Federal Compassionate Release Attorney

By Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., and Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA

What is federal compassionate release and who may qualify?

Compassionate release is a federal court order under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) reducing a prison sentence — often to time served — when “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant it, the person is not a danger to the community, and the sentencing factors support release. Terminal illness, serious medical decline, advanced age, and the loss of a family caregiver are the recognized grounds.

Key takeaways on federal compassionate release

• The motion goes to the sentencing judge, not the parole board and not the warden. After the First Step Act of 2018, a person in federal custody may file directly in the district court that sentenced them. In fiscal year 2025, 369 of the 394 motions granted — 93.7% — were filed by the defendant, not by the Bureau of Prisons (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 5).
• You must ask the warden first. The court cannot act until the person has either fully exhausted BOP administrative appeals or 30 days have passed since the warden received the request, whichever is earlier (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Failure to exhaust was cited 447 times as a reason for denial in FY2025.
• The odds are real but sober. Courts granted 394 of 2,795 motions decided in fiscal year 2025 — a 14.1% grant rate. Through the first half of FY2026 the rate was essentially unchanged at 14.0% (125 of 894).
• Where you were sentenced matters enormously. In FY2025 the Ninth Circuit granted 31.0% of these motions and the Eighth Circuit granted 4.9% — a more than sixfold spread on the same statute (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 3).
• Two Supreme Court decisions in May 2026 closed off two common arguments. A sentence made longer by a law Congress later changed but did not make retroactive is no longer a qualifying reason (Rutherford), and a claim that the conviction itself was wrong belongs in a § 2255 motion, not here (Fernandez).
• Rehabilitation alone is never enough — Congress said so in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) — but it was still the single most-cited reason courts gave when they did grant relief in FY2025, in combination with something else.

What Is Compassionate Release?

Compassionate release is the shorthand name for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A federal sentence is normally final: “The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,” the statute says, before listing a handful of exceptions. This is one of them. A district judge may “reduce the term of imprisonment” — and may replace the unserved portion with supervised release or probation — if extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction. Not everyone in federal custody can use it, and the exclusions are collected on our page on who is not eligible for compassionate release.

Three points about the name, because all three confuse people.

It is not only for the dying. The phrase “compassionate release” comes from the heading Congress gave § 603(b) of the First Step Act, and the Supreme Court has said that name “highlights its focus on granting mercy rather than righting legal wrongs” (Fernandez, slip op. at 11). But the statute’s own text reaches well past terminal illness. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement lists serious medical conditions that fall short of terminal, functional and cognitive impairment, aging-related decline, advanced age combined with time served, four categories of family caregiving crisis, and abuse suffered in custody.

It is not a release valve for a sentence you think was unfair. After May 2026, that distinction is sharper than it used to be. The Court described the heartland of the statute as “age, illness, a child left with no guardian” — reasons that “bear no resemblance to the grounds for relief under § 2255” (Fernandez, slip op. at 13).

It results in a modified sentence, not a vacated conviction. If the motion succeeds, the conviction stands. Only the length of the prison term changes. Most people released this way serve a term of supervised release afterward, on conditions the judge sets.

The word “extraordinary” carries weight the everyday sense of the word does not. The Court took its definition from Webster’s Third: “most unusual,” “far from common,” “having little or no precedent.” “Compelling” means “tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence.” And critically, whether a reason is compelling depends on what it is offered to justify. The Court’s own illustration: “a 25th wedding anniversary is a convincing reason to shorten a business trip, but it is not a convincing reason to shorten a prison sentence” (Fernandez, slip op. at 10).

For a fuller treatment of terminology and history, see our page on the compassionate release definition, and for the plain-language version written for families, what is a compassionate release.

What Qualifies as “Extraordinary and Compelling” Circumstances?

Six categories are written into the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement, USSG § 1B1.13(b). The policy statement says extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of them “or a combination thereof” — so a case that is weak in one category can be built from several. Because the sixth category, § 1B1.13(b)(6), is still printed in the Manual and is now partly invalid, it has its own page: unusually long sentence.

Medical circumstances, § 1B1.13(b)(1). Four separate paths:

• (A) Terminal illness — “a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory.” The guideline is explicit that “[a] specific prognosis of life expectancy… is not required,” and names metastatic solid-tumor cancer, ALS, end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia as examples. Do not let a facility tell a family that a six-month prognosis is required. It is not.
• (B) Serious physical or medical condition, serious functional or cognitive impairment, or deteriorating health from aging that “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility” and from which recovery is not expected. The self-care element is where most of these motions are actually won or lost.
• (C) A condition requiring long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided, leaving the person at risk of serious deterioration or death. This is the provision aimed squarely at BOP’s failure to treat, and it does not require that the condition itself be terminal or disabling.
• (D) Infectious-disease outbreak or declared public health emergency at the facility, combined with personal risk factors and an inability to mitigate that risk in time. All three conditions must be met.

Age, § 1B1.13(b)(2). Three requirements, all of which must be satisfied: at least 65 years old; experiencing “a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process”; and having served “at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.”

Family circumstances, § 1B1.13(b)(3). Four sub-categories: (A) death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the person’s minor child, or of an adult child incapable of self-care; (B) incapacitation of a spouse or registered partner where the defendant would be the only available caregiver; (C) incapacitation of a parent, same condition; and (D) the same situation involving another immediate family member — expressly including a grandchild, grandparent, or sibling — or someone whose relationship is similar in kind.

Victim of abuse in custody, § 1B1.13(b)(4). Sexual abuse involving a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2), or physical abuse causing serious bodily injury, committed by or at the direction of a correctional officer, a BOP employee or contractor, or anyone else with custody or control. The misconduct must ordinarily be established by a criminal conviction, a civil finding or admission of liability, or an administrative finding — unless those proceedings are unduly delayed or the person is in imminent danger.

Other reasons, § 1B1.13(b)(5). Any other circumstance, alone or combined with the categories above, that is “similar in gravity” to them.

Unusually long sentence, § 1B1.13(b)(6). This one requires a warning. The provision still appears in the printed Guidelines Manual, and it is now partly invalid — see the next section.

Medical grounds carry more of these motions than any other category, and the proof problems are specific enough to need their own treatment — see compassionate release medical condition.

Two structural rules cut across all six. First, 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) forbids treating “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone” as an extraordinary and compelling reason, though § 1B1.13(d) permits weighing it in combination with other circumstances — and in practice courts do exactly that. Second, § 1B1.13(e) makes clear that a reason “need not have been unforeseen at the time of sentencing.” A judge who knew about the illness at sentencing is not thereby barred from acting on how much worse it has become.

Applied Insight — Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, Managing Director: Families almost always lead with the diagnosis. Courts respond to the function. The question a judge is answering under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) is not how frightening the condition sounds — it is whether this person can still bathe, dress, move, eat, and get to pill line inside a federal facility. What moves the needle is a record built out of BOP’s own documents: the Activities of Daily Living assessment, the Care Level designation, the chronic-care clinic notes, the medical duty status, the housing accommodations the institution has already made. When the Bureau’s own paperwork says a person needs help to function, that is far more persuasive than an outside letter saying the same thing.

What the Supreme Court’s 2026 Decisions Changed

On May 28, 2026 the Supreme Court decided two compassionate release cases and narrowed the statute in both. Any page, packet, or advice written before that date is out of step with the law. Both decisions, their reservations, and the follow-on circuit law are covered in full on our page on rutherford v united states.

Rutherford v. United States, decided with Carter v. United States, held that a sentencing disparity created by a change Congress chose not to make retroactive cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason. Daniel Rutherford and Johnnie Carter were serving stacked sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) — a 32-year minimum and a 57-year minimum — imposed under a regime the First Step Act later abolished for first-time offenders but did not apply retroactively. They argued the resulting gap between their sentences and what they would receive today was itself extraordinary and compelling.

The Court disagreed, and the reasoning matters more than the result. Nonretroactive amendments are “the norm,” not an extraordinary event: “Such a disparity is an unexceptional feature of a system in which nonretroactivity is the default.” And Congress’s deliberate choice to leave those sentences alone cannot be a compelling reason to undo them. The holding is stated in the disjunctive: the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) “considered by itself or in combination with other factors—cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release. To the extent that it counsels otherwise, the Commission’s policy statement is invalid” (slip op. at 16).

That last sentence is aimed at § 1B1.13(b)(6). The Sentencing Commission added the “Unusually Long Sentence” category in 2023 as part of Amendment 814, and it became the second most-cited reason courts gave for granting relief — 98 citations in FY2024 and 80 in FY2025. It is still printed in the current Guidelines Manual. The Commission has not amended it, and the only § 1B1.13 change effective November 1, 2026 is a renaming of the Bureau of Prisons. A reader who looks up the guideline today will find a provision the Supreme Court has held invalid in significant part, with nothing on the page to say so.

Fernandez v. United States closed a different door. Joe Fernandez, serving a life sentence for murder for hire, had lost his direct appeal and a first § 2255 motion (a second vacated only his firearms count) before filing a compassionate release motion arguing that he was innocent. The district court granted it. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s reversal: “A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not 18 U.S.C. § 3582.”

The line the Court drew is between what happened at trial and what is happening now: “When a prisoner moves for compassionate release based on a terminal illness, his motion does not suggest that his conviction is invalid. But if a prisoner moves for relief because of alleged problems with the underlying criminal investigation or trial, his motion suggests that his conviction is flawed” (slip op. at 14–15). If the argument is that the jury got it wrong, the prosecutor hid evidence, or trial counsel failed, that argument belongs in a § 2255 motion — see our page on post-conviction deadlines, because § 2255 carries a one-year limit that § 3582 does not.

What the Court did not decide

Two reservations in Rutherford matter, and most commentary has missed them.

• “We need not decide whether there are reasons beyond personal circumstances that could qualify as ‘extraordinary and compelling.'” Slip op. at 10–11. The Court described medical condition, age, and family circumstances as the historical heartland. It did not declare them exhaustive.
• “We need not nail down the precise boundaries of the phrase ‘extraordinary and compelling.'” Slip op. at 16.

And Rutherford footnote 3 states that the 2023 amendment’s victim-of-abuse provision “is not at issue in today’s cases.” § 1B1.13(b)(4) survives untouched — which matters a great deal to people harmed in custody. See victims of sexual abuse lawyer.

How the lower courts have read it since

The early returns are broad, not narrow. In United States v. Hall, No. 24-6094 (6th Cir. June 25, 2026), a published decision reversing a grant, the Sixth Circuit held that Rutherford’s logic is not confined to § 1B1.13(b)(6): where binding circuit precedent has already construed the statute to foreclose a ground, “the Commission’s policy statement ‘must land within the statutory goalposts,’ as defined by our precedent” — so the “other reasons” catch-all in (b)(5) could not carry it either. That holding is Sixth-Circuit-specific, and the broader textual reading of “similar in gravity” appears in a separate concurrence rather than in the per curiam opinion. In United States v. Chineag, No. 25-10557 (11th Cir. July 2, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit applied Rutherford to a nonretroactive Controlled Substances Act change rather than a § 924(c) change, and rejected an attempt to stack unrelated factors under (b)(5) as not “similar in gravity” to the listed categories. In United States v. Loggins, Nos. 24-1488 and 24-1569 (8th Cir. July 10, 2026), the Eighth Circuit read Rutherford as confirming its own prior rule.

We have not found a published decision holding that a non-§ 924(c) “unusually long sentence” theory survives. Anyone telling a family otherwise is reading the case optimistically.

Applied Insight — Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney: The practical effect of May 28, 2026 is that the sentence-focused motion is largely finished and the person-focused motion is what remains. For three years a great many filings led with the length of the sentence and treated the client’s health as supporting detail. That order now has to reverse. If a motion cannot survive having every sentencing-law argument struck from it, it is not yet a compassionate release motion. What it does not mean is that a long sentence has become irrelevant: § 1B1.13(c) still allows a change in the law to inform how much of a reduction is warranted once eligibility is established on other grounds, and the two Rutherford reservations quoted above were deliberate. The place to make that argument is at step two, not step one.

The Legal Framework for Compassionate Release

A compassionate release motion is decided in two distinct steps, and conflating them is the most common analytical error we see in denied pro se filings. Each of the § 3553(a) factors, and what evidence speaks to it, is covered on our page on the 3553(a) factors.

Step one is eligibility, and it is a gate. The court must find that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction. This determination does not involve weighing the § 3553(a) factors at all. As the Supreme Court put it in Rutherford, relying on Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010): “Before determining the extent of a reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors, a court must first ensure that a movant is part of the ‘limited class of prisoners’ who are ‘eligibl[e]’ for such a reduction.” A person who does not clear this gate never reaches step two.

Step two is discretion. If the gate is cleared, the court then considers the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) — the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence to reflect seriousness, afford deterrence, protect the public, and provide treatment. The statute says the court “may” reduce the sentence. It does not say “shall.” As the Sixth Circuit put it in United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020), “[e]ven if those conditions are met… a district court may still deny relief if it finds that the applicable § 3553(a) factors do not justify it.”

That second step is where most motions actually die. In fiscal year 2025 courts cited the § 3553(a) factors 1,260 times as a reason for denial — nearly a quarter of all denial reasons given, and more than twice the next most common (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 11). How individual judges weigh those factors on a sentence they themselves imposed is its own subject: see what do judges consider when sentencing.

A court may skip straight to step two. Several circuits hold that a judge who denies on § 3553(a) grounds alone need never decide whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. The Second Circuit stated it cleanly in United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2021): when a court denies “in sole reliance on the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors, it need not determine whether the defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Accord United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278 (9th Cir. 2021). This is why a motion that only proves illness is a motion that has done half the work.

There is a third finding. USSG § 1B1.13(a)(2) requires the court to determine that “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)” — the same factors that govern pretrial detention: the nature of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the person’s history and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger release would pose.

The standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion, which is deferential — but not empty. A denial resting on “a purely legal mistake” can be reversed (Ruffin), and so can one resting on a mistaken fact or no explanation at all. The Fourth Circuit vacated a denial in United States v. Swartz, No. 25-6090 (4th Cir. Nov. 3, 2025) (unpublished), because the district court rejected a caregiver claim on the belief that the defendant’s wife was still available to care for their disabled adult son — she had recently died. The Third Circuit vacated in United States v. Traumann, No. 23-2985 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2024) (not precedential), where a brief order left it unclear whether the court had read the 166 pages of medical records filed the same day, making the ruling “essentially unreviewable.” And the First Circuit vacated in United States v. Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th 79 (1st Cir. 2023), holding that where a denial implies the crime of conviction is a categorical bar, “no such categorical bar currently exists”. Whether a judge explained the ruling is often the whole appeal — see compassionate release denial.

Who Is Eligible for Compassionate Release?

Eligibility has four moving parts: who may file, whether the BOP request requirement has been satisfied, whether a recognized extraordinary and compelling reason exists, and whether the § 3142(g) danger finding and the § 3553(a) factors permit relief. The table below states each one, its source, and what it means in practice. That finding has its own body of law, covered on our page on danger to the community.

Federal compassionate release: eligibility and process at a glance

Element	The rule	Source	What it means in practice
Who may file	The BOP Director, or the defendant personally, in the district court that imposed the sentence	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)	Defendant-filed motions are the whole ballgame: 369 of 394 grants in FY2025 (93.7%); the BOP Director filed 16 (4.1%)
Who may not	State prisoners housed in BOP facilities, D.C. Code offenders in federal institutions, and pre-November 1, 1987 offenders with non-parolable sentences — as to BOP-initiated motions	28 C.F.R. § 571.64	Confirm the sentence is a federal § 3582 sentence before anything else. D.C. Code felony sentences have their own compassionate release statute, D.C. Code § 24-403.04, and BOP policy now processes requests under it (PS 5050.51 § 8)
Threshold requirement	Full exhaustion of BOP administrative appeals, or 30 days from the warden’s receipt of the request, whichever is earlier	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)	Not jurisdictional, but mandatory when the government raises it: Alam, 960 F.3d 831 (6th Cir. 2020); Franco, 973 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2020). Cited 447 times as a denial reason in FY2025
What the BOP request must contain	The extraordinary or compelling circumstances relied on, and proposed release plans — where the person will live, how they will support themselves, and for health-based requests where treatment will be received and how it will be paid for	28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a)	A request missing the release plan can be treated as not properly made. Write it as if it were the motion
Ground 1 — Terminal illness	“A serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory.” No specific life-expectancy prognosis required	USSG § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A)	28 citations among FY2025 grants. BOP’s policy no longer states an 18-month prognosis: PS 5050.51 § 4.a (Sept. 3, 2026) uses the guideline’s end-of-life-trajectory wording. BOP’s screen is its internal filter, not the court’s test
Ground 2 — Serious medical condition	A serious physical, medical, functional, or cognitive condition, or aging-related decline, that “substantially diminishes the ability… to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility” and from which recovery is not expected	USSG § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)	The most-cited medical ground: 71 citations among FY2025 grants
Ground 3 — Care not provided	A condition requiring long-term or specialized care that is not being provided, risking serious deterioration or death	USSG § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C)	12 citations among FY2025 grants. Requires proof of the gap in care, not just the diagnosis
Ground 4 — Age	65 or older and serious deterioration from aging and at least 10 years or 75% of the sentence served, whichever is less	USSG § 1B1.13(b)(2)	All three required. 16 citations among FY2025 grants
Ground 5 — Family circumstances	Death or incapacitation of the caregiver of a minor child or disabled adult child; incapacitation of a spouse, registered partner, or parent where the defendant is the only available caregiver; or the same as to another immediate family member, including a grandchild, grandparent, or sibling	USSG § 1B1.13(b)(3)	“Only available caregiver” is the contested element in nearly every one of these. Care for a parent was the most-cited family ground in FY2025 (23 citations). BOP’s own policy no longer lists any caregiver ground as a reason it will move for relief (PS 5050.51, Sept. 3, 2026), but the court still applies § 1B1.13(b)(3) once the 30 days have run or BOP appeals are exhausted
Ground 6 — Abuse in custody	Sexual abuse involving a “sexual act” under 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2), or physical abuse causing serious bodily injury, by staff or anyone with custody or control	USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4)	Ordinarily must be established by a criminal conviction, civil finding or admission, or administrative finding — unless proceedings are unduly delayed or the person is in imminent danger. Unaffected by Rutherford (footnote 3)
Ground 7 — Other reasons	Any other circumstance, alone or combined with the above, “similar in gravity”	USSG § 1B1.13(b)(5)	Narrowed in practice after Hall (6th Cir. 2026): the catch-all cannot carry a ground that binding circuit precedent has already construed the statute to foreclose
Ground 8 — Unusually long sentence	Still printed at § 1B1.13(b)(6): unusually long sentence, 10+ years served, nonretroactive change in law producing a gross disparity	USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6)	Invalid to the extent it makes a nonretroactive change a qualifying reason — Rutherford (2026). Do not build a motion on it
Rehabilitation	Never sufficient standing alone	28 U.S.C. § 994(t); USSG § 1B1.13(d)	Still the most-cited reason overall among FY2025 grants (95 citations) — always alongside another ground
Danger finding	The court must find the defendant “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)”	USSG § 1B1.13(a)(2)	Disciplinary history, offense conduct, and the release plan all bear on this
Final discretionary step	The § 3553(a) factors must support the reduced sentence	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)	The single largest cause of denial: 1,260 citations in FY2025
Foreseeability	A reason “need not have been unforeseen at the time of sentencing”	USSG § 1B1.13(e)	Overrides the older BOP regulation’s “could not reasonably have been foreseen” language for court motions
Typical timeline	30 days minimum before filing; then briefing and decision in the district court	§ 3582(c)(1)(A); local practice	Realistically several months from the warden request to a ruling; expedited in documented terminal cases

Nothing in the statute imposes a minimum amount of time served as a general matter. The 10-year and 75% thresholds appear only in the age category at § 1B1.13(b)(2) and in the now-troubled § 1B1.13(b)(6). Nor is there a categorical bar based on offense type — Quirós-Morales is explicit about that — though offense conduct bears heavily on both the danger finding and § 3553(a). In FY2025, drug trafficking accounted for 46.4% of the individuals granted relief, robbery 16.2%, and firearms offenses 13.3%; no child-pornography defendant was granted relief that year (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 8).

There is also a separate statutory route almost nobody qualifies for: § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) permits a reduction where the defendant is at least 70, has served at least 30 years on a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) — the federal three-strikes provision — and the BOP Director has determined the person is not a danger. Because it requires a § 3559(c) sentence and a Director determination, it is not a practical path for most people. For the age-based arguments that actually work, see compassionate release for elderly inmates.

Do I Have to Ask the Warden First? The 30-Day Rule

Yes. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a defendant-filed motion only “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.”

Two routes, and the second is the one most people use. Submit a written request to the warden; count 30 days from the date the warden received it; file. For someone in a residential reentry center or on home confinement, BOP policy treats the Residential Reentry Manager as the warden, and the request must explain why a reduction is warranted despite the prerelease placement (PS 5050.51 § 3). 28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a) sets what the request must contain — the circumstances relied on, and a release plan covering residence, financial support, and, for health-based requests, where treatment will be delivered and how it will be paid for.

Courts have uniformly held the requirement is not jurisdictional but is a mandatory claim-processing rule the government can insist on: Alam, 960 F.3d 831 (6th Cir. 2020); Franco, 973 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2020); Saladino, 7 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2021) (also holding the government may waive or forfeit it). The Eighth Circuit has held there are no equitable exceptions — futility will not excuse it. United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082 (8th Cir. 2021).

One unsettled point is worth knowing before you draft the warden request: whether the grounds raised with the warden must match the grounds raised in court. The Seventh Circuit says yes (United States v. Williams, 987 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2021)); the Fourth Circuit says no (United States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262 (4th Cir. 2022)). Until that is resolved, the safe course everywhere is to put every ground in the warden request.

The mechanics — what to write, how the BOP routes the request internally, what a warden denial does and does not open up, and how the BP-9/BP-10/BP-11 sequence interacts with all of this — belong on our dedicated page: compassionate release request to warden.

How the First Step Act Changed Compassionate Release

Before December 21, 2018, a compassionate release motion could reach a court only “upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” If the BOP declined to file — and it declined nearly always — there was no court to go to. Section 603(b) of the First Step Act changed one clause of § 3582(c)(1)(A) and, with it, who controls the courthouse door. A defendant may now file directly once the request requirement is satisfied.

The scale of that shift is visible in the data. Of the 394 motions granted in FY2025, 369 came from the defendant and 16 from the BOP Director (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 5).

The Act also added 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d), a set of duties the BOP owes people who are dying. For a defendant diagnosed with a terminal illness — defined in § 3582(d)(1) as “a disease or condition with an end-of-life trajectory” — the Bureau must notify the person’s attorney, partner, and family within 72 hours of the diagnosis and tell them they may file a request on the person’s behalf; provide in-person visitation within 7 days; assist in preparing the request on request; and process the request within 14 days. Section 3582(d)(2)(C) requires the BOP to post notice of these rights in inmate handbooks, law libraries, and medical and hospice units. Section 3582(d)(3) requires an annual report to Congress that includes the time elapsed from the warden’s receipt to a final decision and the number of prisoners who died while a request was pending.

What the First Step Act did not do is loosen the substantive standard. In Fernandez, the Supreme Court described the Bureau’s changed role — “from exclusive filer to initial evaluator” — and noted that even the petitioner agreed that shift “did not change the substantive standard applicable to compassionate release motions” (slip op. at 11–12). Rutherford, decided the same day, held that “[w]hile the terms ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ leave room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any consideration” (slip op. at 11). Older descriptions of the Act as encouraging judges “to interpret ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ broadly” no longer state the law accurately.

The Act’s other early-release machinery — earned time credits, the risk and needs assessment, expanded home confinement — runs on entirely different statutes and does not touch § 3582. For how those interact with a compassionate release strategy, see compassionate release first step act and First Step Act time credits.

What Evidence Is Needed to Support a Compassionate Release Motion?

A compassionate release motion is an evidentiary filing, not a letter. The judge reading it sentenced this person years ago and knows nothing about what has happened since. Everything that has changed must be proved on paper. The release plan has enough moving parts to need its own treatment: see the compassionate release plan.

Medical proof. Complete BOP health records, not a summary — chronic care clinic notes, consultation reports, imaging, labs, medication administration records, and the Health Services clinical encounters. Add the institutional documents that describe function rather than diagnosis: the Care Level assignment, Activities of Daily Living assessments, medical duty status and work restrictions, and any assistive-device or housing accommodations. Where the claim is that care is not being provided under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C), the proof is the gap itself: the referral made and never scheduled, the surgery approved and never performed, the specialist appointment postponed four times. An independent physician’s review of those records, addressing prognosis and the capacity for self-care in a correctional setting, does work that no BOP record does. In FY2025, insufficient proof of a serious medical condition was cited 352 times as a denial reason, and “able to provide self-care in prison” 260 times (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 11). Those two lines are the entire medical fight.

Family and caregiver proof. Where the ground is § 1B1.13(b)(3), documentation must establish both the incapacitation and the absence of an alternative. Death certificates, hospital and physician records for the incapacitated caregiver, guardianship or custody orders, school and social-services records for the child, and declarations from every family member who might be thought capable of stepping in, explaining specifically why they cannot. The Fourth Circuit affirmed a denial where two adult sons were also available to care for an ill spouse. “Other care available for minor child” was cited 142 times as a denial reason in FY2025. See caregiver compassionate release.

Institutional record. SENTRY reports, the inmate discipline record, program and education transcripts, work evaluations, FSA risk and needs assessment history, and any letters from unit staff, chaplains, or program coordinators. This evidence does not establish eligibility on its own — § 994(t) forbids that — but it is what answers the danger finding and much of § 3553(a). Post-sentencing conduct was cited 55 times as a reason for denial in FY2025.

Release plan. Named residence with the address and a letter from whoever owns or rents it; a confirmed medical provider with an intake appointment where possible; insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, or VA coverage documented; income, disability benefits, or family support identified; and transportation from the facility. 28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a)(2) requires this at the BOP stage, and judges want it in the motion. A plan naming a specific hospice, a specific bed, and a specific date is a different document from one that says the family will provide care.

Support letters. Few and specific beats many and generic. A letter that says what the writer will personally do — drive to dialysis three times a week, provide a room, employ the person — is evidence. A letter saying someone is a good person is not.

Applied Insight — Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney: The motions that succeed read like a medical chart with a legal argument attached, not a legal argument with medical records attached. We build the timeline first — every clinical encounter, every referral, every missed appointment, in date order — and only then decide which subsection of § 1B1.13 the facts actually fit. Often it is not the one the family assumed. A case the family describes as terminal cancer sometimes proves out most strongly under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C), because what the record documents is not the prognosis but a six-month delay in getting to the oncologist.

How Often Is Compassionate Release Granted?

Courts granted 394 of the 2,795 motions decided in fiscal year 2025 — a 14.1% grant rate. Through the first half of fiscal year 2026 the rate was 14.0% (125 of 894 motions decided). The rate has sat in a narrow band since the pandemic ended. The full circuit and district breakdown, updated as the Commission publishes it, is on our page on the compassionate release grant rate.

Fiscal year	Motions decided	Granted	Grant rate
FY2020–FY2022 (combined, as published)	27,789	4,502	16.2%
FY2023	3,140	432	13.8%
FY2024	3,015	481	16.0%
FY2025	2,795	394	14.1%
FY2026, first two quarters	894	125	14.0%

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission Compassionate Release Data Reports, Tables 2–3 of each report. The FY2020–22 figures are the Commission’s published three-year aggregate; it did not publish single-year totals for those years.

The story in that table is volume, not rate. More than 15,000 motions were decided in FY2021 alone at the height of the COVID-19 emergency (the report’s footnotes count 2,052 grants and 13,255 denials that year); FY2025 saw fewer than 2,800. COVID-19 was cited as a reason for granting relief 1,304 times in FY2020 and 3 times in FY2025.

Geography is the largest single variable a family cannot control. In FY2025 the grant rate ran from 31.0% in the Ninth Circuit (72 of 232) to 4.9% in the Eighth (26 of 528). The Second Circuit granted 27.1%, the Tenth 20.8%, the Eleventh 16.8%, the Fourth 14.2%, the Third 12.6%, the Fifth 9.9%, the Sixth 8.9%, and the Seventh 8.1%. District-level variation is wider still: the District of Maryland granted 31.6% of 95 motions while the Southern District of Iowa granted none of 81. Motions are decided by the sentencing court, so this is set by where the case was prosecuted — not by where the person is now imprisoned. For what that means in one of the harder circuits, see compassionate release texas.

What courts actually credit. Among the 631 reasons courts gave for the 394 grants in FY2025: rehabilitation in combination with something else (95), the unusually-long-sentence provision now curtailed by Rutherford (80), serious physical or medical condition (71), multiple § 924(c) penalties (45), terminal illness (28), care for a parent (23), young age at the time of the offense (19), care for a minor or disabled child (18), and age 65 with deteriorating health (16).

Two figures in that list are about to fall out of it. The 80 citations to § 1B1.13(b)(6) and the 45 to multiple § 924(c) penalties describe grants made under a reading of the statute the Supreme Court rejected in May 2026. Any assessment of the odds built on FY2024 or FY2025 data overstates what is available today, because roughly a fifth of the reasons courts were giving for granting relief are no longer available reasons.

Who gets relief. The average age at the time of decision was 51 for those granted and 47 for those denied. Half of the people granted relief in FY2025 were serving sentences of 20 years or more. Criminal history category VI accounted for 35.7% of grants — a long record is not disqualifying.

How Long Does the Compassionate Release Process Take?

There is no statutory deadline for a court to rule, and the honest answer is months rather than weeks. Every stage, who controls it, and which deadlines are real is set out on our page on how long does compassionate release take. The sequence:

1. Request to the warden. Delivered in writing; considered submitted when received by the warden. The clock starts here.
2. 30 days. The earliest a defendant-filed motion can go in under the lapse route. If the BOP responds sooner and denies, the other route — full administrative exhaustion — may be shorter or longer depending on the circuit; either way, 30 days from receipt is available.
3. Motion filed in the sentencing court, with exhibits.
4. Government response, typically 14 to 30 days depending on the district’s local rules and any extension.
5. Reply, where permitted.
6. Decision, usually on the papers. Hearings are uncommon.
7. If granted, the BOP releases “forthwith” once the amended judgment issues (28 C.F.R. § 571.62(b)).

Two accelerators exist. In documented terminal cases, § 3582(d)(2)(A)(iv) requires the BOP to process a request within 14 days, and 28 C.F.R. § 571.62(c) directs staff to “expedite the request at all levels” where the basis is medical. Courts will also expedite briefing on a showing that the person’s condition is deteriorating — but only if someone asks and documents why.

The BOP’s internal review chain runs Warden → Office of General Counsel → the Medical Director or the Assistant Director for Correctional Programs → the Director, and no regulation sets a deadline for the warden’s decision or for General Counsel review. The only enforceable clock in the entire process is the statutory 30 days. That is the practical argument for filing on day 31 rather than waiting for an answer.

Compassionate Release Compared With the Other Ways Out

Compassionate release is one of several mechanisms that can shorten federal custody, and they are frequently confused with each other. They come from different statutes, go to different decision-makers, and answer different questions. Because § 2255 carries a one-year deadline that § 3582 does not, the choice between them matters; we cover it on our page on compassionate release vs 2255.

Mechanism	Who decides	What it requires	What it changes
Compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)	The sentencing judge	Extraordinary and compelling reasons; no danger; § 3553(a) support	Reduces the sentence itself, often to time served
Retroactive guideline amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)	The sentencing judge	A Sentencing Commission amendment made retroactive that lowers the applicable range	Reduces the sentence within the new range
§ 2255 motion	The sentencing judge	A constitutional or jurisdictional defect in the conviction or sentence; one-year limit	Vacates or corrects the conviction or sentence — the only route for a validity challenge after Fernandez
Direct appeal	The court of appeals	Preserved legal error, raised within 14 days of judgment	Reverses or remands — see federal appeals
First Step Act earned time credits	The BOP	Program participation and a qualifying risk level	Advances release to supervision or RRC; does not change the sentence — see First Step Act time credits
RDAP early release, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)	The BOP	Completion of the residential drug abuse program; a qualifying offense	Up to 12 months off — see RDAP
Home confinement / RRC, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)	The BOP	Placement discretion near the end of the term	Changes where the term is served — see home confinement
Commutation or pardon	The President	Clemency petition through the Office of the Pardon Attorney	Commutation shortens the sentence; a pardon forgives it — see federal clemency

The right question is rarely “which one” but “which first, and does filing one damage another.” A § 2255 motion has a one-year clock that a compassionate release motion does not; that ordering can matter a great deal. For a fuller comparison of these routes, see compassionate release attorneys.

What Happens if the Court Grants Compassionate Release?

A grant does not always mean walking out that afternoon, and families should know the range before they get their hopes fixed on one outcome.

Reduction to time served. The most common result. The court reduces the term to the time already served and orders release. Under 28 C.F.R. § 571.62(b), the warden “shall release the inmate forthwith” — in practice, once the amended judgment reaches the institution and Records has processed it, typically a few days.

Reduction to a shorter term. The court may cut the sentence without ending it — twenty years to twelve, for example. The person stays in custody on the shorter term. This is common where the § 3553(a) factors support some relief but not release.

Reduction plus added supervision. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) expressly permits the court to “impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment.” A judge uneasy about release can convert the remaining prison time into supervised release — frequently with home detention or location monitoring as a condition. This is the mechanism behind what people loosely call “release to home confinement” on a compassionate release motion, and it is a court-imposed condition of supervision, not the BOP home-confinement program under § 3624(c).

Conditions. Expect the standard conditions of supervised release plus conditions tailored to the grounds of the motion: compliance with a treatment regimen, residence at a named address, reporting to a specific provider, restrictions on travel. Violating them can send the person back. Where release was granted so a person could care for a child, the court can make providing that care a condition of supervision — and failure to provide it a violation.

Restitution, forfeiture, and fines survive. A reduced sentence does not disturb the financial components of the judgment. So do immigration consequences: a non-citizen released early may be transferred to ICE custody rather than to a home address.

The government may appeal. A grant is not final until the appeal window closes, and the government does appeal — United States v. Hall (6th Cir. 2026) is a 2026 example of a grant reversed on the government’s appeal.

If the motion is denied, denial is ordinarily without prejudice as to a later motion resting on changed circumstances, and a new motion generally requires a new request to the warden. Appeal is to the court of appeals for abuse of discretion. Both routes are covered on our page about a compassionate release denial. For when a second filing is permitted and on what terms, see can you file compassionate release twice.

How a Federal Criminal Defense Lawyer Can Help With Your Compassionate Release Case

Most of the work in a compassionate release motion is not legal argument. It is assembling a record that does not yet exist, from an institution that has no obligation to help assemble it, on behalf of someone who cannot make phone calls or gather documents.

What that involves: obtaining the complete BOP medical file rather than the summary a family can request; identifying which subsection of § 1B1.13 the documented facts actually support; drafting a warden request that satisfies 28 C.F.R. § 571.61 and preserves every ground for court, given the unresolved issue-exhaustion split; retaining an independent physician where prognosis or self-care capacity is contested; building a release plan concrete enough to answer the danger finding; briefing § 3553(a) affirmatively rather than defensively, because that is the step that defeats most motions; and knowing the sentencing judge’s and district’s actual record on these motions.

It also means telling a family when the answer is no. After May 2026, a case whose entire theory was the length of the sentence is a case that needs a different vehicle — often a § 2255 motion or a clemency petition — and the sooner that is said, the less time is lost.

Christopher Zoukis leads the firm’s federal prison consulting work: designation, sentence computation, First Step Act credits, RDAP, medical-care advocacy, and reentry planning. The legal work on any compassionate release motion — the filing, the briefing, and any appeal — is handled by Elizabeth Franklin-Best and the firm’s attorneys.

Why work with Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C.

Elizabeth Franklin-Best is the founder and Principal Attorney of Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C., a boutique firm devoted to federal criminal appeals and post-conviction relief. Over more than 20 years she has handled more than 330 federal proceedings, over 100 of them appeals, with sixteen published decisions as counsel of record. She is admitted to the U.S. Supreme Court and twelve of the thirteen U.S. Courts of Appeals — every regional circuit (1st–11th) plus the D.C. Circuit — and has appeared pro hac vice in federal courts from Montana to Florida. She is recognized by Best Lawyers in America 2026 for Appellate Practice and by Chambers USA 2026 for Litigation: White-Collar Crime & Government Investigations, and was named South Carolina Public Defender of the Year in 2010. She is the author of Reversing Your Criminal Conviction: Develop Your Winning Strategy (2023) and serves as Board Chair of Justice 360.

Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, is the firm’s Managing Director and a nationally recognized federal prison expert. He is the author of the Federal Prison Handbook, Directory of Federal Prisons, Prison Education Guide, and College for Convicts, and serves as Chairman of the Board of the Human Rights Defense Center. He has been quoted as a federal prison expert by outlets including CNN, the Associated Press, and The Washington Post. He earned his J.D. at the University of California, Davis School of Law after serving roughly a decade in the federal Bureau of Prisons, where he became an award-winning incarcerated journalist — a combination of formal training and firsthand knowledge that few in federal defense can offer.

The firm runs a national federal practice on an intentionally small caseload, from offices in Columbia and Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. Compassionate release motions are filed in the district that imposed the sentence, wherever in the country that is.

Talk to a federal compassionate release lawyer

If someone in your family is sick, aging badly, or the only person who can care for a child, and you are trying to work out whether the law offers anything, the first useful step is a look at the actual record — the medical file, the sentence, the district, the judge.

Call (843) 620-1100 or schedule a consultation directly. Our federal compassionate release lawyers handle these motions nationwide.

Frequently Asked Questions About Compassionate Release

Reviewed for legal accuracy by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney·September 2026