After Sentencing

By Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., and Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA

The hearing ends, and four short deadlines are in play — each fourteen days long, and running from three different triggers. Missing the wrong one closes the door on a direct appeal permanently, which is why the single most important thing to do in the week after a federal sentencing is find out, in writing, which deadlines apply and who is responsible for meeting them.

This is step 7 of seven in the federal court process. The step before is sentencing basics. There is no later step inside this sequence — from here the case moves to direct appeal, to collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and into the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The judgment: what it is and when it exists

The sentence a judge announces in the courtroom is not yet the judgment. The judgment is a written document, entered on the docket by the clerk, and its entry is what starts the appeal clock. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(k)(1) sets out what it contains: “In the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.” It adds: “The judge must sign the judgment, and the clerk must enter it.”

Alongside the judgment, the court completes a statement of reasons form. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires the court to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence,” and where the sentence is outside the guideline range, “the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in a statement of reasons form.”

Two practical consequences follow from the gap between announcement and entry.

The written judgment may differ from what you heard. Typographical errors, a misstated count, a wrong restitution figure, a condition of supervised release that was not announced — all of these happen, and all of them are worth catching immediately. Where the oral pronouncement and the written judgment conflict, that is a matter for counsel to raise with the court promptly, and one of the reasons Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) exists.

The judgment is what travels. The judgment, together with the presentence report and the court’s Rule 32(i)(3) determinations, is what the Bureau of Prisons receives. Everything the Bureau computes — the sentence length, the concurrent or consecutive structure, the term of supervised release, the financial obligations — comes off that document.

The four post-sentencing clocks, and what starts each one

This is the section that matters most on this page, and it is the section most other pages get wrong. There are four short deadlines clustered in the weeks after a federal trial and sentencing. They run from three different triggers. Writing “you have 14 days after sentencing to appeal” is not a shorthand — it is wrong, and it can cost a defendant an appeal.

What	Deadline	Rule	What triggers the clock	Who files
Notice of appeal — defendant	14 days, filed in the district court	Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)	Later of entry of the judgment or order appealed, or the filing of the government’s notice of appeal	The defendant
Notice of appeal — government	30 days, filed in the district court	Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(B)	Later of entry of the judgment or order, or any defendant’s notice of appeal	The government
Extension of the appeal period	Up to 30 additional days, on a finding of excusable neglect or good cause	Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4)	Expiration of the Rule 4(b) period	Either party; the district court decides
Correction of clear error in the sentence	14 days	Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a)	The oral announcement of the sentence — Rule 35(c) says “‘sentencing’ means the oral announcement of the sentence”	The court, on its own or on request
Motion for a new trial — other grounds	14 days	Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2)	The verdict or finding of guilty	The defendant
Motion for a new trial — newly discovered evidence	3 years	Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1)	The verdict or finding of guilty	The defendant
Judgment of acquittal, post-verdict	14 days	Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1)	Later of the guilty verdict or the discharge of the jury	The defendant
Sentence reduction for post-sentencing substantial assistance	Generally 1 year; later only on the three grounds in Rule 35(b)(2)	Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)	Sentencing	The government — a defendant cannot file it
§ 2255 motion	1 year	28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)	The latest of four dates in § 2255(f)(1)–(4) — usually when the conviction becomes final	The defendant, in the sentencing court
Sentence commences	On the date received in custody for transport, or on voluntary arrival at the designated facility	18 U.S.C. § 3585(a)	Being taken into custody, or self-surrender	Bureau of Prisons computes

Three things about that table are worth stating separately, because they are the errors that recur.

Rule 35(a) and FRAP 4(b) are two different fourteen-day periods with two different triggers. Rule 35(a) runs from the oral announcement in the courtroom. FRAP 4(b) runs from entry of the written judgment, which is normally some days later. They overlap; they do not coincide.

The notice of appeal is filed in the district court. Not in the court of appeals. Rule 4(b)(1)(A): “a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days.” A notice filed in the wrong court is a problem nobody needs.

A notice filed too early is fine. Rule 4(b)(2): “A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, sentence, or order—but before the entry of the judgment or order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.” There is no penalty for filing the day of the hearing. There is a severe one for filing late.

The 30-day extension in Rule 4(b)(4) is discretionary — “[u]pon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may … extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days.” It is a safety net, not a plan.

Direct appeal, in outline

A direct appeal is a review of the record made in the district court by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals. It is not a retrial, there are no new witnesses, and the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. It asks whether legal error occurred and, where it did, whether the error requires relief.

The firm’s appellate pages cover this in depth — start at how to appeal a federal conviction and grounds for a federal appeal. What belongs on this page is the handful of things a person needs in the first two weeks.

The deadline is 14 days from entry of judgment, filed in the district court. Everything else can be sorted out later; that cannot.

Standards of review decide most appeals, and they are set by how the issue was handled below. In one line each: a preserved question of law is generally reviewed de novo; a factual finding is generally reviewed for clear error; a discretionary ruling is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion; and an issue not objected to below is generally reviewed only for plain error. For sentencing specifically, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), holds that “[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” The firm’s pages on standards of review and preserving error for appeal go further.

An appeal waiver in a plea agreement may limit what can be raised. Most negotiated federal pleas contain one. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) requires the court, at the plea, to inform the defendant of and confirm they understand “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” A waiver is not total — in Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019), the Supreme Court noted that “no appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims,” and that “[a] valid and enforceable appeal waiver … only precludes challenges that fall within its scope.” See the firm’s page on appeal waivers and collateral-attack waivers.

Counsel must file the notice if you ask — even with a waiver. This is Garza‘s holding, and it is the most actionable case on this page: “We hold that the presumption of prejudice … applies regardless of whether the defendant has signed an appeal waiver.” The Court’s reasoning is worth reading in its own words: “the bare decision whether to appeal is ultimately the defendant’s, not counsel’s, to make,” and “a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable. … filing a notice of appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to the defendant’s wishes.” Where that happens, “the defendant gets a new opportunity to appeal.”

Read the scope carefully. Garza applies where the defendant instructed counsel to file and counsel did not. It does not create a right to appeal claims that fall inside a waiver’s scope, and it is not a remedy for a lawyer who advised against appealing. The practical takeaway is not “a waiver doesn’t matter.” It is: if you want to appeal, tell your lawyer in writing, immediately, and keep a copy. If that already happened and no notice was filed, see what to do when a lawyer did not file the appeal.

Related appellate topics — where an appointed lawyer concludes there are no non-frivolous issues, the Anders brief procedure applies; after a panel decision there is rehearing and rehearing en banc and then a petition for certiorari; and on timing, see how long a federal appeal takes.

Section 2255, in outline

A motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is a collateral attack, not a second appeal, and the difference is structural rather than semantic. A direct appeal goes to the court of appeals and is confined to the record made in the district court. A § 2255 motion goes back to the sentencing court, and it is the vehicle for claims that depend on facts outside that record — most commonly ineffective assistance of counsel, which usually cannot be raised on direct appeal because the record does not contain the evidence.

Section 2255(a) states the grounds: a prisoner in custody “claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” Being “in custody” is a jurisdictional requirement.

The limitation period is one year, and it runs from the latest of four dates. Section 2255(f): “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”

Note what the statute does not say. It does not define when a judgment “becomes final,” and it is not “one year from sentencing” or “one year from the denial of your appeal.” Trigger (3) runs from a Supreme Court decision, not a circuit decision. The firm maintains dedicated pages on when a conviction becomes final, on post-conviction deadlines, and a § 2255 deadline calculator.

A first § 2255 has to be right the first time. Section 2255(h) requires that “[a] second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain— (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” That gate is narrow. It is the strongest single argument for getting counsel involved before a § 2255 is filed rather than afterwards. See second or successive § 2255 motions and, on the mechanics, what a § 2255 motion is, direct appeal versus § 2255, ineffective assistance of counsel and procedural default.

Two practical notes. First, a § 2255 usually needs the transcripts and the presentence report, and obtaining them takes time — see getting transcripts, the PSR and your file. Second, for a person already in custody, the date a filing counts as filed can turn on the prisoner mailbox rule.

Custody or self-surrender: what happens in the courtroom and after

Whether a person leaves the courthouse in custody or goes home to await a report date is decided by statute, and the presumption after conviction is the reverse of the pretrial presumption.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1), a person found guilty and awaiting sentence must be detained “unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released.” After sentencing to imprisonment, a person who has appealed is detained under § 3143(b)(1) unless the court finds, again by clear and convincing evidence, that they are not likely to flee or pose a danger and finds “that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in— (i) reversal, (ii) an order for a new trial, (iii) a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or (iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process.” For the offense categories listed in § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(C), § 3143(b)(2) is flat: such a person, sentenced to imprisonment and having appealed, is to be detained.

The burden here is on the defendant, which is the reverse of the pretrial position. See the firm’s page on appeal bonds and release pending appeal.

When the sentence actually starts

18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) is precise: “A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”

Two phrases carry the weight. “Received in custody awaiting transportation” covers the person taken into custody at the hearing. “Arrives voluntarily” is the statutory basis for self-surrender — and it means the sentence starts on the report date, not the sentencing date. Any arithmetic about a release date has to start from that day, and the Bureau of Prisons, not the court, does the computing.

Credit for time already served

Section 3585(b) provides that “[a] defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences— (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence.”

That final clause is where most disputes live. Time a state has already applied to a state sentence does not get counted twice. The Bureau of Prisons computes the credit — not the judge — and disputes about it are administrative in the first instance. See prior custody credit, challenging a BOP sentence computation, and the firm’s explainer on the Bureau’s sentence computation manual. Where a state sentence is in the picture, see also nunc pro tunc state designation and designation of a state institution for service of a federal sentence.

What voluntary surrender means in practice

Self-surrender means reporting to a designated facility, on a specified date, without being transported by the Marshals Service. It is not automatic, it is not a right, and whether a court permits it turns on the § 3143 findings above. Where it is permitted, the Bureau’s own framework is described in the firm’s explainer on voluntary surrender and unescorted transfers, with the practical account at self-surrender.

The interval between sentencing and reporting is short and it is the only period in which certain things can be arranged. Practical preparation is covered at before you report, how to prepare for prison, and the firm’s preparing for prison service page. Families in particular find what families should know about federal prison and prison life for families the most useful starting points.

Designation: who decides where you go

The judge does not choose the prison. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) gives that authority to the Bureau of Prisons: “The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment, and shall, subject to bed availability, the prisoner’s security designation, the prisoner’s programmatic needs, the prisoner’s mental and medical health needs, any request made by the prisoner related to faith-based needs, recommendations of the sentencing court, and other security concerns of the Bureau of Prisons, place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a facility within 500 driving miles of that residence.”

Read the qualifiers, because they are doing real work. The 500-mile provision is conditioned twice over — “as close as practicable” and “to the extent practicable” — and it sits behind bed availability, security designation, programmatic needs, medical needs and the Bureau’s security concerns. It is not a promise.

The statute also lists five things the Bureau considers in designating any available facility that meets its minimum standards of health and habitability: “(1) the resources of the facility contemplated; (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner; (4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence— (A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or (B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission.”

A sentencing court can recommend, and § 3621(b)(4) requires the Bureau to consider the recommendation — but a recommendation is not an order. The statute says of one category expressly: “Any order, recommendation, or request by a sentencing court that a convicted person serve a term of imprisonment in a community corrections facility shall have no binding effect on the authority of the Bureau.” And the designation itself is insulated from review: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.” One more sentence in the same subsection is worth knowing: “In designating the place of imprisonment or making transfers under this subsection, there shall be no favoritism given to prisoners of high social or economic status.”

No page can tell you which facility a person will be designated to, or when. What can be described is the process and the inputs. The Bureau’s scoring framework is explained at security designation and custody classification and in the firm’s explainer on Program Statement 5100.08 — a Program Statement is Bureau policy, not law. The practical account is at designation, the security tiers at prison security levels, and later movement at transfers and the federal inmate transfer process.

The single largest input into all of it is the presentence report, which is why the objection window described on the presentence report page is worth taking seriously months before anyone thinks about a facility.

Applied Insight — Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, Managing Director: The questions families ask in the first week after sentencing are almost always about the facility and the date, and those are the two things nobody can answer. What is answerable, and useful, is the list of things that are still in play: whether the court will make a judicial recommendation and what it should say; whether the medical or mental-health record supports a particular care level; whether a documented substance-use history is in the presentence report; whether there is a separation or security concern that needs to be raised before designation rather than after. Every one of those is a paper question with a deadline attached. The legal work is handled by the firm’s attorneys; the point here is that the window is measured in weeks.

What happens inside: good conduct time is not First Step Act credits

These two are conflated in almost every non-specialist source, including a great many law firm pages. They are different statutes, doing different work, on different arithmetic.

	Good conduct time	First Step Act earned time credits
Statute	18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1)	18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4); applied under § 3624(g)
Rate	Up to 54 days for each year of the sentence imposed by the court	10 days per 30 days of successful participation, plus 5 more per 30 for a prisoner the Bureau has assessed at minimum or low risk over two consecutive assessments
Earned by	“exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations”	successful completion of evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities
Effect	Shortens the term of imprisonment	Applied “toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release”
Eligibility	A sentence of more than 1 year, other than life	Excludes prisoners serving sentences under any of a long list of statutory provisions, plus the risk and computation conditions in § 3624(g)

Good conduct time. Section 3624(b)(1) provides that “a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner’s life, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence of up to 54 days for each year of the prisoner’s sentence imposed by the court, subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.”

Two words in that sentence are load-bearing: “may receive,” and “subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons.” It is not automatic. And note the base of the calculation — the sentence imposed by the court. Before the First Step Act the statute computed the credit against time served, which produced roughly 47 days a year. Every article on the internet describing “about 47 days” or “you serve about 87 percent” is describing repealed law. See good conduct time and the Bureau-side explainer on good conduct time policy.

First Step Act earned time credits. Section 3632(d)(4)(A) provides that a prisoner who is not statutorily ineligible “and who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits as follows: (i) A prisoner shall earn 10 days of time credits for every 30 days of successful participation.” A prisoner the Bureau has “determined … to be at a minimum or low risk for recidivating, who, over 2 consecutive assessments, has not increased their risk of recidivism, shall earn an additional 5 days of time credits for every 30 days of successful participation.” The credits “shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release.”

Earning credits and having them applied are different things. Section 3624(g) adds its own conditions before credits convert into prerelease custody or supervised release — the prisoner must have earned credits “in an amount that is equal to the remainder of the prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment,” must have “shown through the periodic risk reassessments a demonstrated recidivism risk reduction or … maintained a minimum or low recidivism risk,” must have had the remainder of the term computed, and must satisfy the risk-level or warden-petition conditions the subsection sets out. The ineligibility list is long. No page can tell a reader they are eligible.

Depth on all of this lives on the Bureau side of this site: First Step Act time credits, the First Step Act of 2018, First Step Act assessments, programming and incentives, the PATTERN risk score, offenses that preclude early release, and the plain-language overview at the First Step Act.

Prerelease custody: halfway house and home confinement

Section 3624(c)(1) directs that “[t]he Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such conditions may include a community correctional facility.” Section 3624(c)(2) adds that “[t]he authority under this subsection may be used to place a prisoner in home confinement for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months.”

“Not to exceed 12 months” is a ceiling, not an entitlement, and it is qualified twice — “to the extent practicable” and “a portion of.” Nobody is promised a year of halfway house. Note also that § 3624(g)(10) provides that “[t]he time limits under subsections (b) and (c) shall not apply to prerelease custody under this subsection” — the First Step Act pathway is separate and is not capped by the 12-month and 10-percent figures.

For depth: halfway houses, home confinement, the Bureau’s halfway house placement procedures and home confinement policy, the Second Chance Act, and building a residential reentry center release plan.

Programming, and the first days inside

Programming decisions begin at intake, and the record built at sentencing is what they are made from. The firm’s pages cover intake screening, admission and orientation, the practical first day in prison and intake process, the Residential Drug Abuse Program with the Bureau-side treatment at psychology treatment programs and RDAP early release procedures and the legal angle at RDAP in federal prison, plus education, work assignments, visitation, staying in contact and release preparation alongside the Bureau’s release preparation program.

Where circumstances change dramatically during a sentence, compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a separate route with its own requirements, and early release options generally sit alongside it. Those are different proceedings from anything on this page.

Supervised release is not parole

Federal parole was abolished for offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987. There is no federal parole board for those offenses and nobody “makes parole.” What Congress put in its place is a determinate sentence, plus a separate term of supervised release served after the prison term, plus the credits described above.

That is the correction to make every time somebody says “parole” about a federal sentence. Supervised release is not early release and it is not a portion of the prison term served in the community. It is an additional term that begins when the prison term ends.

18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) fixes the start: “The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment and runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or local term of probation or supervised release or parole for another offense to which the person is subject or becomes subject during the term of supervised release.” It also stops the clock in one situation: “A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.”

How long it lasts. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) sets the authorized terms: “Except as otherwise provided, the authorized terms of supervised release are— (1) for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than five years; (2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years; and (3) for a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor (other than a petty offense), not more than one year.” Several statutes provide otherwise, including some that require longer terms.

Mandatory conditions. Section 3583(d) requires the court to order, “as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant not commit another Federal, State, or local crime during the term of supervision, that the defendant make restitution in accordance with sections 3663 and 3663A, or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution, and that the defendant not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.” It also requires an order that the defendant “refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to a drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court),” and — where authorized — cooperation in the collection of a DNA sample. Additional mandatory conditions apply to defendants required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and, in specified circumstances, to first-time domestic-violence convictions.

Revocation. Section 3583(e)(3) allows the court to “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on post-release supervision, if the court … finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” The procedure is Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1, which entitles the person to written notice of the alleged violation, disclosure of the evidence, an opportunity to appear, present evidence and question adverse witnesses, notice of the right to counsel, and “an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation.” Rule 32.1 sets no numeric deadlines — the standards are “without unnecessary delay,” “promptly,” and “within a reasonable time.” Where release pending the proceedings is sought, “[t]he burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community rests with the person.”

Early termination. Section 3583(e)(1) permits the court to “terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release … if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” That is a discretionary judicial decision on a full record, not an entitlement. See early termination of supervised release and the plain-language overview at supervised release basics.

Restitution, fines and the special assessment

Financial obligations are part of the judgment, and they start earlier than most people expect.

Payment is due immediately unless the court says otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1): “A person sentenced to pay a fine or other monetary penalty, including restitution, shall make such payment immediately, unless, in the interest of justice, the court provides for payment on a date certain or in installments.” Where installments are allowed, “the installments shall be in equal monthly payments over the period provided by the court, unless the court establishes another schedule,” and under § 3572(d)(2) the period “shall be the shortest time in which full payment can reasonably be made.”

Changed circumstances must be reported. Section 3572(d)(3) requires a judgment permitting installments to include “a requirement that the defendant will notify the court of any material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances that might affect the defendant’s ability to pay the fine,” and on receiving that notice “the court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice require.”

Default has a defined consequence. Section 3572(i): “A fine or payment of restitution is in default if a payment is delinquent for more than 90 days. Notwithstanding any installment schedule, when a fine or payment of restitution is in default, the entire amount of the fine or restitution is due within 30 days after notification of the default.”

The special assessment is separate and it is mandatory. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a) requires the court to assess, on an individual, $100 for each felony; $25 for a Class A misdemeanor; $10 for a Class B misdemeanor; and $5 for an infraction or Class C misdemeanor. For a defendant other than an individual the figures are $400 for a felony, $125, $50 and $25 respectively. The assessment “shall be collected in the manner that fines are collected in criminal cases,” and “[t]he obligation to pay an assessment ceases five years after the date of the judgment.”

Inside the institution, the Bureau administers collection through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. That program is where court-ordered financial obligations meet a person’s institutional pay, and participation status has consequences inside. It is Bureau policy, not law, and it is covered on the firm’s page about the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, with the practical account at inmate restitution.

Rule 35: two different things with the same rule number

Rule 35 does two unrelated jobs and the subsections get mixed up constantly.

Rule 35(a) — clear error, 14 days. “Within 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Rule 35(c) defines the trigger: “As used in this rule, ‘sentencing’ means the oral announcement of the sentence.” This is for genuine error — a mathematical mistake, a technical defect, a sentence that could not lawfully be imposed. It is not a vehicle for reconsidering the sentence because the defendant or the government is unhappy with it.

Rule 35(b) — substantial assistance after sentencing, on the government’s motion. “Upon the government’s motion made within one year of sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.” A motion made more than a year out is available only on the three narrow grounds in Rule 35(b)(2) — information the defendant did not know until a year or more after sentencing; information provided within a year that did not become useful until later; or information whose usefulness could not reasonably have been anticipated until later and that was promptly provided once it was apparent. Rule 35(b)(4) permits a reduction “to a level below the minimum sentence established by statute,” and the rule allows the court, in evaluating the assistance, to “consider the defendant’s presentence assistance.”

Rule 35(b) requires a government motion. A defendant cannot file it, and cooperating does not entitle anyone to one. See the firm’s page on the Rule 35 motion and, for the broader landscape, federal sentence reduction.

What to do in the first two weeks

A short, ordered list, because this is the part people ask for.

1. Get the deadline in writing. Ask counsel, in writing, for the date the judgment was entered and the date the notice of appeal is due. Fourteen days from entry of judgment, filed in the district court.
2. Say whether you want to appeal — in writing. Garza makes the decision the defendant’s, not counsel’s, and makes the failure to file a requested notice professionally unreasonable. Put the instruction in an email or a letter and keep a copy.
3. Read the written judgment against what was said in court. Count numbers, restitution figures, the supervised-release term and its conditions. Rule 35(a)’s fourteen days run from the oral announcement, so this cannot wait.
4. Confirm the surrender arrangement, if there is one — the date, the location if known, and what to bring. See self-surrender and before you report.
5. Ask whether the court made a judicial recommendation about facility or programming, and what it says. It is not binding on the Bureau, but § 3621(b)(4) requires the Bureau to consider it.
6. Ask what happens to counsel’s representation. Trial counsel’s obligations do not automatically extend to an appeal, and the answer differs between retained and appointed counsel.
7. Start the appellate file. Transcripts take time to prepare and a § 2255 later will need them; see getting transcripts, the PSR and your file.
8. Note the § 2255 year. It runs from the latest of four dates and it is not “one year from sentencing.” See post-conviction deadlines.

Where people get stuck on the 14-day appeal clock

“Fourteen days from the sentencing hearing.” No. Fourteen days from entry of the judgment, which is usually some days after the hearing — and the notice goes to the district court.

Assuming an appeal waiver ends the matter. Garza is explicit that no waiver bars all appellate claims and that a valid waiver “only precludes challenges that fall within its scope.” Whether a particular claim falls inside a particular waiver is a lawyer’s question.

Treating § 2255 as a second appeal. It is a different proceeding, in a different court, on different claims, with a different clock — and a second one requires certification by a court of appeals under § 2255(h).

Calling supervised release “parole.” Federal parole was abolished for offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987. Supervised release runs after the prison term, not instead of part of it.

Adding good conduct time to First Step Act credits as though they were one number. They are different statutes with different rates, different eligibility rules and different effects.

Assuming a judicial recommendation controls the facility. It does not. Section 3621(b) gives the designation to the Bureau, and the designation “is not reviewable by any court.”

Waiting for the Bureau to explain the sentence computation. Computation questions have an administrative route and the sooner they are raised the better. See challenging a BOP sentence computation.

Getting help after a federal sentencing

Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C. is a boutique federal criminal defense and appellate firm founded in 2019, running a national federal practice on an intentionally small caseload with more than 20 years of federal and appellate criminal defense experience. Elizabeth Franklin-Best is admitted to the U.S. Supreme Court and twelve of the thirteen U.S. Courts of Appeals — every regional circuit (1st–11th) plus the D.C. Circuit — and handles direct appeals, § 2255 motions, § 2241 petitions, sentence reductions and compassionate release. Christopher Zoukis leads the firm’s federal prison consulting work: designation, sentence computation, First Step Act credits, RDAP and reentry planning. The legal work is handled by the firm’s attorneys.

Offices are in Columbia and Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, and the practice is nationwide. The number is (843) 620-1100, and there is a contact page.

If a judgment has recently been entered in your case, the fourteen-day appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) is already running. That is the fact worth acting on today. Reading this page does not create an attorney-client relationship, and nothing here is legal advice about any particular case.

Where this sits in the federal case sequence

After sentencing is step 7 of seven — the last step in the federal court process, and the point where the court file becomes a Bureau of Prisons file.

• Before: Sentencing basics — the Guidelines calculation, the § 3553(a) factors and the hearing itself. Before that, the presentence report.
• The whole path: The federal court process.
• From here the case goes in three directions: direct appeal; collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and into custody, where the firm’s Bureau of Prisons policy library and its prison life pages take over.

Together they are recognized authorities on 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions and federal post-conviction relief.

Frequently Asked Questions About What Happens After Sentencing

Reviewed for legal accuracy by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney·September 2026