ends up federally prohibited.

Kentucky is the starkest. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 196.045(3) defines the “civil rights” the Department of Corrections restores as “the ability to vote, serve on a jury, obtain a professional or vocational license, and hold an elective office,” and then adds: “It does not include the right to bear arms.” A Kentucky restoration therefore restores civil rights in the ordinary sense while stating on its face that firearms are outside it. Whether that is an express provision that “the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms” for § 921(a)(20) purposes is a question a federal court would have to resolve; what is certain is that no one should assume the answer is favorable.

Minnesota goes further, by legislative command. Minn. Stat. § 609.165 restores a discharged person “to all civil rights and to full citizenship, the same as if such conviction had not taken place” — and then requires that “[t]he order of discharge must provide that a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence . . . is not entitled to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm or ammunition for the remainder of the person’s lifetime.” A Minnesota crime-of-violence discharge order is, by statute, an instrument that expressly forbids firearms. That is the unless-clause on the page in front of you.

Utah restores the vote at § 20A-2-101.5 and, later, the right to hold office. It says nothing about jury service and nothing about firearms — a different problem, since a restoration that never reached jury service may not be a restoration of “civil rights” at all in the sense the federal courts require.

Missouri permanently disqualifies a felon from jury service under § 561.026(3) — “[c]onvicted of any felony shall be forever disqualified from serving as a juror” — while restoring the vote on completion of the sentence. A person in that position has not had the full trio of civil rights restored, which is a live obstacle to the exemption clause.

Wyoming limits its automatic five-year firearm restoration to non-violent felonies “under the laws of the state of Wyoming,” § 7-13-105(j)(ii), and voids the certificate automatically on a new felony conviction “under the laws of the state of Wyoming, the laws of another state or federal law,” § 7-13-105(h).

Iowa withholds firearm rights permanently for a defined class: § 914.7 provides that a person convicted of “a forcible felony, a felony violation of chapter 124 involving a firearm, or a felony violation of chapter 724 shall not have the person’s rights of citizenship restored to the extent of allowing the person to receive, transport, or possess firearms.”

New York carves firearms out of its certificates of relief: a certificate under N.Y. Correct. Law § 701 does not prevent forfeiture of a § 400.00 license for a person convicted of a class A-I felony or a violent felony offense, and such a conviction “shall impose a disability to apply for or receive” that license.

The pattern is consistent enough to state as a rule. Read the instrument, not the statute. The statute tells you a restoration exists; the certificate, order, or pardon tells you what it actually restored — and under Caron, a single sentence in the document can undo the whole thing.

Traps in individual statutes

Sixteen jurisdictions have something in the text that a summary will not carry. These are the ones that come up.

Texas. Tex. Penal Code § 46.04(a) is written in two parts. Before the fifth anniversary of release from confinement or supervision, possession is an offense anywhere. After that anniversary, possession is an offense “at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.” The bar does not lapse; its geography changes. A person who reads “five years” as a sunset and puts a rifle in a truck has committed the offense. Subsection (g) is the other half of the trap in the good direction: a federal or out-of-state offense is not a Texas “felony” for this purpose if it is not designated a felony here and does not contain all the elements of one.

Michigan. The three-year track is automatic; the five-year track is not. MCL 750.224f(2) requires, for a “specified felony,” both the five-year period and that “[t]he person’s right to possess . . . a firearm has been restored under section 4 of 1927 PA 372, MCL 28.424.” “Specified felony” is defined broadly — any felony with an element of force against person or property, or that “by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used,” plus controlled-substance, firearm, explosive, and occupied-dwelling burglary and arson offenses. Most serious felonies are in.

Kansas. Two traps in one statute. The caption reads “criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,” but § 21-6304 bars any “weapon,” and defines “weapon” to mean “a firearm or a knife,” with “knife” defined to include “a dagger, dirk, switchblade, stiletto, straight-edged razor or any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character.” And the expungement-or-pardon exception at subsection (c) applies to tiers (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(4) — conspicuously omitting the eight-year serious-felony tier at (a)(3).

Delaware. The five-year lapse at § 1448(d) is often quoted as though it applied to felonies. It does not: it applies to “any person who is a prohibited person solely as the result of a conviction for an offense which is not a felony.” A Delaware felony bar has no time limit in the section.

Hawaii. Same structure, longer clock. The twenty-year lapse at § 134-7(i) is expressly limited to a conviction “for a crime that is not a felony,” and it is further conditioned on the person not being prohibited “under title 18 United States Code section 922 or another provision of federal law.” Hawaii wrote the federal check directly into the state exemption.

California. § 29800(c) is the sleeper. It provides that the felon-in-possession bar “shall not apply to a conviction . . . under the laws of the United States unless” a comparable California offense could only be a felony, or the person served more than thirty days in a federal facility, or paid a fine exceeding one thousand dollars. A federal misdemeanant, and some federal felons, may fall outside California’s bar while remaining squarely inside § 922(g)(1) — a mismatch that produces exactly the wrong intuition.

Indiana. § 35-47-4-5 bars possession by a “serious violent felon,” defined by a closed list of thirty-two Indiana offenses, several with felony-class qualifiers keyed to whether the crime was committed before or after July 1, 2014. There is no general Indiana felon-in-possession statute in this section, and the section is silent on out-of-state and federal predicates. Separately, § 35-47-4-7(a) decouples firearm rights from civil-rights restoration for domestic-violence convictions in terms — notwithstanding restoration of jury service, restoration of the vote, or expungement, “a person who has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence may not possess a firearm.”

North Dakota. Both tiers expire, and the shorter one is the broader one. Ten years for a felony “involving violence or intimidation”; five years for “a felony offense of this or another state or the federal government not provided for in subdivision a.” A non-violent federal felony is on the five-year track. The section also defines “conviction” to sweep in suspended executions, deferred impositions, probation, and equivalent dispositions “imposed or granted by a court, board, agency, or law of another state or the federal government.”

South Carolina. The caption of § 16-23-500 says “violent offense.” The operative threshold is any “crime punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year.” And the statute never says “United States” — it reaches “another jurisdiction” only inside the definitional carve-out at subsection (F). South Carolina’s expressly federal-facing provision is § 16-23-30, the handgun statute, which reaches conviction “in any court of the United States, the several states, commonwealths, territories, possessions, or the District of Columbia.”

Pennsylvania. Enumerated offenses only — and the enumeration is offense-specific rather than grade-specific, so § 6105(a)(1) applies “regardless of the length of sentence.” Two entries show how granular it gets: § 2504 (involuntary manslaughter) counts only “if the offense is based on the reckless use of a firearm,” and § 3921 (theft) counts only “upon conviction of the second felony offense.”

Montana. § 45-8-313 is one of the narrowest bars in the country. It reaches only a felony for which the person received the § 46-18-221 dangerous-weapon enhancement, its federal or out-of-state equivalent, and a felony requiring sexual or violent offender registration. But § 45-8-314 attaches “life supervision by the state for the purpose of restricting the person’s right to purchase and possess firearms,” with a district-court permit available on a showing of “good cause for the possession of each firearm sought to be purchased and possessed” — firearm by firearm.

Vermont. § 4017 reaches only enumerated “violent crimes,” with six express exclusions from the § 5301(7) listed-crime set — including lewd or lascivious conduct, recklessly endangering another person, and impaired-driving offenses resulting in death or serious bodily injury. A Vermont conviction for one of the excluded offenses is not within the state bar even though it may sit comfortably inside § 922(g)(1).

New York. § 265.01(4) reaches only long guns: “a rifle, shotgun, antique firearm, black powder rifle, black powder shotgun, or any muzzle-loading firearm.” Handguns run through the licensing scheme at § 400.00 and the separate offense at § 265.01-b. And the escalation provision at § 265.02(1) lists subdivisions one, two, three, and five of § 265.01 — subdivision four is not among them.

Nebraska. A documentation trap rather than a statutory one. The published text of § 28-1206 carries embedded case annotations formatted like statutory language, including a note that release from probation and restoration of civil rights “does not nullify the conviction under the terms of subsection (1) of this section.” That is an annotation summarizing a 1991 Nebraska Supreme Court decision, not statutory text. It is a correct statement of Nebraska law and an incorrect thing to quote as a statute.

Maryland. Two errors travel together in published charts. The citation is Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133, and Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-204 is not a possession statute at all — it prohibits using a firearm “in the commission of a crime of violence . . . or any felony.” Within § 5-133 itself, subsection (c) reaches “an offense under the laws of another state or the United States”; subsection (b)(1), which carries the broader “disqualifying crime” bar, is defined in in-state terms only.

Utah. The 2025 renumbering moved everything. What used to be § 76-10-503 is now spread across §§ 76-11-302 and 76-11-303 (definitions of category I and category II restricted persons), §§ 76-11-305 and 76-11-306 (the offenses), and § 76-11-304 (the exceptions, including the § 921(a)(20)-style restoration clause). A chart still citing § 76-10-503 is citing a repealed section.

What the federal relief program changes — and what it does not

The Department of Justice’s rule implementing 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) was published at 91 Fed. Reg. 54054 on August 20, 2026, and takes effect September 21, 2026. The rule states that “[s]tarting on September 21, 2026, the Department will begin soliciting applications from individuals.” The Department maintains the program page at justice.gov/ffrr, and our detailed treatment of eligibility, the presumptive-disqualification categories, and the application mechanics is on the federal firearm rights restoration page.

For purposes of this page, three things about that program matter, and all three run through the federal/state division.

First, it is the only route that clears a federal conviction. Beecham leaves exactly two federal keys: a presidential pardon, and § 925(c) relief. For decades the second key did not exist in practice — Congress defunded ATF’s processing of individual applications beginning in 1992, and United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002), held that ATF’s inaction was not a “denial” that a district court could review. The reopening of a functioning § 925(c) process is the first change in that landscape in a generation. Anyone whose disability arises from a federal conviction has been told for thirty years that a pardon was the only option; that is no longer accurate.

Second, it does not reach state law. The statute authorizes relief “from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws,” and the Federal Register document implementing it is titled, word for word, “Application for Relief From Disabilities Imposed by Federal Laws With Respect to the Acquisition, Receipt, Transfer, Shipment, Transportation, or Possession of Firearms.” A grant is federal relief and nothing more. Whether it does anything for you in your state depends on the row above: it is dispositive in Vermont and Wisconsin, effective through the definition in Oregon, an element in Kentucky, a mandatory ground for a court petition in Pennsylvania, and — in most states — simply not addressed.

Third, capacity is the binding constraint. The program opens to the general public on November 4, 2026, capped at 5,000 applicants. A cap of that size against a prohibited population in the millions means the practical question for most people is not whether they would qualify but whether they will get in the door, and that in turn means the state analysis is not a fallback — for many people it is the only analysis that will matter in the near term.

Applied Insight: The sequencing question we get most often is whether to pursue a pardons lawyer route or the § 925(c) route, and the honest answer is that they are not alternatives for most people. A presidential pardon under Article II is discretionary, slow, and evaluated against the standards in 28 C.F.R. part 1 with a five-year post-release eligibility rule; § 925(c) relief is administrative, criteria-driven, and capped. Where the conviction is old, non-violent, and well-documented, the § 925(c) application is the faster path and the pardon petition is the durable one — and there is no rule against pursuing both. What there is a rule against is pursuing a state remedy for a federal conviction, which is what a large fraction of the people who call us have already spent a year doing.

Why this page cites statutes instead of summaries

A note on method, because it explains the fourteen corrections.

Most fifty-state firearm charts are built by reading other fifty-state firearm charts. That is how an error propagates: a chart published in 2019 says Texas’s bar ends at five years, twelve later charts copy it, and by 2026 the claim is everywhere and still wrong. We have watched the same thing happen with Utah’s repealed section number, with New York’s wrong subsection, and with the Michigan five-year rule that is not a five-year rule.

The corrective is unglamorous. Open the statute. Read the operative sentence. Write down what it says, and where it is silent, write down that it is silent. Where the database does not carry the code, say so and leave the row empty. That produces a table that says only what the statutes say and, we think, a table you can act on — which is the only kind worth publishing on a subject where the penalty for a wrong answer is fifteen years under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).

If you want the narrative version of this analysis — how the four restoration routes relate to each other, what each one costs in time, and how to decide which to pursue — that is the state guide to firearm rights restoration. If you want the threshold question answered first, start with can a felon own a gun. And if the conviction you are trying to clear may itself be defective, the remedies in our § 2255 practice and the coram nobis route reach the conviction rather than its consequences — which is a better outcome than restoration whenever it is available.

The Department’s own caution

One more source belongs on this page, because it is the agency that administers the federal relief telling readers exactly what this table is for.

Asked whether a presidential pardon is the only way to regain federal firearm rights, the Office of the Pardon Attorney answers: “No. A federal pardon does restore a person’s federal firearms rights, but also, under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), the Attorney General can restore the federal firearms rights of a person who is prohibited from owning a firearm under federal law.” Then the caution: “Importantly, however, a person who has had their federal firearms rights restored, either through pardon or under the § 925(c) process, should consult with their state, territorial, or tribal authorities to learn more about whether he can possess firearms under the laws where he lives.”

The Department also confirms the other half of the Beecham division from the state side: “Some, but not all, states have instituted procedures for restoring to their citizens certain basic civil rights, such as the rights to vote, hold office, or sit on a jury, even if the disqualifying felony conviction was incurred in federal court.” A state can and often will restore state civil rights after a federal conviction. Under Beecham that restoration does not reach § 922(g)(1), which is why so many people hold a genuine state certificate and remain federally prohibited.

Everything else in the clemency section starts from that same division: clemency lawyers for the executive routes, clemency vs pardon vs commutation for what each one does, how to get a presidential pardon for the petition itself, and firearm rights restoration attorney if you would rather have someone run the analysis against your judgment than run it yourself.

Why work with Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C.

Elizabeth Franklin-Best is a federal criminal defense and appellate lawyer whose practice is federal post-conviction work — direct appeals, § 2255 motions, sentence reductions, and executive relief — in federal district courts and courts of appeals nationwide and before the United States Supreme Court. Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, is the firm’s Managing Director and has written extensively on federal sentencing, Bureau of Prisons policy, and post-conviction relief.

What that means for a firearm-rights matter is narrow and specific. We start by identifying the sovereign and the exact judgment, because the analysis on this page cannot begin until that is settled. We read the actual instrument — the certificate of discharge, the pardon, the expungement order — rather than the statute that authorized it, because Caron turns on what the document says. And we tell people plainly when a state remedy will not do what they hope, which is often, and early enough to be useful.

We do not promise outcomes. Executive relief is discretionary by definition, and any lawyer who tells you otherwise is telling you something they cannot know.

Talk to a lawyer about your specific conviction

If you are trying to work out whether a restoration you already have is worth anything federally, or which route is open to you, the fastest way to get a real answer is a consultation where we look at the judgment and the restoring document together.

Schedule a consultation — or read the companion pages first: federal firearm rights restoration for the § 925(c) program, what a pardon does not do for the limits of executive relief, and gun rights restoration for the overview.

Frequently Asked Questions About Restoration in Your State

Reviewed for legal accuracy by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney·September 2026