Can Abuse in Federal Custody Support Compassionate Release?
Yes. USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) makes it an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) that a person, while serving the sentence they ask the court to reduce, was sexually abused or physically abused by someone who had custody or control over them.
Two definitions do the work. “Sexual abuse” means abuse involving a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) — no injury required. “Physical abuse” qualifies only where it caused “serious bodily injury” as the Commentary to USSG § 1B1.1 defines it. The abuse must ordinarily be established by a criminal conviction, a civil finding or admission of liability, or a finding in an administrative proceeding — unless those proceedings are unduly delayed or the person is in imminent danger. The motion goes to the federal judge who imposed the sentence, after a request to the warden and either 30 days or full exhaustion, whichever comes first.
On this page
Key takeaways on the victim-of-abuse ground
- This is the one ground the Supreme Court expressly did not touch in 2026. Rutherford v. United States (2026), footnote 3, states that the victim-of-abuse provision “is not at issue in today’s cases,” while the same opinion held § 1B1.13(b)(6) invalid to the extent it treats a nonretroactive change in law as a qualifying reason. Every other page in this area needs a caveat about 2026. This one does not.
- “Sexual abuse” in the guideline means a “sexual act,” which is a narrower term than most people assume. Section 1B1.13(b)(4)(A) incorporates the definition at 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2), and expressly includes the conduct described in § 2246(2)(D) — intentional skin-to-skin touching of the genitals with the requisite intent — “regardless of the age of the victim.” Touching over clothing is “sexual contact” under § 2246(3), a different term the guideline does not use.
- The abuser does not have to be a BOP employee. The provision reaches a correctional officer, a Bureau employee or contractor, “or any other individual who had custody or control over the defendant” — which on its face includes contract-facility and residential reentry center staff, and transport personnel.
- The proof requirement is where these motions fail, and the federal data explain why. Among substantiated staff sexual misconduct incidents in prisons from 2016 through 2018, the perpetrator was convicted, pleaded guilty, was sentenced, or was fined in 6% of incidents (BJS Special Report NCJ 304834, Jan. 2023). Of 3,912 concluded BOP investigations into staff-perpetrated sexual abuse from 2014 through 2022, 353 — 9% — were substantiated (GAO-26-107343, May 5, 2026, Table 3).
- Use of the provision is small and has not grown. The victim-of-abuse ground was cited 11 times among the 753 reasons courts gave for the 481 grants in fiscal year 2024, and 5 times among the 631 reasons given for the 394 grants in fiscal year 2025. It does not appear at all in the Commission’s table of reasons for the 125 grants in the first half of fiscal year 2026 (USSC FY2024, FY2025, and FY2026 Q1–Q2 Data Reports, Table 10).
- Proving the abuse is only half the motion. Even after a court finds an extraordinary and compelling reason, it must separately find the person is not a danger under § 1B1.13(a)(2) and that the § 3553(a) factors support release. Those factors were cited 1,260 times as a denial reason in fiscal year 2025 — nearly a quarter of all reasons given.
- You still have to ask the warden first. Failure to exhaust was cited 447 times as a reason for denial in fiscal year 2025. Ask first; count 30 days; then file.
Understanding Compassionate Release for Abuse Victims
Compassionate release is a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) reducing a federal prison sentence — often to time served — when “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant it. The motion goes to the district judge who imposed the sentence, not to the Bureau of Prisons and not to a parole board. For the general framework, see our page on compassionate release. What follows is specific to abuse suffered in custody.
Until November 1, 2023, nothing in the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement addressed abuse in custody at all. Amendment 814 added it. The Third Circuit described the change in Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311 (3d Cir. 2024), as the Commission’s response to a Justice Department suggestion “that a sentence reduction may be appropriate where an individual in BOP custody has been determined to have been the victim of sexual assault perpetrated by BOP personnel.” The same 2023 amendment cycle also raised the punishment for the abuser: Amendment 816 raised the base offense level in USSG § 2A3.3, the guideline for criminal sexual abuse of a ward, from 14 to 18, and extended the guideline to cover criminal sexual abuse of an individual in federal custody under 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c).
The exact text of USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4)
The provision is short, and every clause in it does work. It reads:
Victim of Abuse. — The defendant, while in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced, was a victim of: (A) sexual abuse involving a “sexual act,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) (including the conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(D) regardless of the age of the victim); or (B) physical abuse resulting in “serious bodily injury,” as defined in the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions); that was committed by, or at the direction of, a correctional officer, an employee or contractor of the Bureau of Prisons, or any other individual who had custody or control over the defendant. For purposes of this provision, the misconduct must be established by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding in an administrative proceeding, unless such proceedings are unduly delayed or the defendant is in imminent danger.
Five elements have to line up: the timing (“while in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced”), the conduct (a sexual act, or physical abuse causing serious bodily injury), the actor (someone with custody or control), the proof (one of three formal findings), and — if no formal finding exists — one of the two exceptions.
“Sexual act” is a narrower term than “sexual abuse”
This is the distinction that most often decides whether a motion is viable, and it is the point most often misstated. The guideline does not say “sexual abuse.” It says “sexual abuse involving a ‘sexual act,’ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2).” Section 2246(2) defines a “sexual act” in four subparagraphs covering genital-genital and genital-anal contact, oral-genital and oral-anal contact, penetration of the anal or genital opening by a hand, finger, or object with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or gratify sexual desire, and — in subparagraph (D) — intentional touching of the genitals not through the clothing, with that same intent.
Subparagraph (D) as written in the criminal code applies only where the victim is under 16. The guideline expressly imports it “regardless of the age of the victim.” That single parenthetical materially widens the provision: direct, skin-to-skin genital contact by a staff member, done with the intent the statute describes, is a qualifying sexual act under § 1B1.13(b)(4) even though the person is an adult.
What the guideline does not reach through subparagraph (A) is “sexual contact” as defined at § 2246(3) — touching, “either directly or through the clothing,” of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks. Congress used two different terms and the Commission chose one of them.
Federal criminal law draws the same line, and the difference in exposure shows how deliberate it is. A staff member who engages in a sexual act with a person in official detention commits sexual abuse of a ward under 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b), punishable by up to 15 years — and consent is not a defense, because the statute requires only that the person be in official detention and under the custodial, supervisory, or disciplinary authority of the person engaging. The same staff member who engages in sexual contact falling short of a sexual act commits abusive sexual contact under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(4), punishable by up to two years. The Justice Department has charged both statutes in the same investigation: in one August 2025 pair of guilty pleas arising from the FCI Dublin prosecutions, one former officer pleaded to § 2243(b) and another to § 2244(a)(4) (U.S. Attorney’s Office, N.D. Cal., Aug. 7, 2025).
Conduct that falls outside § 2246(2) is not outside the reach of the law. It is outside the reach of this subsection. It remains actionable under PREA and BOP policy, it can support a Federal Tort Claims Act claim, and it can be presented under the “Other Reasons” provision at § 1B1.13(b)(5), which reaches any circumstance or combination of circumstances “similar in gravity” to the listed categories. It simply does not arrive with the (b)(4) label attached.
“Serious bodily injury” comes from § 1B1.1, not from the criminal code
For the physical-abuse prong, the guideline sends you to the Commentary to USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(L), not to the criminal code. That definition reads: injury “involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” The Commentary adds that serious bodily injury “is deemed to have occurred if the offense involved conduct constituting criminal sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2242 or any similar offense under state law.”
Two practical consequences follow. First, the “requiring medical intervention” clause is a documentary test a medical record can satisfy: a surgery, an inpatient admission, or a course of physical rehabilitation. Second, “protracted impairment of a function of a … mental faculty” is part of the definition itself, which is more precise than the common claim that courts read the term “broadly” to include psychological damage.
Who counts as a person with custody or control
The provision names three categories and closes with a catch-all: “a correctional officer, an employee or contractor of the Bureau of Prisons, or any other individual who had custody or control over the defendant.” The catch-all is doing real work, because a great deal of federal custody is not administered by BOP employees. People in the federal system are held in privately operated contract facilities, in local jails under intergovernmental agreements, in residential reentry centers run by contractors, and in transport operated under contract. On the text, an individual in any of those roles who had custody or control is covered.
The provision also reaches abuse “committed by, or at the direction of,” a covered person — which is how abuse by another incarcerated person can come within it, if the direction can be shown. What the text does not cover is a failure to protect. A warden who ignored warnings has not committed the abuse and has not directed it. That conduct is serious and it has remedies — it is the core of an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim and it bears heavily on the exceptions discussed below — but it is not, standing alone, a (b)(4) predicate.
“While in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced”
The timing clause is a real limit and it is easy to miss. The abuse must have occurred while the person was serving the sentence the motion asks the court to reduce. Abuse suffered in a state prison, in immigration detention, or during a prior federal sentence does not fit the text of (b)(4), however grave. Abuse during pretrial detention on the same case presents a genuine textual question, because a person in pretrial detention is not yet serving a term of imprisonment.
The Ninth Circuit read the subsection consistently with that timing in United States v. Bryant, 144 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2025) (published), describing (b)(4) as addressing “situations in which a defendant was sexually or physically abused by a BOP employee after he began serving his term of imprisonment,” and observing that subsections (b)(1) through (b)(4) “generally refer to circumstances that develop after sentencing.” Bryant was not a (b)(4) case — it held that a defendant’s youth at the time of his offense is not an extraordinary and compelling reason — but its characterization of the subsection is the most useful published appellate language available on it.
Where the abuse falls outside the timing clause, the argument moves to § 1B1.13(b)(5) and to the medical subsections, because untreated trauma that meets the self-care or unprovided-care standards of § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) or (b)(1)(C) is its own qualifying ground. See compassionate release medical condition.
Compassionate Release for Abuse in Custody: Eligibility and Proof at a Glance
Every cell below states the rule and its source. This is the whole of § 1B1.13(b)(4) as a working checklist.
| Element | What the rule requires | Source | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying sexual abuse | Abuse “involving a ‘sexual act,'” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) — genital-genital or genital-anal contact; oral-genital or oral-anal contact; penetration of the anal or genital opening by hand, finger, or object with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or gratify sexual desire | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) | No injury requirement on this prong. The act itself qualifies |
| The age-blind expansion | The guideline includes § 2246(2)(D) conduct — intentional touching of the genitals not through the clothing, with the statutory intent — “regardless of the age of the victim” | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4)(A) | Direct skin-to-skin genital contact by staff qualifies for an adult, even though the criminal code caps that subparagraph at victims under 16 |
| What does not qualify on this prong | “Sexual contact” as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) — touching directly or through clothing of genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks | 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) | Route it to § 1B1.13(b)(5), to a PREA complaint, and to an FTCA claim. It is still misconduct; it is not a (b)(4) predicate |
| Qualifying physical abuse | Physical abuse resulting in “serious bodily injury”: extreme physical pain, or protracted impairment of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or injury “requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation” | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4)(B); USSG § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(L) | The medical-intervention clause is provable from a chart: an operative report, an admission record, a rehabilitation order |
| Deemed serious bodily injury | SBI “is deemed to have occurred if the offense involved conduct constituting criminal sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2242 or any similar offense under state law” | USSG § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(L) | Where forcible conduct is established, the injury element does not have to be separately proved |
| Who the abuser must be | A correctional officer; a BOP employee or contractor; or any other individual who had custody or control over the defendant | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) | Reaches contract-facility staff, residential reentry center staff, contract transport, and jail staff holding federal detainees |
| “Or at the direction of” | Abuse committed by, or at the direction of, a covered person | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) | Abuse by another incarcerated person can qualify if staff direction is shown. A failure to protect is not “direction” |
| Timing | The abuse must have occurred “while in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced” | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) | Abuse on a prior sentence, in state custody, or in immigration detention does not fit this subsection |
| Proof route 1 | A conviction in a criminal case | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) | Rare: in 2016–18, staff perpetrators in substantiated prison incidents were convicted, pleaded guilty, sentenced, or fined in 6% of incidents (BJS NCJ 304834) |
| Proof route 2 | A finding or admission of liability in a civil case | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) | A settlement without an admission is not, on the text, an “admission of liability.” Preserve the FTCA claim early so this route stays open |
| Proof route 3 | A finding in an administrative proceeding | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) | A substantiated PREA determination. Of 3,912 concluded BOP investigations of staff-perpetrated sexual abuse, 2014–2022, 9% were substantiated (GAO-26-107343, Table 3) |
| Exception 1 — undue delay | The proof requirement is excused where “such proceedings are unduly delayed” | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) | Document the delay: the report date, the referral, the quarterly status checks BOP owes under 28 C.F.R. § 115.73(b), and the 12,153 open misconduct cases as of Feb. 2025, ~37% open 3+ years (GAO-25-107339) |
| Exception 2 — imminent danger | The proof requirement is excused where “the defendant is in imminent danger” | USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) | PREA has a matching emergency track: an emergency grievance alleging substantial risk of imminent sexual abuse gets an initial response in 48 hours and a final decision in 5 calendar days (28 C.F.R. § 115.52(f)) |
| Threshold before filing in court | Full exhaustion of BOP administrative appeals or 30 days from the warden’s receipt of the request, whichever is earlier | 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) | Cited 447 times as a denial reason in FY2025 (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 11) |
| Second required finding | The court must find the person “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)” | USSG § 1B1.13(a)(2) | Disciplinary record, offense conduct, and the release plan all bear on this |
| Third required finding | The § 3553(a) sentencing factors must support the reduced sentence | 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) | The largest single cause of denial: 1,260 citations in FY2025 |
| Time served | No minimum. The 10-year and 75% thresholds appear only in the age category at § 1B1.13(b)(2) | USSG § 1B1.13 | BOP’s old 50%/75% screens are gone; PS 5050.51 sets no time-served minimum for its abuse categories (§§ 6–7). BOP’s criteria are not the court’s test |
| Foreseeability | A qualifying reason “need not have been unforeseen at the time of sentencing” | USSG § 1B1.13(e) | Overrides the older BOP regulation’s “could not reasonably have been foreseen” language for court motions |
| Relief available | Reduction of the term, and the court “may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term” | 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); USSG § 1B1.13(a) | Reduction to time served, reduction to a shorter term, or conversion of remaining prison time into supervision |
| Status after Rutherford | Untouched. “The 2023 amendment’s victim-of-abuse provision is not at issue in today’s cases” | Rutherford (2026), n.3 | Unlike § 1B1.13(b)(6), this subsection is fully operative |
Evidence Requirements and Procedural Hurdles
The guideline sets one proof rule and two exceptions to it, and almost every abuse-based motion turns on which of the three you are working within. Read the sentence closely: “the misconduct must be established by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding in an administrative proceeding, unless such proceedings are unduly delayed or the defendant is in imminent danger.”
The three ordinary proof routes
A criminal conviction is the strongest and the least available. It can be the abuser’s conviction at trial or by plea, in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b) or § 2244(a)(4), or a state conviction for an equivalent offense. Where it exists, attach the judgment, the plea agreement or the verdict form, and any factual basis or presentence findings that identify the person as a victim.
A civil finding or admission of liability is the route that requires the most planning, because it depends on a case having been filed. Read the words carefully: a finding of liability, or an admission of liability. A settlement paid without any admission does not obviously satisfy either. That is precisely the posture that reached the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bright, No. 24-10484 (5th Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (unpublished), where the movant argued that her claims of abuse by a correctional officer qualified under § 1B1.13(b)(4) “particularly in light of her receipt of a monetary settlement in a civil lawsuit.” The court never reached the question, because the district court had denied on an independent § 3553(a) ground she did not challenge on appeal. That is the whole holding, and it is a warning about briefing, not a ruling about settlements.
An administrative finding in practice means a substantiated PREA determination. BOP closes every investigation with one of three conclusions — substantiated, unsubstantiated (it may have occurred, but there is insufficient evidence), or unfounded (the evidence proves it could not have happened) — and the agency must tell the person which one it reached, whether or not it is favorable (28 C.F.R. § 115.73(a); PS 5333.01). The governing standard is a preponderance of the evidence, and no higher: 28 C.F.R. § 115.72 provides that the agency “shall impose no standard higher than a preponderance of the evidence.” That regulation matters because BOP has been told, in writing, that its practice fell short of it.
The two exceptions: undue delay and imminent danger
Because formal findings are rare, the exceptions are where most of these motions actually live. Neither is defined in the guideline, which means both are argued from a record.
Undue delay is documented, not asserted. Build the timeline out of the agency’s own obligations: the date the report was made and to whom; the date the allegation was referred; and BOP’s duty, where an outside agency is investigating, to seek a status update “at least once a quarter,” document it, and inform the alleged victim “of any update or lack thereof” (PS 5333.01, implementing 28 C.F.R. § 115.73(b)). Then place that timeline against the systemic record: 12,153 employee misconduct cases open as of February 2025, roughly 37% of them open for three years or longer (GAO-25-107339, Sept. 29, 2025). A backlog is not by itself undue delay in an individual case. A backlog plus a documented individual timeline is an argument.
Imminent danger has a built-in evidentiary path that most filings never use. 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(f) requires the agency to establish an emergency grievance procedure for an allegation that a person “is subject to a substantial risk of imminent sexual abuse,” to forward it immediately to a level of review that can take corrective action, to give an initial response within 48 hours, and to issue a final agency decision within 5 calendar days, documenting its determination and the action taken. Filing that emergency grievance creates a dated federal record of the danger and a dated federal response, which is exactly what a court needs to evaluate the exception. Separately, 28 C.F.R. § 115.62 states flatly that when an agency learns a person “is subject to a substantial risk of imminent sexual abuse, it shall take immediate action to protect the inmate.”
Why the proof routes fail so often — what the federal data show
The Third Circuit anticipated this problem in Kalu, noting that commentators had flagged “potential hurdles that survivors pursuing motions for compassionate release may face … due to the requirement” of a conviction, civil finding, or administrative finding. The government’s own numbers bear that out.
| Measure | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Reported sexual abuse allegations in BOP facilities, 2014–2022 | approx. 8,525 total — 4,325 with a BOP employee as alleged perpetrator, 4,200 with another incarcerated person | GAO-26-107343 (May 5, 2026), Table 1 |
| Concluded BOP investigations of staff-perpetrated sexual abuse, 2014–2022 | 3,912 allegations: 353 substantiated (9%), 3,029 unsubstantiated (77%), 6 unfounded | GAO-26-107343, Table 3 (BOP Office of Internal Affairs data as of March 2025) |
| Concluded investigations where the alleged perpetrator was another incarcerated person, 2014–2022 | 4,200 allegations: 224 substantiated (5%), 3,388 unsubstantiated (81%), 587 unfounded (14%) | GAO-26-107343, Table 2 (BJS Survey of Sexual Victimization data) |
| Criminal outcome for perpetrators of substantiated staff sexual misconduct in prisons, 2016–2018 | convicted, pleaded guilty, sentenced, or fined in 6% of incidents (20% in jails) | BJS Special Report NCJ 304834 (Jan. 2023) |
| Any legal action against the perpetrator of substantiated staff sexual misconduct in prisons | 33% of incidents | BJS NCJ 304834 |
| Open BOP employee misconduct cases of all types, February 2025 | 12,153, about 37% open three years or longer | GAO-25-107339 (Sept. 29, 2025) |
| BOP internal affairs backlog reported to the Senate | approx. 8,000 cases as of late 2022 | Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff Report (Dec. 13, 2022) |
| Federal women’s facilities with documented staff sexual abuse over the prior decade | at least 19 of 29 — two-thirds | PSI Staff Report (Dec. 13, 2022) |
Read together, those rows describe the structural problem the exceptions exist to solve. Roughly one in eleven staff-perpetrated allegations is substantiated; of the substantiated ones, roughly one in seventeen ends in a criminal outcome in a prison. A rule that ordinarily requires one of those outcomes will, most of the time, require the exception instead.
There is a documented reason the substantiation rate is what it is. In October 2022 the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General issued Management Advisory Memorandum 23-001, notifying the BOP Director of “serious concerns” about how the Bureau handles misconduct investigations. The OIG reported being told by BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs that in cases not accepted for criminal prosecution, “the BOP will not rely on inmate testimony to make administrative misconduct findings and take disciplinary action against BOP employees, unless there is evidence aside from inmate testimony that independently establishes the misconduct.” The OIG called that position inconsistent with the fact that such testimony “is fully admissible in criminal and civil cases,” and inconsistent with the PREA regulation requiring credibility to be “assessed on an individual basis” and not “determined by the person’s status as inmate or staff” (28 C.F.R. § 115.71(e)). BOP disputed the characterization. The concurrence in Kalu noted that OIG’s related recommendation — that BOP adopt a policy on handling inmate statements consistent with PREA’s credibility standard — remained unresolved.
Applied Insight — Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, Managing Director: The single most common mistake in these filings is treating “unsubstantiated” as though it meant “disproven.” It does not, and the regulation says so: 28 C.F.R. § 115.71(e) forbids resolving credibility by status and § 115.72 sets a preponderance standard, and BOP’s own manual defines unsubstantiated as “may have occurred, but insufficient evidence to prove.” An unsubstantiated finding is not a (b)(4) administrative finding — but it is documentary proof that a report was made on a date, that an investigation happened, and that the agency did not conclude the event was impossible. Paired with the OIG memorandum on how BOP treats inmate testimony, it becomes part of the undue-delay argument rather than an obstacle to it. What we ask for first is not the conclusion. It is the paper: the Report of Incident, the tracking-log entry, the medical assessment, the psychology intervention note, the retaliation-monitoring form, and the date on each one.
The record a motion has to build
| Document | Where it comes from | What it establishes |
|---|---|---|
| Report of Incident (BP-E583) and PREA tracking log entry (BP-A1181) | BOP records; PS 5333.01 requires an entry for every response level | The date and fact of the report, and that the institution classified it |
| PREA medical assessment and forensic examination records | Health Services; forensic exams are offered without cost under 28 C.F.R. § 115.21(c) | Contemporaneous physical findings; the “medical intervention” element of serious bodily injury |
| Psychology Services Sexual Abuse Intervention note | Required in person within 24 hours of a Level 2 report under PS 5333.01 | A dated clinical record of the disclosure |
| Investigation determination letter | The agency must inform the person of the substantiated / unsubstantiated / unfounded outcome, 28 C.F.R. § 115.73(a) | Proof route 3, or the predicate for an undue-delay argument |
| Notifications about the staff member | Required when a staff member is removed from the unit, leaves the facility, is indicted, or is convicted, 28 C.F.R. § 115.73(c) | Corroboration that the agency acted on the allegation |
| Retaliation monitoring forms (BP-A1176 for inmates; BP-A1175 for staff) | Created by PS 5333.01; minimum 90-day monitoring under 28 C.F.R. § 115.67(c) | Discipline, housing, and program changes after the report — the retaliation record |
| Safeguarding form (BP-A1002) and SHU placement records | PS 5333.01; post-allegation protective custody under 28 C.F.R. § 115.68 | Whether protection came at the cost of segregation |
| Sexual abuse incident review report | Required within about 30 days of the close of every investigation except unfounded ones, 28 C.F.R. § 115.86 | Institutional findings on staffing, sightlines, and camera coverage in the area |
| Facility PREA audit reports | Audits at least once every three years, 28 C.F.R. § 115.401(a) | Compliance history — and, per GAO, a document whose limits should be argued as well as its contents |
| Aggregated agency sexual abuse data | Must be made public at least annually, 28 C.F.R. § 115.89(b) | Facility-level context without any discovery request |
| Investigation reports retained by the agency | Retained “for as long as the alleged abuser is incarcerated or employed by the agency, plus five years,” 28 C.F.R. § 115.71(i) | The records still exist. Ask for them by that regulation |
| Complete BOP medical and mental health file | Health Services; ongoing care for victims is required under 28 C.F.R. § 115.83 | Course of treatment, functional impairment, and any gap in care |
That last regulation is worth naming to a client directly: treatment services for a person victimized by sexual abuse must be provided “without financial cost and regardless of whether the victim names the abuser or cooperates with any investigation” (28 C.F.R. § 115.83(g)). Declining to participate in an investigation does not forfeit care.
Do I Have to Exhaust BOP Remedies Before Filing?
Yes — but the requirement is narrower and faster than most people are told, and the PREA rules change part of it.
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a defendant-filed motion only “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” Two independent routes; the second is the one nearly everyone uses. Submit a written request to the warden, count 30 days from receipt, file. 28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a) sets what the request must contain: the extraordinary or compelling circumstances relied on, and a release plan covering where the person will live, how they will support themselves, and — for health-based requests — where treatment will be delivered and how it will be paid for.
Courts have uniformly held that this requirement is not jurisdictional but is a mandatory claim-processing rule the government can insist on: United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2021) (government may waive or forfeit it). The Eighth Circuit has held there are no equitable exceptions and rejected a futility argument: United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082 (8th Cir. 2021). That last point matters here, because “the warden is the wrong person to ask” is intuitively appealing and is not, in the Eighth Circuit, a reason to skip the step.
PREA changes the grievance rules — but not the § 3582 clock
Two different systems are running at once, and conflating them is a common and costly error.
The compassionate release request is a request to the warden under 28 C.F.R. part 571, subpart G, asking the Bureau to file a motion on the person’s behalf. The 30-day clock in § 3582(c)(1)(A) runs from the warden’s receipt of that request. BOP’s current policy, PS 5050.51 (Sept. 3, 2026), lists sexual abuse, and physical abuse causing serious bodily injury, committed by or at the direction of a Bureau employee, contractor, or volunteer as grounds it will consider if the abuse is substantiated by a criminal conviction, an administrative finding of misconduct, or a civil finding or admission of liability, and it requires wardens to send every such request to the Office of General Counsel (§§ 6–7). A court deciding the motion applies § 1B1.13(b)(4) instead, which also reaches anyone else with custody or control over the person and excuses the proof requirement when proceedings are unduly delayed or the person is in imminent danger.
The PREA grievance is a separate filing about the abuse itself, governed by 28 C.F.R. § 115.52, and it comes with protections the ordinary Administrative Remedy Program does not have:
- No time limit on when a grievance alleging sexual abuse may be submitted, § 115.52(b)(1).
- No informal-resolution step may be required — the agency “shall not require an inmate to use any informal grievance process, or to otherwise attempt to resolve with staff, an alleged incident of sexual abuse,” § 115.52(b)(3). That displaces the ordinary informal-resolution step in 28 C.F.R. § 542.13, commonly called the BP-8.
- The grievance may not be submitted to, or referred to, the staff member who is the subject of the complaint, § 115.52(c).
- A final agency decision on the merits within 90 days of the initial filing, with an extension of up to 70 days on written notice, and a right to treat non-response as a denial at that level, § 115.52(d).
- Third parties may file on the person’s behalf — “fellow inmates, staff members, family members, attorneys, and outside advocates,” § 115.52(e)(1).
- Discipline for filing is permitted only on a showing of bad faith, § 115.52(g), and a good-faith report based on a reasonable belief “shall not constitute falsely reporting an incident or lying, even if an investigation does not establish evidence sufficient to substantiate the allegation,” § 115.78(f).
For the mechanics of the ordinary BP-9/BP-10/BP-11 sequence and its deadlines, see compassionate release request to warden and the firm’s page on the BOP Administrative Remedy Program.
The “sensitive” filing route
There is a provision written for exactly this situation, and it is under-used. Under 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1), if a person “reasonably believes the issue is sensitive and the inmate’s safety or well-being would be placed in danger if the Request became known at the institution,” the request may be submitted directly to the Regional Director, marked “Sensitive,” with a written explanation of why it was not filed at the institution. If the Regional Administrative Remedy Coordinator agrees, it is accepted. If not, the person is told in writing and may refile locally, and “the Warden shall allow a reasonable extension of time for such a resubmission.” That route exists precisely because some complaints cannot safely be handed to the institution that is the subject of them.
One unsettled question worth planning around
Whether the grounds raised with the warden must match the grounds raised in court is not settled. The Seventh Circuit requires issue exhaustion: United States v. Williams, 987 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2021). The Fourth Circuit rejects it, holding that the 30-day route requires only the initial request: United States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262 (4th Cir. 2022). Until that is resolved, the safe course everywhere is to state every ground — the abuse, any medical consequence, any family circumstance — in the warden request itself, even if the motion will lead with only one.
PREA, BOP Policy, and the Paper Trail They Create
The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30309, did not create a right to sue. It set a “zero-tolerance standard,” directed the Attorney General to promulgate “national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape,” and built data-collection, training, and grant programs around them (34 U.S.C. § 30302; § 30307(a)(1)). The Third Circuit made the point directly in Kalu: “While the Act established several mechanisms to tackle the issue of sexual abuse in prisons, it did not create a cause of action against federal prison officials.”
That is the disappointment in PREA and also its practical value. The standards at 28 C.F.R. part 115 generate records, and the records are what a compassionate release motion is built from. Note also that the PREA standards define staff sexual abuse far more broadly than the guideline does. Section 115.6 covers staff conduct “with or without consent,” and reaches touching through clothing, attempts, threats, requests, indecent exposure, and voyeurism. A great deal of conduct is a PREA violation, is a fireable offense, and may be a crime — without being a “sexual act” under § 1B1.13(b)(4). Understanding that gap is the difference between a motion that fits the rule and one that does not.
BOP Program Statement 5333.01 — the March 19, 2026 rewrite
BOP implements the PREA standards through a Program Statement, and that policy was rewritten on March 19, 2026. Program Statement 5333.01, “Sexually Abusive Behavior Prevention and Intervention Program Manual” (March 19, 2026), rescinds Program Statement 5324.12 CN-1 (2/18/2025). Anything written before March 2026 about BOP Program Statement 5324.12 is describing a rescinded policy.
What the new manual does that matters to a motion:
- A three-level response framework replaces what the Bureau previously called the Full Response Protocol. A Level 1 response applies where the investigation belongs to a different institution. A Level 2 response — required for most allegations, and for any allegation that the conduct occurred at the current facility “at any time in the past” — requires in-person intervention from Psychology Services, Health Services, and Correctional Services; a BP-E583 Report of Incident; an investigative case with a determination; notification to the person; and, where appropriate, retaliation monitoring and an Executive Team Review. A Level 3 response adds a forensic medical examination and evidence collection.
- A 24-hour clinical clock. Under the Level 2 protocol, Psychology Services completes a Sexual Abuse Intervention in person with the alleged victim within 24 hours of the report.
- A defined referral chain for staff-perpetrator allegations. The Institution PREA Compliance Manager notifies the Warden immediately; the Warden notifies the Regional Director and the Office of Internal Affairs; OIA notifies the DOJ Office of the Inspector General and, where appropriate, the FBI. Where video or other evidence exists that the staff member did not commit the alleged abuse, the Warden must submit it with the OIA referral and keep a record of the referral.
- New retaliation-monitoring instruments — BP-A1176 for people in custody and BP-A1175 for staff — plus new retaliation codes in the Bureau’s inmate management system.
- A tracking log, BP-A1181, on which every incident requiring any level of response must be entered.
- A written record of consultation when the Compliance Manager departs from the general response guidelines.
Each of those is a document with a date on it. Requesting them by name, and by the regulation and Program Statement provision that requires them to exist, is more effective than a general records request.
PREA obligations and what each one produces
| PREA standard | What the agency must do | Why it matters to the motion |
|---|---|---|
| § 115.51 Inmate reporting | Provide multiple private internal reporting channels; at least one external channel that can receive reports and allow anonymity on request; accept reports verbally, in writing, anonymously, and from third parties, and promptly document verbal reports | Establishes that a report to any staff member counts, and that a verbal report should have generated a written memorandum. BOP identifies the DOJ Office of the Inspector General as its external channel |
| § 115.53 Outside confidential support | Provide addresses and phone numbers, including toll-free lines where available, for victim advocacy and rape crisis organizations, and enable communication “in as confidential a manner as possible” | The facility must tell the person how monitored those communications are before granting access |
| § 115.61 Staff reporting duties | All staff must report immediately any knowledge, suspicion, or information about an incident, about retaliation, and about staff neglect that may have contributed | A staff member who was told and did nothing violated a mandatory duty — a fact with weight in the undue-delay argument |
| § 115.62 Protection duties | Take immediate action when the agency learns of a substantial risk of imminent sexual abuse | The regulatory anchor for the “imminent danger” exception |
| § 115.67 Retaliation protection | Monitor the conduct and treatment of the person who reported for at least 90 days, including disciplinary reports, housing changes, and program changes, with periodic status checks; continue past 90 days if needed | Produces the dated record that turns “I was punished for reporting” into documentation |
| § 115.71 Investigations | Investigate promptly, thoroughly, and objectively; assess credibility individually and never by inmate-or-staff status; never require a polygraph as a condition of investigating; refer substantiated criminal conduct for prosecution; retain reports for the abuser’s incarceration or employment plus five years | § 115.71(e) is the credibility rule the OIG invoked. § 115.71(i) is the retention rule that keeps the file obtainable years later |
| § 115.72 Evidentiary standard | “No standard higher than a preponderance of the evidence” | Argues directly against an “unsubstantiated” outcome reached under a stricter internal practice |
| § 115.73 Reporting to inmates | Inform the person of the outcome; if a staff member is the subject, inform them when the staff member is removed from the unit, leaves the facility, is indicted, or is convicted; document every notification | These notifications are proof route 3 or its absence, in writing |
| § 115.76 Staff discipline | Termination is the presumptive sanction for staff who engaged in sexual abuse; terminations and resignations-in-lieu must be reported to law enforcement unless clearly not criminal | Establishes what the agency’s own policy required, and what it did instead |
| § 115.83 Ongoing care | Offer evaluation and treatment at the community level of care, without cost, regardless of whether the person names the abuser or cooperates | The treatment record; also the basis for arguing what care is and is not being provided |
| § 115.401 Audits | Every facility audited at least once every three years; the agency bears the burden of demonstrating compliance | Facility-level compliance history — with the caveat GAO adds below |
GAO’s May 2026 review is blunt about the limits of that last row. The audits assess compliance with the standards, “not for auditors to detect ongoing sexual abuse at the facilities,” and GAO found that “[s]ome BOP facilities passed their PREA audits despite widespread ongoing sexual abuse” (GAO-26-107343). GAO also found that the standards themselves, implemented in 2012, have not been updated. It made seven recommendations to the Justice Department, which concurred. A passing audit is therefore evidence of paperwork, not of safety — and that is now a finding a court can be pointed to rather than an assertion.
Retaliation, Safety, and Privacy While a Motion Is Pending
Fear of retaliation is not a soft consideration in these cases. It is the reason many people never report, and it has to be planned for before anything is filed.
The 90-day monitoring rule is a right, and it generates evidence. 28 C.F.R. § 115.67(c) requires the agency, for at least 90 days after a report of sexual abuse, to monitor the conduct and treatment of the person who reported — specifically watching for changes in disciplinary reports, housing, or programming that “may suggest possible retaliation” — and to “act promptly to remedy any such retaliation,” continuing past 90 days if the initial monitoring shows a continuing need. PS 5333.01 assigns that duty to the Institution PREA Compliance Manager, requires periodic in-person checks, requires the results to be recorded on the BP-A1176 form, extends monitoring when the person is transferred (the receiving institution must continue it), and requires notification of the Warden and the National PREA Coordinator, plus documented immediate remediation, if retaliation is found. A disciplinary report issued three weeks after a PREA report, sitting next to a monitoring form that recorded nothing, is a document worth having.
Protective custody is protection with a cost. 28 C.F.R. § 115.68 subjects any use of segregated housing to protect a person who alleged sexual abuse to the limits in § 115.43, and PS 5333.01 requires the BP-A1002 safeguarding form in those cases. Placement in a special housing unit generally means loss of programming and property. If a client is being held in segregation because of a report they made, that fact belongs in the motion — see special housing units for what SHU placement actually involves.
Privacy in the filing. Federal filings are public by default, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 49.1 requires redaction of specified personal identifiers in criminal filings. Courts routinely permit sealing or redaction of medical and psychological records and of the details of an assault, with a redacted public version filed alongside a sealed complete version. What the court needs on the public docket is the legal argument and the fact of the abuse; the clinical detail can be filed under seal. Ask before filing, not after.
The person abused is also a crime victim with statutory rights. If the abuser is prosecuted, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, gives “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense” the right to be reasonably protected from the accused; to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of public court proceedings and of any release or escape; not to be excluded from those proceedings; to be reasonably heard at any proceeding involving release, plea, or sentencing; to confer with the prosecutor; to full and timely restitution; to proceedings free of unreasonable delay; and to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy. Those rights run in the prosecution of the staff member, not in the compassionate release motion. They are frequently the fastest route to reliable information about the status of the criminal case, which in turn is what proof route 1 depends on.
There is a mirror-image provision on the compassionate release side. Application Note 2 to § 1B1.13 encourages a court, before granting a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion, to make its best effort to ensure that any victim of the movant’s offense is “reasonably, accurately, and timely notified” and given an opportunity to be heard, unless that victim previously asked not to be notified. Both notice provisions can operate in the same case, and counsel should anticipate the second one rather than be surprised by it.
The FCI Dublin Case Study: A Watershed Moment
FCI Dublin was a low-security federal prison for women in Dublin, California. It closed in April 2024. The published record of what happened there is why § 1B1.13(b)(4) exists in the form it does, and it is the clearest illustration of both what the provision can reach and where its proof requirement binds.
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations reported in December 2022 that BOP employees had sexually abused women in custody in at least 19 of the 29 federal facilities that had held women over the prior decade, and that BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs had a backlog of approximately 8,000 misconduct cases as of late 2022 (PSI Staff Report). The Third Circuit’s opinion in Kalu summarizes that report and records that eight correctional officers at FCI Dublin — including the warden, the chaplain, and the former PREA compliance officer responsible for training supervisors on PREA requirements and coordinating the PREA audit — were indicted for sexually abusing women in custody. The court also noted the facility’s closure, announced ten days after a federal district judge appointed a special master for independent oversight.
The prosecutions continued. As of August 2025, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California had charged ten FCI Dublin correctional officers with crimes related to sexual abuse and published a case-by-case status table showing the convictions and sentences imposed (Aug. 7, 2025 press release). GAO reported in May 2026 that since 2022, nine BOP employees have been convicted of sexual abuse at one women’s facility, including the warden and a chaplain (GAO-26-107343).
Two lessons come out of that record, and both generalize.
First, Dublin is the exception that proves the rule about proof. Convictions there exist because a sustained federal criminal investigation happened. Nationally, in substantiated staff sexual misconduct incidents in prisons, the perpetrator faced a criminal outcome in 6% of incidents (BJS NCJ 304834). A person with a Dublin-style record has proof route 1 available. Most people do not, which is why the undue-delay and imminent-danger exceptions are where the work is.
Second, the compelled-interview problem is structural. The PSI report explains why some BOP employees who admitted misconduct in sworn statements were never prosecuted: statements made in a compelled administrative interview cannot be used against the employee in a criminal prosecution, under the rule of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), as recounted in Kalu. An admission in an internal investigation can therefore end a career without ever producing a conviction — which is another reason the guideline’s administrative-finding route matters, and another reason a request for the administrative file should not be skipped because no criminal case exists.
This page does not report civil settlement figures: the firm does not publish dollar figures it cannot source to a court record or a Justice Department publication.
Strategic Considerations for Compassionate Release Motions
A compassionate release motion is decided in two distinct steps, and treating them as one is the most common analytical error in denied filings. Briefing the sentencing factors affirmatively matters here as much as proving the abuse — see the 3553(a) factors.
Step one is eligibility, and it is a gate. The court must find that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction. That determination does not involve weighing the § 3553(a) factors. As the Supreme Court put it in Rutherford, relying on Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010): before determining the extent of a reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors, “a court must first ensure that a movant is part of the ‘limited class of prisoners’ who are ‘eligibl[e]’ for such a reduction.”
Step two is discretion, and it is where most of these motions die. The statute says the court “may” reduce the sentence, not “shall.” As the Sixth Circuit held in United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020), even when the conditions are met a district court may still deny relief if the § 3553(a) factors do not justify it. In fiscal year 2025 courts cited those factors 1,260 times as a reason for denial (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 11). How a particular judge weighs them on a sentence they imposed is its own subject: see what do judges consider when sentencing.
A court may skip straight to step two. Several circuits hold that a judge who denies in sole reliance on § 3553(a) need never decide whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist: United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278 (9th Cir. 2021).
That is the entire lesson of Bright. The Fifth Circuit wrote that it “need not consider whether the district court erred in determining that Bright failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons; the district court’s alternative and independent consideration of the § 3553(a) factors provides a sufficient basis for affirmance,” and that the § 3553(a) point had been abandoned by not being challenged. A motion that proves the abuse and says little about § 3553(a) has done half the work, and it is the half that does not decide the case.
There is a third finding. USSG § 1B1.13(a)(2) requires the court to determine that the person “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)” — the pretrial detention factors: the nature of the offense, the weight of the evidence, history and characteristics, and the seriousness of the danger release would pose. Where the client’s institutional record shows incident reports issued during the period they were reporting abuse, the retaliation-monitoring record is not just mitigation. It is context the danger analysis needs.
A note on offense type. There is no categorical bar tied to the seriousness of the offense — the First Circuit vacated a denial resting on one in United States v. Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th 79 (1st Cir. 2023) — and the Fourth Circuit has directed courts to consider the totality of the circumstances rather than any single fact in isolation, United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189 (4th Cir. 2022). Offense conduct still bears heavily on both the danger finding and § 3553(a). In fiscal year 2025, drug trafficking accounted for 46.4% of individuals granted relief, robbery 16.2%, and firearms offenses 13.3% (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 8).
Applied Insight — Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney: These motions are built backwards from how families expect. The instinct is to lead with what happened. We start with which of the three proof routes is available, or which exception has to carry the motion — because that decides what documents we need and how long the case takes — and we write the § 3553(a) section before we write the facts. On the facts themselves, the discipline is to let institutional records carry the narrative wherever they can. A dated Report of Incident, a dated 24-hour psychology intervention note, a dated medical assessment, a retaliation-monitoring form showing a disciplinary report three weeks later: that sequence is more persuasive to a federal judge than any adjective, and it does not require the client to write out a description of the assault. Where a client’s own account is necessary, it goes in a sworn declaration, filed under seal, drafted once from a single interview rather than reconstructed across four.
Statistical Analysis and Trends
Compassionate release overall is a narrow remedy, and the abuse category is a small part of it. The honest numbers are these.
| Fiscal year | Motions decided | Granted | Grant rate | Times § 1B1.13(b)(4) cited among reasons for grants |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | 3,140 | 432 | 13.8% | — (provision effective Nov. 1, 2023) |
| FY2024 | 3,015 | 481 | 16.0% | 11 of 753 reasons cited (1.5%) |
| FY2025 | 2,795 | 394 | 14.1% | 5 of 631 reasons cited (0.8%) |
| FY2026, Q1–Q2 | 894 | 125 | 14.0% | not listed among the 199 reasons cited |
Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission Compassionate Release Data Reports, Tables 2–3 and Table 10 of each report. The Commission counts reasons cited, not cases; a court may cite more than one reason for a single grant.
Three things follow from that table, and they should be said plainly rather than spun.
The category is small and it did not grow. Citations went from 11 to 5 and then off the published list. Whether that reflects fewer filings, fewer grants, or a coding threshold in the Commission’s tables is not something the reports say, and it should not be guessed at.
Where the case was prosecuted matters more than most families expect. In fiscal year 2025 the grant rate for all compassionate release motions ran from 31.0% in the Ninth Circuit (72 of 232) to 4.9% in the Eighth (26 of 528) (USSC FY2025 Data Report, Table 3). Motions are decided by the sentencing court, so this is fixed by where the case was charged, not by where the person is imprisoned now.
Women are a larger share of grants than of denials. In fiscal year 2025, women were 45 of the 394 people granted relief (11.4%) and 187 of the 2,398 denied (7.8%) (Table 6). That gap is worth stating carefully: it is a difference in shares, not a causal finding, and the Commission does not attribute it to any cause.
On the denial side, two lines matter here. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies was cited 447 times in fiscal year 2025 and 136 times in the first half of fiscal year 2026 (Table 11). That is an avoidable, procedural loss. And 93.7% of the motions granted in fiscal year 2025 — 369 of 394 — were filed by the defendant, not by the Bureau of Prisons (Table 5). The Bureau filing on someone’s behalf is not the realistic path.
For grant-rate detail by circuit and district, see compassionate release grant rates; for what it means in a low-grant-rate jurisdiction, see compassionate release texas.
Overcoming Common Challenges
“There was never any conviction, so I cannot use this.” Not correct. A conviction is one of three routes, and the guideline supplies two exceptions to all three. What the absence of a conviction changes is the work: the motion now has to document either delay or danger, which means assembling the reporting record, the investigation record, and the agency’s own compliance obligations rather than attaching a judgment.
“The investigation came back unsubstantiated.” An unsubstantiated finding is not an adjudication that nothing happened; BOP defines it as meaning the conduct may have occurred but there was insufficient evidence to prove it (PS 5333.01). It does not satisfy proof route 3. It does establish the date of the report, the fact of an investigation, and the agency’s own obligations that attached — including retaliation monitoring, which under § 115.67(f) terminates only if the allegation is found unfounded, not unsubstantiated.
“I never filed anything, so there is no record.” Check before assuming. PREA requires staff to accept reports made “verbally, in writing, anonymously, and from third parties” and to “promptly document any verbal reports” (§ 115.51(c)). A disclosure to a psychologist, a chaplain, a nurse, or a unit officer should have generated a written memorandum and, under PS 5333.01, an entry on the institution’s PREA tracking log. Medical and mental health practitioners are separately required to report (§ 115.61(c)). The record may exist even where the client never filed a form.
“It has been years.” There is no statute of limitations on a compassionate release motion, and PREA forbids a time limit on a grievance alleging sexual abuse (§ 115.52(b)(1)). Investigation reports must be retained for as long as the alleged abuser is incarcerated or employed by the agency, plus five years (§ 115.71(i)). Other clocks do run — the Federal Tort Claims Act presentment deadline is two years — so an old case still needs prompt assessment.
“I was transferred, so no one is monitoring anything.” Monitoring follows the person. PS 5333.01 requires continued retaliation monitoring at the receiving institution when someone is transferred during the monitoring period, and requires the receiving institution to identify new arrivals needing continued monitoring.
“I am afraid of what filing will do to me.” That fear is the reason the sensitive-filing route at 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1), the emergency grievance track at § 115.52(f), the anti-retaliation monitoring at § 115.67, the third-party filing right at § 115.52(e), and the good-faith protection at § 115.78(f) all exist. None of them makes the fear unreasonable. All of them can be used at once, and they can be used by counsel or a family member rather than by the person in custody.
How Compassionate Release Differs From PREA Complaints, FTCA Claims, and Bivens Suits
These are four different things. They answer different questions, go to different decision-makers, and run on different clocks. Pursuing one does not substitute for another, and two of them have deadlines that a compassionate release motion does not. A claim about the conviction itself belongs in neither — see compassionate release vs 2255.
| Remedy | Who decides | What it requires | What it produces | Clock |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) | The federal judge who imposed the sentence | Extraordinary and compelling reasons under § 1B1.13; no danger; § 3553(a) support | A shorter sentence, often time served, plus supervision | No deadline. Requires the warden request plus 30 days, or full exhaustion |
| PREA report and grievance, 28 C.F.R. part 115 | BOP, with referral to OIA, DOJ OIG, and the FBI | A report; the agency investigates | A substantiated / unsubstantiated / unfounded determination; protective measures; staff discipline. No damages, and PREA creates no private cause of action | No time limit to grieve; final agency decision due in 90 days (70-day extension possible); 48-hour / 5-day emergency track |
| Federal Tort Claims Act claim, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 | The agency first, then a federal district court | Written presentment to the agency on Standard Form 95, then denial or six months’ silence, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) | Money damages against the United States | Two years from accrual to present the claim, then six months from mailing of the final denial to sue, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) |
| Bivens constitutional damages action | A federal district court | An Eighth Amendment claim against the individual officer — and a court willing to recognize the claim in that context | Money damages from the individual | Borrowed state personal-injury limitations period; PLRA exhaustion required first, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) |
Three points about that table deserve more than a cell.
The FTCA deadline is the one that gets missed. A tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues,” and then unless suit is begun within six months of the mailing of a final denial (28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)). Presentment is jurisdictional in the sense that a suit cannot be instituted until the claim has been presented and finally denied, or six months have passed with no final disposition (28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). The FTCA ordinarily excludes claims arising out of assault and battery, but 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) contains a proviso restoring those claims for “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” A compassionate release motion has no deadline; the tort claim does. If both are in play, the tort claim usually has to be presented first. For the Bureau’s own procedure, see how to file a tort claim against the Bureau of Prisons.
A constitutional damages claim against the individual officer faces a real doctrinal wall. In Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311 (3d Cir. 2024), a man alleged that a lieutenant sexually assaulted him three times at a federal prison and that the warden failed to protect him. The Third Circuit held the claims presented a new Bivens context and declined to extend the remedy, reasoning that the BOP Administrative Remedy Program supplies “an alternative remedial structure” — and that the presence of such a structure “is sufficient by itself to preclude an extension of Bivens” — and that Congress, in both the Prison Litigation Reform Act and PREA, “explicitly omitted an individual capacity damages cause of action against federal officials.” Kalu is a Bivens case, not a § 3582 motion. It is cited here for its analysis of PREA and of the administrative remedy structure, and for its concurrence’s account of the oversight findings — not as authority about compassionate release.
The PLRA’s own definitions run through the same statute the guideline uses. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies before any federal action about prison conditions. And § 1997e(e) bars a federal civil action by a prisoner for mental or emotional injury suffered in custody “without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of title 18).” That is the same definition § 1B1.13(b)(4) imports. Establishing a sexual act under § 2246(2) therefore does double duty: it satisfies the guideline’s conduct element and it lifts the PLRA’s mental-injury bar on the civil side.
For how compassionate release compares with the other ways a federal sentence can end early, see compassionate release attorneys.
Intersections With Other Compassionate Release Categories
The policy statement says extraordinary and compelling reasons exist “under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof” (§ 1B1.13(b)). A case that is uncertain under (b)(4) alone is frequently stronger presented across several subsections. Neither 2026 decision touched the abuse ground, and our page on rutherford v united states sets out what each of them did reach.
Medical consequences under (b)(1). Where abuse has produced a condition that substantially diminishes the ability to provide self-care in a correctional facility and from which recovery is not expected, that is § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) on its own terms. Where the condition requires long-term or specialized care that is not being provided, that is § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C) — a subsection aimed squarely at unprovided care, which does not require the condition to be terminal or disabling. Because § 115.83 requires the facility to provide victims with services “consistent with the community level of care,” a documented gap between what is required and what is delivered is evidence for both the PREA record and the (b)(1)(C) argument. See compassionate release medical condition and medical care levels in federal prison.
Age under (b)(2). Section 1B1.13(b)(2) requires all three of: at least 65 years old, serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of aging, and at least 10 years or 75% of the term served, whichever is less. See compassionate release for elderly inmates.
Family circumstances under (b)(3). Four sub-categories, each turning on incapacitation plus the absence of an alternative caregiver. See caregiver compassionate release.
Other reasons under (b)(5). This is where conduct that is real but outside § 2246(2) belongs — repeated sexual harassment, voyeurism, or abuse that falls within the PREA definition at § 115.6 but not within the guideline’s “sexual act.” The standard is “similar in gravity” to the listed categories. Be aware that (b)(5) has been read narrowly since 2026: in United States v. Hall, No. 24-6094 (6th Cir. June 25, 2026) (published), the Sixth Circuit held that Rutherford‘s reasoning is not confined to § 1B1.13(b)(6) and that the catch-all cannot be used to import a ground a statute forecloses. That is a limit on using (b)(5) to smuggle in sentencing-law arguments; it is not a holding about abuse.
One category to avoid building on. Section 1B1.13(b)(6), “Unusually Long Sentence,” is still printed in the Guidelines Manual and is now invalid to the extent it treats a nonretroactive change in law as a qualifying reason (Rutherford (2026)). After May 28, 2026, combining abuse claims with unusually-long-sentence arguments will not carry a motion, and pairing a strong (b)(4) theory with a foreclosed (b)(6) theory invites a court to treat the whole filing as a resentencing request. A change in the law may still bear on the size of a reduction once eligibility is established on other grounds, under § 1B1.13(c) — that argument belongs at step two.
Rehabilitation. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) forbids treating “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone” as an extraordinary and compelling reason, while § 1B1.13(d) permits weighing it in combination with other circumstances. It was nonetheless the single most-cited reason among fiscal year 2025 grants — 95 citations — always alongside something else.
Oversight, Advocacy, and Where the Records Live
Independent oversight of the federal prison system expanded substantially in the last two years, and it generates documents a motion can use.
The Federal Prison Oversight Act, Pub. L. No. 118-71 (July 25, 2024), 138 Stat. 1492, created an inspections regime for BOP facilities implemented by the Justice Department’s Inspector General and an independent Ombudsman who may receive complaints about issues adversely affecting the health, safety, welfare, or rights of incarcerated people or staff. The Act reports to the Judiciary and oversight committees of both chambers. As the concurrence in Kalu observed, the statute is a significant safeguard and it conspicuously does not create a civil damages remedy for survivors of staff abuse — one more reason the sentence-reduction route matters.
The DOJ Office of the Inspector General is BOP’s designated external reporting channel under PS 5333.01, implementing 28 C.F.R. § 115.51(b). OIG investigates staff sexual abuse allegations directly and publishes reports; Management Advisory Memorandum 23-001 is an example of the kind of document that can be cited in a motion without any discovery.
The Government Accountability Office has now published two directly relevant reviews: GAO-25-107339 (Sept. 29, 2025) on employee misconduct case management, and GAO-26-107343 (May 5, 2026) on prevention, detection, and response to sexual abuse. GAO reports are public, citable, and updated — and the May 2026 report’s findings about PREA audits are the most current government statement on how much weight a passing audit deserves.
Agency data is published on purpose. 28 C.F.R. § 115.88(c) requires the agency’s annual review report to be approved by the agency head and made readily available to the public, and § 115.89(b) requires aggregated sexual abuse data to be made public at least annually, with personal identifiers removed and retention for at least 10 years. Facility-level context is therefore obtainable without a discovery fight.
Nothing on this page should be read as a substitute for the confidential support services the regulations require the Bureau to make available. 28 C.F.R. § 115.53 requires facilities to give people mailing addresses and telephone numbers — including toll-free hotline numbers where available — for local, state, or national victim advocacy and rape crisis organizations, to enable reasonable communication with them “in as confidential a manner as possible,” and to say in advance how monitored that communication will be. Ask the Institution PREA Compliance Manager for that list in writing.
Best Practices for Victim of Abuse Compassionate Release Legal Representation
Start with the proof route, not the narrative. The first question is which of the three formal findings exists, or which exception has to carry the motion. That answer determines the records request, the timeline, and whether the case is ready to file in weeks or months.
Request records by the provision that requires them to exist. A general request for “my file” produces less than a request naming the BP-E583 Report of Incident, the BP-A1181 tracking log entry, the PREA medical assessment, the Psychology Services Sexual Abuse Intervention note, the BP-A1176 retaliation monitoring form, the BP-A1002 safeguarding form, the § 115.73(a) determination notice, and the § 115.86 incident review report — and citing the regulation and PS 5333.01 provision that requires each.
Preserve the parallel remedies before they expire. Present the Standard Form 95 tort claim within the two years 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) allows. A civil case that reaches a finding or an admission of liability creates proof route 2 for a later motion; a claim that lapses forecloses it.
Put every ground in the warden request. Given the unresolved issue-exhaustion split between the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, the safe course is to state the abuse ground, any medical ground, and any family ground in the request itself, and to keep proof of the date the warden received it.
Brief § 3553(a) affirmatively, at length, first. Bright is the cautionary case. So is the Commission’s data: § 3553(a) was cited 1,260 times as a denial reason in a year with 394 grants.
Build a release plan the court can check. A named residence with a letter from whoever owns or rents it; a confirmed trauma-informed treatment provider with an intake appointment where possible; insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, or VA coverage documented; income or family support identified; transportation from the facility. 28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a)(2) requires a release plan at the BOP stage, and judges want it in the motion.
Interview once, carefully, and write the declaration from that. Repeated retelling is both harmful and, in a filing, unnecessary. Let the client control the pace and the level of detail; a fragmented or non-chronological account is a recognized feature of traumatic memory, not a credibility problem, and the institutional records usually supply the chronology anyway.
Say no when the answer is no. Where the conduct does not involve a sexual act under § 2246(2) and did not cause serious bodily injury, and no formal finding exists, the honest advice may be that (b)(4) is not the vehicle — and that a PREA complaint, a tort claim, or a medical-ground motion under (b)(1) is. Telling a family that early costs less than a denial does.
Christopher Zoukis leads the firm’s federal prison consulting work: designation, sentence computation, First Step Act credits, RDAP, medical-care advocacy, administrative remedies, and reentry planning. The legal work on any compassionate release motion — the filing, the briefing, and any appeal — is handled by Elizabeth Franklin-Best and the firm’s attorneys.
Future Developments and Emerging Issues
Four questions are genuinely open, and it is more useful to name them than to predict answers.
Whether the exceptions swallow the proof requirement, or the reverse. The guideline does not define “unduly delayed” or “imminent danger,” and no published appellate decision construes either phrase in this context. District courts are working it out one order at a time. The federal data on substantiation and prosecution rates are the strongest available argument that the exceptions were meant to do real work.
Whether “at the direction of” reaches deliberate indifference. The text distinguishes abuse committed by a covered person from abuse committed at that person’s direction. Whether a course of conduct short of an express instruction — placement decisions, ignored warnings, removal of protection — can constitute “direction” is unresolved.
Whether the timing clause excludes pretrial detention. “While in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced” is not obviously satisfied by abuse suffered before sentencing on the same case. The Bryant framing — subsections (b)(1) through (b)(4) address circumstances developing after sentencing — cuts toward the narrower reading.
Whether the PREA standards will be revised. GAO found in May 2026 that the standards, implemented in 2012, have not been updated to reflect technological and practice changes, and recommended that the Justice Department review them; DOJ concurred (GAO-26-107343). A revision would change the records this provision depends on.
What is not an open question is whether the provision survives the 2026 Supreme Court term. Rutherford footnote 3 answered that, and the November 1, 2026 guideline amendment touches subsection (b)(4) only to rename the Bureau of Prisons (official amendment text).
The Importance of Holistic Advocacy
A sentence reduction ends the custody. It does not end anything else, and a plan that treats it as the finish line usually fails on the § 3553(a) step anyway, because a judge reading it cannot see where the person is going.
Continuity of care is the first piece, and the regulations anticipate it. 28 C.F.R. § 115.83(b) requires that evaluation and treatment of victims include, as appropriate, “follow-up services, treatment plans, and, when necessary, referrals for continued care following their transfer to, or placement in, other facilities, or their release from custody.” A release plan that names the receiving clinician, the appointment date, and how the care will be paid for is both the answer to that regulation and the answer to the court’s concern.
The second piece is the parallel legal work. A tort claim, a PREA complaint that is still open, or a criminal case in which the client is a crime victim under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 will all outlive the compassionate release motion. Someone has to keep track of those clocks and those notice rights after release, and it should be decided in advance who that is.
The third is documentation that does not stop at filing. Conditions change, investigations conclude, staff members are indicted, notifications arrive under § 115.73(c). A supplemental filing that puts a new development in front of the court can matter more than anything in the original motion, and a denial without prejudice can be followed by a new motion resting on changed circumstances — which generally requires a new request to the warden first. See compassionate release denial for what follows a denial, including the 14-day deadline for a defendant’s notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
For general background on what conditions inside federal facilities actually look like, see violence and sexual assault in prison.
Why work with Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C.
Elizabeth Franklin-Best is the founder and Principal Attorney of Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C., a boutique firm devoted to federal criminal appeals and post-conviction relief. Over more than 20 years she has handled more than 330 federal proceedings, over 100 of them appeals, with sixteen published decisions as counsel of record. She is admitted to the U.S. Supreme Court and twelve of the thirteen U.S. Courts of Appeals — every regional circuit (1st–11th) plus the D.C. Circuit — and has appeared pro hac vice in federal courts from Montana to Florida. She is recognized by Best Lawyers in America 2026 for Appellate Practice and by Chambers USA 2026 for Litigation: White-Collar Crime & Government Investigations, and was named South Carolina Public Defender of the Year in 2010. She is the author of Reversing Your Criminal Conviction: Develop Your Winning Strategy (2023) and serves as Board Chair of Justice 360.
Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, is the firm’s Managing Director and a nationally recognized federal prison expert. He is the author of the Federal Prison Handbook, Directory of Federal Prisons, Prison Education Guide, and College for Convicts, and serves as Chairman of the Board of the Human Rights Defense Center. He has been quoted as a federal prison expert by outlets including CNN, the Associated Press, and The Washington Post. He earned his J.D. at the University of California, Davis School of Law after serving roughly a decade in the federal Bureau of Prisons, where he became an award-winning incarcerated journalist — a combination of formal training and firsthand knowledge of how BOP records are created, kept, and obtained that few in federal defense can offer.
The firm runs a national federal practice on an intentionally small caseload, from offices in Columbia and Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. A compassionate release motion is filed in the district that imposed the sentence, wherever in the country that is.
Talk to a Lawyer About Abuse-Based Compassionate Release
If you or someone you love was abused by staff in a federal facility, the first useful step is a look at the actual record — what was reported and when, what the institution did, what the medical and psychology files show, and which of the three proof routes is available. That review also identifies the deadlines that are already running, including the two-year Federal Tort Claims Act presentment deadline, which a compassionate release motion does not extend.
Call (843) 620-1100 or schedule a consultation directly. Elizabeth Franklin-Best and the firm’s attorneys represent victims of sexual abuse in federal custody and handle these motions in federal district courts nationwide. If you are writing on behalf of someone in custody, you can start the process yourself: 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(e)(1) permits family members, attorneys, and outside advocates to file a PREA administrative remedy request on a person’s behalf.
Frequently Asked Questions About Abuse-Based Compassionate Release
What qualifies as abuse-based compassionate release under the federal guidelines?
USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4) recognizes two categories: sexual abuse involving a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2), and physical abuse resulting in “serious bodily injury” as defined in the Commentary to USSG § 1B1.1. The abuse must have occurred while the person was serving the sentence they are asking the court to reduce, and must have been committed by, or at the direction of, someone with custody or control over them.
What evidence do I need to prove abuse by BOP staff or another federal prison employee?
Ordinarily one of three things: a criminal conviction, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding in an administrative proceeding — typically a substantiated PREA determination. If none exists, the guideline excuses the requirement where “such proceedings are unduly delayed or the defendant is in imminent danger.” In practice that means building the record: the report, the investigation file, the medical and psychology notes, the retaliation-monitoring forms, and the dates on each.
How does the FCI Dublin case affect compassionate release for victims of abuse?
It supplied much of the factual record behind the 2023 amendment. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations documented staff sexual abuse in at least 19 of 29 federal facilities holding women, and the Justice Department has since obtained convictions of nine BOP employees at that one facility, including the warden and a chaplain (GAO-26-107343, May 2026). Dublin is not precedent — it is the exceptional case in which convictions actually exist.
What hurdles do people face when filing a compassionate release motion for abuse?
Three, in order of frequency. The proof requirement, because formal findings are rare: only 9% of concluded BOP investigations into staff-perpetrated sexual abuse from 2014 through 2022 were substantiated (GAO-26-107343, Table 3). The exhaustion requirement, cited 447 times as a denial reason in fiscal year 2025. And the § 3553(a) step, cited 1,260 times.
Does the victim of abuse pathway apply only to sexual abuse, or also physical abuse?
Both, on different terms. Sexual abuse qualifies where it involved a “sexual act” under 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) — no injury requirement. Physical abuse qualifies only where it caused “serious bodily injury” as the Commentary to USSG § 1B1.1 defines it: extreme physical pain, protracted impairment of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or injury requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.
What should a compassionate release motion for abuse include?
The guideline element-by-element; the proof route relied on or the exception argued, with a dated timeline; the complete BOP records that document the report and its handling; medical and mental health records addressing injury and ongoing treatment needs; the institutional conduct record; a concrete release plan naming a residence, a treatment provider, and a source of support; and full briefing on the § 3142(g) danger finding and the § 3553(a) factors.
Do I have to exhaust BOP remedies before filing for abuse-based compassionate release?
Yes. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a defendant-filed motion only after full exhaustion of BOP administrative appeals or 30 days from the warden’s receipt of the request, whichever is earlier. Courts treat this as a mandatory claim-processing rule (Alam, 6th Cir. 2020), and the Eighth Circuit recognizes no futility exception (Houck, 2021). Separately, a PREA grievance about the abuse itself has its own rules under 28 C.F.R. § 115.52.
Can abuse while in federal custody be used as an extraordinary and compelling reason by itself?
Yes. Section 1B1.13(b)(4) is a freestanding category; nothing requires it to be combined with anything else, and no minimum time served applies. Clearing that gate is not the same as winning, though: the court must still find no danger under § 1B1.13(a)(2) and that the § 3553(a) factors support the reduction.
What should I do if I was abused by a guard, counselor, or other BOP staff member?
Report it to any staff member, in writing if possible, and keep a copy. PREA requires staff to accept verbal, written, anonymous, and third-party reports and to document verbal ones (28 C.F.R. § 115.51). If you are in immediate danger, file an emergency grievance — the agency owes an initial response in 48 hours (§ 115.52(f)). If you fear the request becoming known at the institution, send it directly to the Regional Director marked “Sensitive” (28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1)).
Did the Supreme Court’s 2026 decisions change abuse-based compassionate release?
No. Rutherford v. United States (2026), footnote 3, states that the 2023 amendment’s victim-of-abuse provision “is not at issue in today’s cases.” Rutherford held that a nonretroactive change in sentencing law cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason and invalidated § 1B1.13(b)(6) to that extent; Fernandez held that a challenge to the validity of a conviction belongs in a § 2255 motion. Neither touches § 1B1.13(b)(4).
Does psychological harm alone qualify under § 1B1.13(b)(4)?
Not by itself. The sexual-abuse prong requires a “sexual act”; the physical-abuse prong requires serious bodily injury. But the § 1B1.1 definition of serious bodily injury includes “protracted impairment of a function of a … mental faculty,” so documented lasting psychological impairment is part of that element. Severe psychological consequences may also support a motion under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), or (b)(5).
Can I file if another incarcerated person abused me rather than staff?
Only if the abuse was committed “at the direction of” a correctional officer, a BOP employee or contractor, or another person with custody or control over you. Abuse by another incarcerated person without that direction falls outside § 1B1.13(b)(4), though PREA covers it fully and it may support a failure-to-protect claim. It can also be presented under § 1B1.13(b)(5), or under (b)(1) where it produced a qualifying medical condition.
How does a Federal Tort Claims Act claim interact with a compassionate release motion?
They are separate and only one of them has a deadline. A tort claim must be presented in writing to the agency — on Standard Form 95 — within two years of accrual, and suit must follow within six months of a mailed final denial (28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); § 2675(a)). A civil case that produces a finding or admission of liability creates the guideline’s second proof route. See how to file a tort claim against the Bureau of Prisons.
Can my family file the request while I am inside?
They can file the PREA administrative remedy request. 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(e)(1) permits fellow inmates, staff members, family members, attorneys, and outside advocates to assist with, or file, a request relating to a sexual abuse allegation on someone’s behalf, though the facility may require the person to agree and to pursue subsequent steps personally. The compassionate release motion itself must be filed by the defendant or by counsel.
Reviewed for legal accuracy by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney·September 2026