A federal crime is conduct made criminal by a statute Congress enacted, investigated by a federal agency, charged by a United States Attorney, and tried in a United States District Court. What matters most about the particular federal offense named on your paperwork is not its label but two numbers attached to it: the statutory maximum term of imprisonment, which fixes the offense’s letter-grade class under 18 U.S.C. § 3559 and drives the fine ceiling and the supervised release term, and any statutory minimum, which the sentencing judge cannot go below except in two narrowly defined situations.
This page is built around those two numbers. It gives the full classification scheme — Class A through E felonies, Class A through C misdemeanors, and infractions — against the fines authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3571 and the supervised release terms authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). It then walks the major categories of federal offense, and for each one gives a real statutory citation and a maximum read off the text of the statute rather than from memory. It explains how mandatory minimums and the Sentencing Guidelines interact, which is the single distinction that most often separates a negotiable case from one that is not. And it gives the federal conviction-rate numbers with the one caveat that makes them intelligible.
Nothing here tells you what will happen in your case. Federal sentencing turns on the record — the specific counts of conviction, the Guidelines calculation, criminal history, and the sentencing judge’s weighing of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). What this page can do is let you read an indictment and understand the size of the box you are in.
What is a federal crime?
A federal crime is an offense defined by an Act of Congress and codified in the United States Code, prosecuted by the Department of Justice in a United States District Court. That is the whole definition. It is not a category of worse conduct than state crime; it is a category of conduct that Congress chose to reach, usually because the conduct crosses a state line, touches a federal instrumentality, defrauds a federally insured or federally funded institution, or occurs on federal property.
Most federal criminal offenses live in Title 18 of the United States Code, the general federal criminal code. But a great many of the offenses that actually get charged do not. Drug trafficking lives in Title 21. Tax offenses live in Title 26. Immigration offenses live in Title 8. Securities, banking, environmental, food-and-drug, customs, and firearms-licensing provisions are scattered across other titles, and a substantial number of federal regulations carry criminal penalties by cross-reference to a statute. When someone says “I looked up my charge and it isn’t in Title 18,” that is usually why.
The four features every federal prosecution shares
- The prohibition comes from Congress. A federal offense must be created by statute. There is no federal common-law crime. If the government cannot point to a statute that reaches the conduct, there is no federal charge — which is why the first thing a defense lawyer does with a new indictment is read the charging statute element by element against what the government says the client did.
- A federal agency investigates. The FBI, DEA, ATF, IRS Criminal Investigation, Homeland Security Investigations, Customs and Border Protection, the Secret Service, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the inspectors general of individual federal departments each have their own statutory jurisdiction. Which agency is at your door is often the fastest available clue about what the government thinks the offense is.
- A United States Attorney charges. Federal criminal cases are brought by Assistant United States Attorneys in one of the 94 federal judicial districts, or by a litigating division of Main Justice. There is no private federal prosecution and no state district attorney anywhere in the process.
- Federal procedure governs. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Speedy Trial Act, the Bail Reform Act, and the 2025 Guidelines Manual apply. Every timing rule and every sentencing mechanism on this page comes from that body of law and none of it comes from state practice.
The jurisdictional hooks
Federal jurisdiction attaches through the conduct’s connection to a federal interest. In practice you will see four recurring hooks, and the indictment will usually recite one of them in the charging paragraph:
- Interstate or foreign commerce. The most common hook by far. Wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires a transmission “by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce”; the felon-in-possession statute at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) requires that the firearm be shipped, transported, possessed “in or affecting commerce,” or received after interstate shipment.
- Federal property, federal territory, or a federal officer. Assault on a federal officer, arson of a federal building, and offenses committed on federal enclaves fall here.
- Federal money or a federally regulated institution. 18 U.S.C. § 666 reaches theft and bribery involving an organization or government that “receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program.” Bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 reaches schemes to defraud a “financial institution.”
- The mails or a private interstate carrier. Mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 reaches anything placed in the mail or deposited with “any private or commercial interstate carrier” for the purpose of executing a scheme.
Applied Insight — Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney: The jurisdictional element is an element. It has to be pleaded and it has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt like every other element, and in a marginal case it is sometimes the weakest part of the government’s proof. It is also the element clients most often assume away, because “the FBI showed up” feels like the end of the analysis rather than the beginning of it. When we read a new indictment we read the jurisdictional allegation as carefully as the conduct allegation.
Dual jurisdiction and the “adopted” case
The same act can violate both a federal statute and a state statute. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, prosecution by one sovereign does not, by itself, bar prosecution by the other. In practice, successive federal and state prosecutions for the same conduct are uncommon; the Department of Justice’s own internal policy on dual and successive prosecution — the “Petite Policy,” JM 9-2.031 — restricts when a federal case may follow a state one. That is Department policy, not law: it guides federal prosecutors internally and does not give a defendant a right that a court will enforce.
What happens far more often is that a case originating with local police is “adopted” federally — the firearm recovered on a local arrest becomes a § 922(g) count, or a local narcotics investigation becomes a 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy. The practical consequence is a different sentencing system, a different release regime, and a different set of collateral consequences. Our comparison of the two systems is at federal vs. state criminal cases.
On this page
How Federal Offenses Are Classified: Class A Through E Felonies, Class A Through C Misdemeanors, and Infractions
Every federal offense carries a letter-grade class, and that class is determined mechanically by the maximum term of imprisonment the statute authorizes. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) provides that “an offense that is not specifically classified by a letter grade in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is” — and then supplies nine tiers. Because almost no federal statute assigns itself a letter grade, in practice the class of nearly every federal offense is derived from its maximum.
The class is not cosmetic. It sets the ceiling on the fine under § 3571(b), the authorized term of supervised release under § 3583(b), and whether probation is available at all under § 3561(a). It also decides whether the government must proceed by grand jury indictment: Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a) requires an indictment for any offense “punishable by death” or “by imprisonment for more than one year,” which is every felony class.
The federal offense classification table
If the statutory maximum is X, the class is Y, the individual fine ceiling is Z, and the supervised release term is W. Every value below is the authorized figure in the cited statute. The fine column states the default ceiling for an individual under § 3571(b); the alternative fine under § 3571(d) and any higher fine written into the offense statute itself can exceed it.
| Statutory maximum term of imprisonment | Class (§ 3559(a)) | Default authorized term (§ 3581(b)) | Individual fine ceiling (§ 3571(b)) | Organizational fine ceiling (§ 3571(c)) | Supervised release (§ 3583(b)) | Probation (§ 3561) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Life imprisonment, or maximum penalty is death | Class A felony | Life or any period of time | $250,000 | $500,000 | Not more than 5 years | Not available to an individual |
| 25 years or more | Class B felony | Not more than 25 years | $250,000 | $500,000 | Not more than 5 years | Not available to an individual |
| Less than 25 years but 10 or more years | Class C felony | Not more than 12 years | $250,000 | $500,000 | Not more than 3 years | 1 to 5 years |
| Less than 10 years but 5 or more years | Class D felony | Not more than 6 years | $250,000 | $500,000 | Not more than 3 years | 1 to 5 years |
| Less than 5 years but more than 1 year | Class E felony | Not more than 3 years | $250,000 | $500,000 | Not more than 1 year | 1 to 5 years |
| 1 year or less but more than 6 months | Class A misdemeanor | Not more than 1 year | $100,000 (if no death results) | $200,000 (if no death results) | Not more than 1 year | Not more than 5 years |
| 6 months or less but more than 30 days | Class B misdemeanor | Not more than 6 months | $5,000 (if no death results) | $10,000 (if no death results) | None authorized (petty offense) | Not more than 5 years |
| 30 days or less but more than 5 days | Class C misdemeanor | Not more than 30 days | $5,000 (if no death results) | $10,000 (if no death results) | None authorized (petty offense) | Not more than 5 years |
| 5 days or less, or no imprisonment authorized | Infraction | Not more than 5 days | $5,000 | $10,000 | None authorized (petty offense) | Not more than 1 year |
Sources for each column, in order: 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1)–(9); 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3)–(7); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(3)–(7); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1)–(3) read with the definition of “petty offense” at 18 U.S.C. § 19; 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a) and (c).
Five things this table will not tell you unless you read the footnotes
One: the fine ceiling does not vary by felony class. Section 3571(b)(3) says simply “for a felony, not more than $250,000.” A Class E felony and a Class A felony carry the same default fine ceiling for an individual. What changes the number is not the class but two other provisions: the fine written into the offense statute itself (bank fraud under § 1344 authorizes $1,000,000; money laundering under § 1956(a)(1) authorizes $500,000), and the alternative fine based on gain or loss at § 3571(d) — “if any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss.” In a large fraud case, § 3571(d) is the number that matters, and it is unbounded in principle.
Two: § 3581(b) is a default that almost never operates. The “authorized term” column above says a Class C felony carries “not more than twelve years.” But a Class C felony is any offense whose maximum is “less than twenty-five years but ten or more years” — which includes twenty-year statutes such as wire fraud and money laundering. The apparent contradiction dissolves once you read 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a), which applies the chapter “except as otherwise specifically provided.” Where the offense statute states its own maximum — and nearly every one does — that maximum controls, and § 3559 works backwards from it to assign the class. Section 3581(b) fills the gap only for the rare offense whose defining statute is silent on the term. This is the most common place a non-specialist gets federal classification wrong.
Three: supervised release is a separate sentence, not a discount on the prison term. Under § 3583(a) the court “may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment,” and must do so where a statute requires it. It runs after release from custody. It is not parole, and violating it can return a person to prison.
Four: § 3583(b) yields to any statute that says otherwise, and several do. The subsection opens “Except as otherwise provided.” Two carve-outs sit in the same section: § 3583(j) authorizes “any term of years or life” for a terrorism predicate listed in § 2332b(g)(5)(B), and § 3583(k) authorizes “any term of years not less than 5, or life” for offenses including §§ 2250, 2251, 2252, 2422 and 2423. The drug statutes go further and say so expressly: each of § 841(b)(1)(A) through (D) begins its supervised release provision with “Notwithstanding section 3583 of title 18,” and then sets its own floor — at least 5 years under (b)(1)(A), at least 4 under (b)(1)(B), at least 3 under (b)(1)(C), and at least 2 under (b)(1)(D), each doubling to 10, 8, 6 and 4 years respectively where there was a qualifying prior conviction.
Five: a “petty offense” gets no supervised release. Section 3583(b)(3) authorizes a term for “a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor (other than a petty offense),” and 18 U.S.C. § 19 defines “petty offense” as “a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction” within the § 3571(b)(6)–(7) fine limits. So the Class B and C misdemeanor rows in the table above carry no authorized supervised release term at all.
Where the class shows up again later
The letter grade is not a one-time label. It reappears at several decision points that matter a great deal to a defendant:
- Grand jury. Rule 7(a) requires prosecution by indictment for any offense punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year — every felony class. A defendant may waive indictment “in open court and after being advised of the nature of the charge and of the defendant’s rights,” which is the ordinary route into a negotiated pre-indictment resolution.
- Probation eligibility. § 3561(a)(1) removes probation as an option for an individual convicted of a Class A or Class B felony. For Class C, D and E felonies probation remains authorized by statute, though the Guidelines and any mandatory minimum may foreclose it in fact.
- Firearm disability. § 922(g)(1) disqualifies anyone “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” — the felony/misdemeanor line, drawn by the statutory maximum rather than by the sentence actually imposed. Our explainer on restoring firearm rights is at can a felon own a gun.
- Immigration exposure. Whether a conviction is an “aggravated felony” or a “crime involving moral turpitude” for immigration purposes turns in part on the maximum and the elements. That analysis is separate from § 3559 and has to be done by counsel; our discussion of when immigration advice becomes a Sixth Amendment issue is at Padilla and immigration consequences.
Penalties for Federal Crimes
A federal sentence is assembled from separate components, each authorized by its own statute, and a defendant can receive several of them at once. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) lists the three primary sentences for an individual — “a term of probation,” “a fine,” or “a term of imprisonment” — and adds that “a sentence to pay a fine may be imposed in addition to any other sentence,” with restitution, forfeiture and notice-to-victims sanctions available on top under §§ 3554–3556.
Imprisonment
The term of imprisonment is bounded above by the statutory maximum and below by any statutory minimum. Between those two poles, the Guidelines produce an advisory range and the court selects a sentence after weighing the § 3553(a) factors. Federal sentences run in months, and multiple counts may run concurrently or consecutively — with one important exception discussed below, where the statute forbids a concurrent sentence.
Fines
The default ceilings are in the table above. Three refinements matter in practice. First, the offense statute may set a higher number, and for financial offenses it usually does. Second, § 3571(d)’s twice-the-gain-or-loss alternative can vastly exceed the default. Third, § 3571(e) provides that where the offense statute specifies a lower fine and “by specific reference, exempts the offense from the applicability of the fine otherwise applicable under this section,” the lower figure governs — a narrow provision that requires an express cross-reference, not merely a smaller number in the statute.
Restitution and forfeiture
These are different things and are routinely confused. Restitution compensates identified victims for losses caused by the offense and is paid to them. Forfeiture transfers to the United States property that constitutes or derives from the proceeds of the offense, or property used to commit it — and for some statutes it is mandatory rather than discretionary. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), the RICO penalty provision, says a defendant “shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law,” any interest acquired or maintained in violation of § 1962, any interest in the enterprise, and “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds” of the racketeering activity. Section 1963(m) adds substitute-asset forfeiture: if the specific property “cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence,” has been transferred to a third party, placed beyond the court’s jurisdiction, substantially diminished in value, or commingled, “the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value” of what is missing.
Forfeiture in a large case can dwarf the fine. In the prosecution of Joaquín Guzmán Loera, the Second Circuit’s opinion affirming the judgment records that he was “sentenced primarily to five concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the CCE and narcotics trafficking violations and 30 years consecutively for the firearms violation, and ordered to forfeit more than $12 billion.” United States v. Beltran-Leyva (Guzman Loera), 24 F.4th 144 (2d Cir. 2022). Our asset-forfeiture practice page is at federal asset forfeiture.
Note what that sentence structure shows about federal law generally: the consecutive 30 years was the firearms count, and it had to be consecutive. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.” Section 924(c)(1)(D)(i) also forbids probation on such a count.
Supervised release
Nearly every federal prison sentence is followed by a term of supervised release, imposed under § 3583. Violating its conditions can result in revocation and a return to custody. Supervised release is administered by the United States Probation Office, not by the Bureau of Prisons, and it is not a form of early release — it is additional time under court supervision that begins when the prison term ends.
There is no federal parole for modern offenses
Federal parole was abolished for offenses committed on or after 1 November 1987, the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act. What replaced it is a determinate sentence imposed under § 3553(a), a term of supervised release served after prison, good conduct time, and — since 2018 — First Step Act earned time credits. Nobody in the modern federal system “makes parole,” and a page or a person who tells you otherwise is describing a system that ended before most current defendants were charged.
The two credit mechanisms are distinct and are constantly conflated:
| Good conduct time | First Step Act earned time credits | |
|---|---|---|
| Statute | 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) | 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), applied under § 3624(g) |
| Rate | Up to 54 days for each year of the sentence imposed by the court | 10 days per 30 days of successful participation, plus 5 more per 30 days for a person assessed minimum or low risk over two consecutive assessments |
| Earned by | Exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations | Successful completion of evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities |
| Effect | Shortens the term of imprisonment | Applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release |
| Availability | Sentence of more than one year, other than life | Excluded for people serving sentences under a long list of specified offenses, plus risk and computation conditions |
Applied Insight — Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, Managing Director: The most common error we correct in the first week of a consulting engagement is arithmetic that predates the First Step Act. The old rule computed good conduct time against time served, which produced the familiar “you serve about 87 percent” figure. The current statute computes it against the sentence imposed by the court. Anything you read that runs the old math is describing repealed law. And even the current math produces a maximum available credit, not a release date: good conduct time is awarded for compliance, not automatically, and the Bureau’s computation is its own process. We never give a client a date. We tell them what the statute authorizes and then read the sentence computation the Bureau actually produces.
Our detailed explainers sit on the prison side of the site: good conduct time, First Step Act time credits, RDAP, halfway houses and prerelease custody, and offenses that preclude early release.
Collateral consequences
A federal felony conviction carries consequences no judgment recites in full: loss of the right to possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1), professional licensing and debarment exposure, loss of federal benefits eligibility in some categories, immigration consequences including removal for non-citizens, and the practical employment and credit effects of a public federal conviction. For anyone who is not a United States citizen, the immigration analysis must be done before a plea, not after.
Mandatory Minimums Versus the Sentencing Guidelines
These are two different systems, they do different work, and confusing them is the most consequential misunderstanding a federal defendant can carry into a first meeting with counsel. A mandatory minimum is a floor written by Congress into a criminal statute; the judge cannot go below it unless one of two narrow statutory provisions applies. The Sentencing Guidelines are an advisory framework produced by the United States Sentencing Commission; the judge must calculate the range correctly and then may sentence inside or outside it after weighing the § 3553(a) factors.
The practical difference: a Guidelines problem is an argument. A mandatory minimum is a wall.
Where mandatory minimums come from
They are written into individual offense statutes, and they are concentrated in a handful of areas. Drug quantity is the largest source: 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) sets a term “which may not be less than 10 years or more than life” for the highest quantity tier, and § 841(b)(1)(B) sets a term “which may not be less than 5 years and not more than 40 years” for the middle tier. Firearms are the second: § 924(c)(1)(A) sets consecutive minimums of 5, 7 and 10 years depending on whether the firearm was possessed, brandished or discharged. Child exploitation is the third: § 2251(e) requires “not less than 15 years nor more than 30 years” for a production offense, and § 2252(b)(1) requires “not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years” for transportation, receipt or distribution.
Three features of mandatory minimums repeatedly surprise people:
- They are driven by facts, not by the offense name. In a drug case the trigger is quantity, and quantity is charged in the indictment. Two people convicted of the same statute can face a 5-year floor, a 10-year floor, or no floor at all depending on the amount the government alleges and proves.
- They stack. A second or subsequent conviction under § 924(c) carries “not less than 25 years,” and life if the firearm is a machinegun, a destructive device, or equipped with a silencer — and each § 924(c) term must run consecutively to everything else.
- Prior convictions raise the floor sharply. Under § 841(b)(1)(A), a defendant with one prior final conviction for a “serious drug felony or serious violent felony” faces “not less than 15 years”; with two or more, “not less than 25 years.”
Our dedicated explainer is at mandatory minimum sentences, and the recidivist firearm enhancement is covered at the Armed Career Criminal Act.
The two ways below a statutory minimum
There are exactly two, and both are narrower than clients expect.
One: substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). The statute is titled “Limited Authority To Impose a Sentence Below a Statutory Minimum” and it opens with four words that decide most of the question: “Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” The Guidelines counterpart, USSG §5K1.1, opens identically — “Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, a sentence that is below the otherwise applicable guideline range may be appropriate” — and lists five factors the court weighs in setting the size of the reduction.
Three points that matter and that no defendant should learn late. A defendant cannot make either motion; only the government can. Cooperating does not entitle anyone to a motion. And §5K1.1 by itself goes below the guideline range, not below a statutory minimum — going below a statutory minimum requires § 3553(e). A third provision, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), reduces a sentence already imposed for assistance rendered after sentencing, again only on the government’s motion. Our pages are at § 5K1.1 substantial assistance, proffer agreements and Rule 35 motions.
Two: the safety valve at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). This one does not require a government motion — it requires findings by the court. It applies only to a defined set of drug offenses: violations of §§ 841, 844 and 846 of the Controlled Substances Act, §§ 960 and 963 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, and 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 and 70506. Where it applies, “the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission … without regard to any statutory minimum sentence,” if the court finds at sentencing — after the government has been given the opportunity to make a recommendation — that all five criteria are met.
The five criteria, from the current text of § 3553(f):
- Criminal history. The defendant does not have (A) “more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines”; (B) “a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines”; and (C) “a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”
- No violence or weapon. The defendant “did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense.”
- No death or serious bodily injury. “The offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person.”
- Not an organizer. The defendant “was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense” and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise.
- Full and truthful disclosure. By the time of sentencing the defendant has “truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense,” whether or not it is useful and whether or not the government already knows it.
Criterion 1 is the one the First Step Act rewrote in 2018. The old rule limited the safety valve to defendants with no more than one criminal history point. The current rule is a three-part points test that opens the provision to a materially larger group — and, because it is expressed in Guidelines criminal-history terms, it interacts with Amendment 821’s narrowing of “status points” at USSG §4A1.1(e). Section 3553(f) also contains a use immunity provision: “Information disclosed by a defendant under this subsection may not be used to enhance the sentence of the defendant unless the information relates to a violent offense.” Our explainer is at the safety valve in federal sentencing.
Whether any of these provisions applies to a particular defendant is a determination for the sentencing court on the record before it. Nothing on this page can tell you that you qualify for any of them.
What the data shows about how often the wall comes down
The Sentencing Commission publishes this. In fiscal year 2025, of the 66,662 cases reported to the Commission, 13,926 — 21 percent — involved an offense carrying a statutory mandatory minimum penalty, and 15 percent of all sentenced individuals were subject to a mandatory minimum at sentencing. Among those convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum, 33 percent were relieved of the penalty: 14 percent through the safety valve, 15 percent through substantial assistance, and 5 percent through both. Sixty-seven percent received no relief. Of the cases carrying a mandatory minimum, 68 percent were drug trafficking, 8 percent sexual abuse, 7 percent child pornography, 5 percent firearms and 3 percent fraud. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Quick Facts: Mandatory Minimum Penalties (FY 2025).
The same publication reports average sentence lengths for the three groups: 158 months for those subject to the mandatory minimum, 74 months for those who received relief, and 28 months for individuals not convicted of an offense carrying one. Those are national averages across all offense types and all districts, not a forecast for any individual — but the spread is the clearest single illustration of why identifying a mandatory minimum early is the most valuable thing a defense lawyer does in the first month of a drug or firearms case.
How the Guidelines fit around the minimum
The Guidelines are advisory, but the court must still calculate them. USSG §1B1.1 sets out a two-step structure: Step One is a nine-part sequence producing the guideline range, and Step Two is consideration of the remaining § 3553(a) factors “to determine a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary.” The range itself comes from the Sentencing Table in Chapter 5, Part A — 43 offense levels down the vertical axis and 6 criminal history categories across the horizontal, with each cell expressed in months.
Where a mandatory minimum exceeds the top of the calculated range, the minimum becomes the sentence. Where the range exceeds the minimum, the range does the work. Two Guidelines provisions come up in almost every case:
- USSG §3E1.1, acceptance of responsibility. Subsection (a) gives a 2-level decrease to a defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” Subsection (b) gives 1 additional level — but only where the defendant qualifies under (a), the offense level before the (a) reduction is 16 or greater, and the government moves for it on the ground of timely notification of an intention to plead guilty. It is not “three levels for pleading guilty,” and the third level is the government’s to move for. Worth knowing: the current commentary states that “Preparations for pretrial proceedings (such as litigation related to a charging document, discovery motions, and suppression motions) ordinarily are not considered ‘preparing for trial’ under this subsection,” so filing a suppression motion does not by itself cost the third level. Our page is at acceptance of responsibility.
- USSG §4C1.1, the zero-point offender adjustment. Added by Amendment 821 effective 1 November 2023, it gives a 2-level decrease — but only where a defendant meets all eleven listed criteria conjunctively, beginning with receiving no criminal history points at all and including that the defendant did not possess a firearm in connection with the offense and did not receive an aggravating-role adjustment. “Zero-point offender” is a term of art; having no prior record is criterion one, not the whole test.
The full Guidelines walkthrough lives at federal sentencing guidelines explained and the mechanics of the sentencing hearing at the federal sentencing hearing. The operative edition is the 2025 Guidelines Manual, effective 1 November 2025.
List of Federal Crimes by Category
Federal criminal law is organized less by moral category than by federal interest, which is why the categories below cut across each other — a single scheme can be charged as wire fraud, money laundering, and a false statement, all arising from the same conduct. What follows is the working map, with a real statutory citation and a maximum read off the text of the statute for each principal offense. Where a statute has multiple tiers, the tiers are given.
Read the maximum, then read the class. Every offense below is classified under § 3559(a) by the maximum shown, using the table earlier on this page.
Federal fraud and white-collar offenses
Fraud prosecutions are built on a small number of very broad statutes, and prosecutors routinely charge several of them in the alternative for the same conduct.
| Offense | Statute | Maximum term | Enhanced tier |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mail fraud | 18 U.S.C. § 1341 | 20 years | 30 years and $1,000,000 if the violation affects a financial institution or relates to a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency |
| Wire fraud | 18 U.S.C. § 1343 | 20 years | 30 years and $1,000,000, same triggers |
| Bank fraud | 18 U.S.C. § 1344 | 30 years and $1,000,000 | — |
| Health care fraud | 18 U.S.C. § 1347 | 10 years | 20 years if the violation results in serious bodily injury; any term of years or life if it results in death |
| Securities and commodities fraud | 18 U.S.C. § 1348 | 25 years | — |
| Access device (credit card) fraud | 18 U.S.C. § 1029(c) | 10 years for a first offense under (a)(1), (2), (3), (6), (7) or (10); 15 years under (a)(4), (5), (8) or (9) | 20 years for an offense after a prior conviction under § 1029, plus forfeiture of personal property used to commit it |
| False statements to the government | 18 U.S.C. § 1001 | 5 years | 8 years if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism as defined in § 2331, or if the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110 or 117 or § 1591 |
| Theft or bribery involving federal program funds | 18 U.S.C. § 666 | 10 years | — |
| Extortionate extension of credit (“loan-sharking”) | 18 U.S.C. § 892(a) | 20 years | — |
Four points a reader should take from that table.
Mail and wire fraud are the same statute twice. The elements are a scheme to defraud plus a use of the mails or of interstate wires in furtherance of it. Because virtually every modern commercial scheme touches an email, a bank transfer or a phone call, wire fraud is the default charge in white-collar cases. The 30-year enhanced tier is not reserved for enormous cases — it applies whenever the violation “affects a financial institution,” which in practice reaches a great many ordinary fraud schemes.
The § 1001 carve-out is real and narrow. Subsection (b) provides that § 1001(a) “does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.” It does not immunize statements to agents. There is no “exculpatory no” exception for a false denial to an investigator.
Section 666 has two dollar thresholds and they do different work. The property, or the business or transaction involved, must be “valued at $5,000 or more”; separately, the organization or government must have received “benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program” in a one-year period. Both must be present.
Fraud is where the alternative fine bites hardest. Under § 3571(d) the fine can be twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, which in a nine-figure loss case is a very large number.
Related offenses in this family — antitrust and bid-rigging, bankruptcy fraud, computer fraud under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, conflict of interest, consumer fraud and telemarketing schemes, copyright infringement on a commercial scale, corporate fraud, counterfeiting of currency and goods, embezzlement, forgery, gambling businesses, identity theft, insider trading, insurance fraud, investment and Ponzi schemes, labor racketeering, mass-marketing fraud, misappropriation, mortgage fraud, pill-mill prescribing, real estate fraud, structuring and Bank Secrecy Act reporting violations, theft of trade secrets, and tobacco-tax trafficking — are charged under the same core statutes plus their own specialized provisions. Our practice pages: white-collar crime, wire fraud, bank fraud, health care fraud, Medicare fraud, securities fraud, insider trading, embezzlement, Ponzi and investment fraud, bankruptcy fraud, financial crime generally, Anti-Kickback and Stark Law matters, False Claims Act and qui tam defense, FBAR and offshore accounts, SEC investigations, civil investigative demands, OIG exclusion, counterfeiting as a white-collar crime, real estate fraud and theft of trade secrets.
Federal drug offenses
Drug trafficking is the second-largest category of federal sentencing by volume and the largest single source of mandatory minimums. The core prohibition is 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) — manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to do so — and the penalties are tiered by drug type and quantity in § 841(b).
| Tier | Representative quantity triggers | Penalty range | With one qualifying prior | With two or more |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| § 841(b)(1)(A) | 1 kg or more heroin; 5 kg or more cocaine; 280 g or more cocaine base; 400 g or more fentanyl (100 g of an analogue or fentanyl-related substance); 1,000 kg or 1,000 plants marijuana; 100 g PCP or 1 kg of a PCP mixture; 10 g LSD | Not less than 10 years, not more than life; not less than 20 years to life if death or serious bodily injury results | Not less than 15 years to life for a prior serious drug felony or serious violent felony; life if death or serious bodily injury results | Not less than 25 years |
| § 841(b)(1)(B) | 100 g or more heroin; 500 g or more cocaine; 28 g or more cocaine base; 40 g or more fentanyl (10 g analogue or fentanyl-related substance); 100 kg or 100 plants marijuana; 10 g PCP or 100 g of a PCP mixture; 1 g LSD | Not less than 5 years, not more than 40 years; not less than 20 years to life if death or serious bodily injury results | Not less than 10 years to life; life if death or serious bodily injury results | — |
| § 841(b)(1)(C) | Any Schedule I or II substance not within (A), (B) or (D) | Not more than 20 years; not less than 20 years to life if death or serious bodily injury results | Not more than 30 years for a prior felony drug offense; life if death or serious bodily injury results | — |
| § 841(b)(1)(D) | Less than 50 kg marijuana (except 50 or more plants), 10 kg hashish, 1 kg hashish oil | Not more than 5 years | Not more than 10 years | — |
Four things a reader should notice. First, there is no mandatory minimum at all in the (C) and (D) tiers — those are maximum-only provisions unless death or serious bodily injury results. Second, the (B) tier maximum is 40 years, not life, which makes it a Class B felony rather than a Class A felony and carries different supervised release and probation consequences. Third, the death-or-serious-bodily-injury enhancement is enormous, converting a no-minimum (C) case into a 20-year floor. Fourth, conspiracy carries the same exposure as the completed offense: 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides that a person who “attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” A drug conspiracy defendant who never personally handled a kilogram can face a 10-year floor if the conspiracy’s attributable quantity crosses the threshold.
That last point is why quantity is contested in nearly every federal drug case, and why the drug-quantity finding in the presentence report deserves as much attention as the guilty plea itself. Our pages: federal drug charges, role reduction and minor participant, and Amendment 833 and the drug role reduction.
Simple possession for personal use is normally a state matter; it becomes federal when it occurs on federal property or is charged as part of a larger federal investigation. Marijuana remains a controlled substance under federal law regardless of state legalization, and § 841(b)(1)(D) still supplies a 5-year federal maximum for quantities below the (B) threshold.
Federal firearms offenses
Two statutes do most of the work, and they operate very differently.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — possession by a prohibited person. Subsection (g) makes it unlawful for nine categories of person “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” The nine categories are: a person convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”; a fugitive from justice; an unlawful user of or person addicted to a controlled substance; a person adjudicated as a mental defective or committed to a mental institution; certain non-citizens; a person discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; a person who has renounced United States citizenship; a person subject to a qualifying domestic-violence protective order; and a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
The penalty is in § 924(a)(8): “Whoever knowingly violates subsection (d) or (g) of section 922 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both.” That makes a § 922(g) offense a Class C felony.
The knowledge element changed in 2019, and it changed in the defendant’s favor. In Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), the Supreme Court held: “In a prosecution under §922(g) and §924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Before Rehaif, every court of appeals to consider the question had held that knowledge of status was not required. The Court explained why status matters: “It is the defendant’s status, not his conduct alone, that makes the difference. Without knowledge of that status, a defendant may lack the intent needed to make his behavior wrongful.” The Court noted that the parties and the majority did not extend the knowledge requirement to the interstate-commerce element.
Rehaif is now a routine part of a § 922(g) defense — the indictment must allege the knowledge-of-status element and the government must prove it. It has generated a substantial body of appellate and collateral litigation about pleas and verdicts entered before 2019.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) — using, carrying or possessing a firearm in connection with another crime. This is the provision that reshapes a federal sentence. It applies to a person who, “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime … uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm,” and it adds a term “in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime”:
| Circumstance | Minimum term under § 924(c) |
|---|---|
| Firearm used, carried or possessed | Not less than 5 years |
| Firearm brandished | Not less than 7 years |
| Firearm discharged | Not less than 10 years |
| Short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon | Not less than 10 years |
| Machinegun, destructive device, or firearm equipped with a silencer or muffler | Not less than 30 years |
| Second or subsequent conviction under § 924(c) | Not less than 25 years; life if the firearm is a machinegun, destructive device, or silencer-equipped |
Two structural features make § 924(c) different from every other sentencing provision on this page. It is mandatorily consecutive: § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) forbids any § 924(c) term from running concurrently with any other term, “including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.” And probation is unavailable: § 924(c)(1)(D)(i) provides that “a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of this subsection.” The statute states minimum terms; it does not state a maximum term for a § 924(c)(1) violation.
Other firearms offenses — unlicensed dealing, straw purchasing, trafficking, possession of an unregistered National Firearms Act weapon, and possession in a school zone or federal facility — are charged under their own provisions in chapter 44 of Title 18 and Title 26. Restoration of firearm rights is a separate subject; see federal firearm rights restoration.
Federal child exploitation and sex offenses
These carry the longest mandatory minimums outside homicide and the most severe supervised release consequences in the federal system. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) provides that for offenses including §§ 2250, 2251, 2252, 2422 and 2423, and for § 1201 kidnapping involving a minor victim, “the authorized term of supervised release … is any term of years not less than 5, or life” — overriding the ordinary § 3583(b) ceilings entirely.
| Offense | Statute | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Sexual exploitation of children (production) | 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) | Not less than 15 years nor more than 30 years; not less than 25 nor more than 50 years with one qualifying prior; not less than 35 years nor more than life with two or more; death or not less than 30 years or life where conduct in the course of the offense results in death |
| Transportation, receipt, distribution or sale of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors | 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) | Not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years; not less than 15 nor more than 40 years with a qualifying prior |
| Possession of such material | 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) | Not more than 10 years; not more than 20 years if a depiction involved a prepubescent minor or a minor who had not attained 12 years of age; not less than 10 nor more than 20 years with a qualifying prior |
| Failure to register as a sex offender | 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) | Not more than 10 years; § 2250(d) adds not less than 5 nor more than 30 years, consecutive, for a person described in (a) or (b) who commits a federal crime of violence |
Note the structure of § 2252: the conduct verb decides the floor. Receipt and distribution carry a 5-year minimum; possession carries none, but carries a 10-year maximum that doubles where the depiction involved a prepubescent minor or a child under 12. In practice, whether a case is charged as receipt or as possession is frequently the single most consequential charging decision in the file, and it is one that can sometimes be addressed before an indictment issues.
Related offenses in this family include sex trafficking of minors under § 1591, criminal sexual abuse offenses within federal jurisdiction under chapter 109A, coercion and enticement of a minor under §§ 2422 and 2423, obscenity offenses, and Mann Act violations. Prosecutions frequently begin as undercover or online operations, and digital evidence — chat logs, hash values, forensic images — is usually the center of the case.
Federal money laundering and financial reporting offenses
| Offense | Statute | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Laundering of monetary instruments | 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) | Fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both |
| Engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property over $10,000 | 18 U.S.C. § 1957 | Fine under Title 18, or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both; alternate fine of not more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property |
The two statutes are not interchangeable. Section 1956 requires a financial transaction involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity plus one of several specific intents — to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, to violate 26 U.S.C. § 7201 or § 7206, to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds, or to avoid a transaction reporting requirement. Section 1957 requires much less: a knowing monetary transaction in criminally derived property “of a value greater than $10,000” derived from specified unlawful activity. Section 1957 is easier for the government to prove and carries half the maximum.
Money laundering counts are almost always add-ons to a predicate fraud or drug charge, and they matter for three reasons: they raise the aggregate maximum, they support forfeiture, and they can significantly change the Guidelines calculation. Our page is at money laundering defense.
Federal tax offenses
| Offense | Statute | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Attempt to evade or defeat tax | 26 U.S.C. § 7201 | Felony; fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution |
| Fraud and false statements — false return signed under penalties of perjury | 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) | Felony; fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution |
Section 7201 requires a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax or its payment — an affirmative act, not merely a failure to pay. Section 7206(1) is the “false return” count and reaches anyone who “willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.” Section 7206(2) reaches the preparer who “willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or presentation” of a false document, whether or not the taxpayer knew.
Two practical notes. The § 7201 and § 7206 fine figures are the amounts stated in Title 26 and date from a 1982 amendment; the alternative fine provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3571 apply to Title 26 offenses in the ordinary course, so the fine actually imposed can exceed the number printed in the tax statute. And a tax case that begins as a civil examination can be resolved civilly; the point at which IRS Criminal Investigation becomes involved is the point at which the analysis changes completely. Our page is at tax fraud defense.
Federal immigration offenses
Immigration is exclusively federal, and immigration offenses make up the largest single block of the federal sentencing caseload by volume.
| Offense | Statute | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Improper entry by an alien — first commission | 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) | Fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both |
| Improper entry — subsequent commission | 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) | Fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both |
| Reentry of a removed alien | 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) | Fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both |
| Reentry after removal following three or more drug or person misdemeanors, or a non-aggravated felony | 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) | Fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both |
| Reentry after removal following an aggravated felony | 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) | Fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both |
The 2-year, 10-year and 20-year tiers under § 1326 are the whole game in a reentry case, and which one applies turns on the prior conviction that preceded removal. Note the classification consequence: a bare § 1326(a) offense is a Class E felony; a § 1326(b)(2) offense with a 20-year maximum is a Class C felony, with a longer authorized supervised release term and a very different Guidelines picture.
Other offenses in this family include bringing in and harboring aliens, alien transportation, visa fraud, document fraud, naturalization and citizenship fraud, and asylum fraud, each charged under its own provision of Title 8 or Title 18. For a non-citizen, every federal charge — not only the immigration ones — carries a parallel immigration analysis that must be done before any plea.
Federal public corruption offenses
| Offense | Statute | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Bribery of a public official | 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) | Fined under Title 18 or not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both; and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States |
| Illegal gratuity to a public official | 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) | Fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both |
| Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds | 18 U.S.C. § 666 | Fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both |
The gap between the § 201(b) bribery maximum of 15 years and the § 201(c) gratuity maximum of 2 years is the largest single-statute penalty cliff in federal white-collar law, and it turns on intent: bribery requires a corrupt quid pro quo intended to influence an official act; a gratuity is something of value given for or because of an official act. Section 666 is the workhorse provision for state and local officials, because it reaches any agent of an organization or government receiving more than $10,000 in federal benefits in a year — which is most of them.
Public corruption cases also routinely carry honest-services fraud counts under the mail and wire fraud statutes, extortion counts, campaign finance counts and false statement counts. Sentences in this area are substantial: the Seventh Circuit’s opinion affirming the resentencing of a former Illinois governor records that “the district court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment” — fourteen years — and that on resentencing after five counts were vacated, “the sentence was again 168 months.” United States v. Blagojevich, 854 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2017). Our page is at federal bribery charges.
RICO and enterprise offenses
18 U.S.C. § 1962 creates four prohibited activities: (a) investing income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; (b) acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; (c) — the provision most often charged — making it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt”; and (d), making it “unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c).”
The penalty is in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a): “fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or both,” plus mandatory forfeiture. In lieu of the ordinary fine, “a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.”
RICO is not limited to organized crime in the traditional sense. It is charged against street organizations, labor unions, corrupt public offices, fraud rings and drug organizations. What makes it powerful for the government is that a “pattern of racketeering activity” lets a single indictment aggregate conduct across years and across defendants, and that § 1962(d) conspiracy liability does not require the defendant personally to have committed any predicate act.
Conspiracy, attempt, aiding and abetting, accessory and misprision
These “inchoate” and derivative offenses account for an enormous share of federal charges, and each has a distinct rule.
| Offense | Statute | Rule and penalty |
|---|---|---|
| General conspiracy | 18 U.S.C. § 371 | Two or more persons conspire to commit an offense against the United States or to defraud the United States, “and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy” — imprisonment not more than 5 years; capped at the misdemeanor maximum if the object offense is a misdemeanor only |
| Drug conspiracy and attempt | 21 U.S.C. § 846 | “Subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy” |
| Aiding and abetting | 18 U.S.C. § 2 | A person who “commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal”; § 2(b) reaches a person who “willfully causes an act to be done” that would be an offense if performed directly |
| Misprision of felony | 18 U.S.C. § 4 | Having knowledge of the actual commission of a federal felony, “conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same” to a judge or other civil or military authority — not more than 3 years |
| Witness tampering conspiracy | 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) | Same penalties as the object offense |
Three distinctions worth carrying away. Section 371 requires an overt act; § 846 does not say so on its face — the general conspiracy statute contains the words “and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,” and the drug conspiracy statute contains no comparable language. Section 371 caps at 5 years; § 846 does not cap at all — a drug conspiracy carries the full penalty of the object offense, mandatory minimum included. And aiding and abetting is not a lesser charge: under § 2 an aider and abettor is punishable as a principal, exposed to the same maximum as the person who committed the act.
Misprision is charged rarely, and the element people miss is concealment: mere failure to report is not enough; the statute requires that the person “conceals and does not as soon as possible make known” the felony. Our discussion is at misprision of a felony, and accessory-after-the-fact liability is covered at accessory.
Obstruction, false statements and perjury
| Offense | Statute | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Influencing or injuring an officer or juror; obstructing the due administration of justice | 18 U.S.C. § 1503(b)(3) | Not more than 10 years in any case other than a killing or attempted killing; not more than 20 years for an attempted killing or where the offense was committed against a petit juror and a Class A or B felony was charged; the § 1111/§ 1112 penalties in the case of a killing |
| Tampering with a witness, victim or informant | 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) | Not more than 20 years |
| Corruptly altering, destroying or concealing a record, or otherwise obstructing an official proceeding | 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) | Not more than 20 years |
| Intentional harassment that hinders attendance, reporting or prosecution | 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d) | Not more than 3 years |
| False statements to the federal government | 18 U.S.C. § 1001 | Not more than 5 years; not more than 8 years in the terrorism and specified-offense tiers |
| Perjury generally | 18 U.S.C. § 1621 | Not more than 5 years |
Obstruction charges are frequently added late, and they frequently arise from conduct that occurred after the underlying investigation began — the deleted file, the coached witness, the second interview that contradicts the first. Both § 1503 and § 1512 contain a trial-uplift provision: § 1512(j) provides that if the offense occurs in connection with a criminal trial, “the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.”
There is a Guidelines consequence too. USSG §3C1.1 adds 2 levels for willfully obstructing or impeding the administration of justice, but its commentary draws a line that matters: the provision “is not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right,” and a “denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes perjury), refusal to admit guilt or provide information” does not trigger it. Testifying and losing is not obstruction; committing perjury is. Our perjury explainer is at perjury.
Federal violent crimes
Most violence is prosecuted by the states. Federal violent-crime jurisdiction attaches through federal property, a federal victim, an interstate element, or a specific federal statute. The recurring charges are arson affecting interstate commerce or federal property; assault on a federal officer; bank robbery; carjacking; kidnapping where the victim is transported across a state line; murder of a federal official, murder committed during a bank robbery or a drug trafficking crime, and murder-for-hire crossing state lines; interstate threats and stalking; mailing injurious articles; hate crimes under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act; and terrorism offenses.
Two federal features change the picture in a violent case. First, a firearm converts the sentence: a § 924(c) count attached to a federal crime of violence adds a mandatory consecutive term of at least 5, 7 or 10 years. Second, § 3583(j) authorizes supervised release of “any term of years or life” for terrorism predicates. Our pages: federal arson, federal assault charges and assault on a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111.
Offenses involving federal prisons
Conduct inside a federal facility is still federal conduct. The recurring charges are escape or attempted escape from custody — which includes walking away from a minimum-security camp or failing to return from a furlough — providing or possessing contraband in prison, assault on a correctional officer or another incarcerated person, and bribery of a staff member. New charges arising from conduct in custody run separately from the original sentence and can be ordered to run consecutively to it. Failure to appear after release on conditions is its own federal offense; see federal failure to appear.
Other federal offenses
The remainder of the federal criminal code is genuinely miscellaneous, and the following are all real federal charges: criminal civil rights violations, including deprivation of rights under color of law; conservation and wildlife offenses under the Endangered Species Act and the Lacey Act; criminal contempt of court; product tampering under the Federal Anti-Tampering Act, including tampering with food and drugs; mailing injurious articles; counterfeiting; and the large body of regulatory offenses that carry criminal penalties by cross-reference — environmental, customs, food-and-drug, export control, and securities. And federal misdemeanors are prosecuted: a Class A misdemeanor is punishable by up to 1 year of imprisonment under § 3559(a)(6) and § 3581(b)(6), and includes many offenses committed on federal property and minor regulatory violations. Our pages: federal Class A misdemeanors, product tampering and mailing injurious articles.
This list is a map, not an inventory. Congress has enacted federal criminal provisions across nearly every title of the United States Code, and additional conduct is criminalized by regulations that carry penalties by statutory cross-reference. If the conduct has a plausible federal interest, there is usually a statute that reaches it. What matters for a specific case is not the size of the code but the four or five statutes actually named in the charging document — and their maximums, their minimums, and their elements.
What Federal Prosecutors Actually Charge: The Fiscal Year 2025 Numbers
The federal criminal code is vast, but federal charging is concentrated. The Sentencing Commission reports every individual sentenced in the federal system each fiscal year, grouped by offense type, and the distribution is nothing like an even spread across the code. In fiscal year 2025, 66,662 individuals were sentenced in the federal courts. Here is where they came from, with the plea and trial breakdown for each category.
| Type of crime | Individuals sentenced (FY2025) | Resolved by guilty plea | Resolved at trial |
|---|---|---|---|
| All offenses | 66,662 | 65,099 (97.7%) | 1,563 (2.3%) |
| Immigration | 25,119 | 25,044 (99.7%) | 75 (0.3%) |
| Drug trafficking | 16,222 | 15,879 (97.9%) | 343 (2.1%) |
| Firearms | 8,041 | 7,821 (97.3%) | 220 (2.7%) |
| Fraud, theft and embezzlement | 5,080 | 4,894 (96.3%) | 186 (3.7%) |
| Child pornography | 1,432 | 1,390 (97.1%) | 42 (2.9%) |
| Sexual abuse | 1,409 | 1,294 (91.8%) | 115 (8.2%) |
| Money laundering | 1,368 | 1,270 (92.8%) | 98 (7.2%) |
| Robbery | 1,249 | 1,182 (94.6%) | 67 (5.4%) |
| Assault | 854 | 767 (89.8%) | 87 (10.2%) |
| Administration of justice offenses | 559 | 515 (92.1%) | 44 (7.9%) |
| National defense | 499 | 491 (98.4%) | 8 (1.6%) |
| Prison offenses | 414 | 411 (99.3%) | 3 (0.7%) |
| Tax | 409 | 392 (95.8%) | 17 (4.2%) |
| Murder | 405 | 303 (74.8%) | 102 (25.2%) |
| Obscenity and other sex offenses | 325 | 323 (99.4%) | 2 (0.6%) |
| Bribery and corruption | 310 | 279 (90.0%) | 31 (10.0%) |
| Stalking and harassing | 288 | 265 (92.0%) | 23 (8.0%) |
| Environmental | 150 | 145 (96.7%) | 5 (3.3%) |
| Kidnapping | 146 | 116 (79.5%) | 30 (20.5%) |
| Drug possession | 107 | 106 (99.1%) | 1 (0.9%) |
| Individual rights | 100 | 77 (77.0%) | 23 (23.0%) |
| Manslaughter | 94 | 90 (95.7%) | 4 (4.3%) |
| Commercialized vice | 88 | 87 (98.9%) | 1 (1.1%) |
| Forgery, counterfeiting and copyright | 83 | 76 (91.6%) | 7 (8.4%) |
| Arson | 77 | 72 (93.5%) | 5 (6.5%) |
| Extortion and racketeering | 57 | 52 (91.2%) | 5 (8.8%) |
| Burglary and trespass | 50 | 47 (94.0%) | 3 (6.0%) |
| Food and drug | 44 | 44 (100.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Antitrust | 18 | 16 (88.9%) | 2 (11.1%) |
| Other | 1,665 | 1,651 (99.2%) | 14 (0.8%) |
Source: U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2025 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, tbls. 11 and 12 (FY2025 datafile). These are data, not law — they describe what happened, not what any statute requires.
Four practitioner readings of that table.
Immigration and drugs are nearly two-thirds of the federal docket. Together they account for 41,341 of 66,662 individuals sentenced — 62 percent. Add firearms and fraud and you are at 82 percent. The image of the federal system as a white-collar system is not what the numbers describe.
The trial rate varies by a factor of eighty across offense types. Immigration cases go to trial 0.3 percent of the time; murder cases go to trial 25.2 percent of the time. That is not an accident of temperament. It tracks the strength of the government’s documentary proof, the size of the plea discount available, and whether the defendant has anything left to lose. In a category where the evidence is a removal order and a fingerprint, there is very little to try. In a category where the mandatory exposure is life either way, the calculus is different.
Category size does not predict severity. Antitrust produced 18 sentenced individuals in the year; drug trafficking produced 16,222. Neither number tells you anything about the exposure a particular defendant faces, which comes from the statute charged.
The plea rate is the fact that shapes practice. 97.7 percent of the people sentenced in federal court in FY2025 pleaded guilty. What follows from that is not that a defendant should plead — it is that the negotiation, the Guidelines calculation, and the sentencing record are where nearly all federal defense work happens, and that a defense that consists solely of preparing for a trial that will not occur is not a defense.
Federal Crimes vs. State Crimes
The differences that actually change outcomes are five, and they are not the ones people expect.
Governing law and forum. Federal offenses are defined by Congress, prosecuted by United States Attorneys, and tried in United States District Courts under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. State offenses are defined by state legislatures and tried in state courts under state rules. Conduct legal under a state’s law can remain a federal offense — the clearest current example being marijuana, which remains a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841 regardless of state legalization.
Investigative resources and timeline. Federal investigations are typically longer and better documented before any charge issues. A federal white-collar or narcotics investigation can run for years with the subject unaware, and the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day arrest-to-indictment clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) does not begin until arrest or service of a summons on the federal charge. Nothing in the Speedy Trial Act limits how long the government may investigate before arresting; that is the statute of limitations’ job.
Sentencing architecture. Federal sentencing runs on a determinate sentence, an advisory Guidelines range calculated under USSG §1B1.1, statutory minimums and maximums, and the § 3553(a) factors. Many state systems retain indeterminate sentencing, parole boards, or both.
No parole. As set out above, federal parole was abolished for offenses committed on or after 1 November 1987. Good conduct time under § 3624(b)(1) and First Step Act earned time credits under § 3632(d)(4) are what remain, and neither is a parole system.
Release pending trial. Federal pretrial release is not a bail schedule. It runs on conditions of release under the Bail Reform Act, with detention decided at a hearing on statutory factors. There is no cash bail schedule by charge and no commercial bondsman industry of the kind that exists in many state courts. That machinery is covered on our pretrial stage page.
Dual sovereignty means the same conduct can violate both bodies of law and be charged by both sovereigns, though successive prosecution is restrained in practice by the Department’s internal dual-and-successive-prosecution policy — again, Department policy that guides its own attorneys, not law a defendant can enforce. The far more common pattern is a case that begins locally and is adopted federally, which changes the sentencing system, the custody system, and the collateral consequences all at once. A side-by-side comparison is at federal vs. state.
Federal Judges vs State Judges: Roles and Selection Processes
Federal district judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and they hold office under Article III of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 provides that “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” and that “The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”
Those two clauses are the whole structural difference. “Good Behaviour” is life tenure in practice: an Article III judge serves until retirement, death, or removal by impeachment, which is exceedingly rare. The salary protection removes the other lever. Neither an unpopular ruling nor an unpopular defendant costs a federal judge anything.
State judicial selection varies by state and includes partisan election, non-partisan election, gubernatorial appointment, legislative selection, and merit-commission systems, often with retention elections and fixed terms. A judge who must stand for election operates in a different environment from one who does not.
| Aspect | Federal district judges | State trial judges |
|---|---|---|
| Selection | Nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate | Varies by state: election, appointment, or merit selection |
| Term | During good Behaviour — life tenure under Art. III, § 1 | Varies: fixed terms with re-election or reappointment, or longer tenure |
| Compensation | May not be diminished during continuance in office | Set by state law |
| Removal | Impeachment | Varies: elections, judicial conduct commissions, recall |
| Jurisdiction | Federal law, constitutional questions, and other cases within federal jurisdiction | State law, which is most criminal and civil litigation in the United States |
One more federal actor deserves naming because defendants meet them first and are often confused about who they are. United States magistrate judges are not Article III judges; they are appointed by the district judges of their court for fixed terms. In a criminal case the magistrate judge typically conducts the initial appearance under Fed. R. Crim. P. 5, decides release or detention, holds the preliminary hearing under Rule 5.1 where one occurs, and conducts the arraignment under Rule 10. The district judge takes the felony case from there.
How Federal Criminal Cases Work (Investigation to Charges)
This is an orientation. Each stage has its own page in our federal court process sequence, and the detail lives there.
1. Investigation. A federal agency develops a case, often for months or years, using grand jury subpoenas, search warrants, financial records, cooperating witnesses and electronic surveillance. Many people first learn of a federal investigation through a subpoena, a search warrant, an agent at the door, or a target letter from a United States Attorney’s Office. Nothing in the Speedy Trial Act limits the length of an investigation. See investigation, target letters and grand jury subpoenas.
2. Charging. A felony must be prosecuted by indictment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a) unless the defendant waives indictment in open court, in which case the government may proceed by information. A federal grand jury has 16 to 23 members under Rule 6(a)(1), and it “may indict only if at least 12 jurors concur.” Grand jury proceedings are secret as to the listed insiders — jurors, interpreters, reporters, transcribers and government attorneys — but Rule 6(e)(2)(A) states that “No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B),” and a witness is not on that list. A grand jury witness may tell their own lawyer, and anyone else, what they were asked. See federal indictments.
3. Arrest, initial appearance and release. Rule 5(a)(1)(A) requires that a person arrested in the United States be taken before a magistrate judge “without unnecessary delay.” The rule contains no fixed number of hours. At the initial appearance in a felony case the judge must inform the defendant of the complaint and any supporting affidavit, the right to retain or have appointed counsel, “the circumstances, if any, under which the defendant may secure pretrial release,” any right to a preliminary hearing, and the right not to make a statement. Release or detention is decided at this stage.
4. Speedy Trial Act clocks. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) an information or indictment “shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges,” extended by a further thirty days if no grand jury was in session in the district during that period. Under § 3161(c)(1) trial must begin within 70 days of the later of the filing and unsealing of the charge or the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer of the trial court — and under § 3161(c)(2) trial may not begin sooner than 30 days after the defendant first appears through counsel unless the defendant consents in writing. Section 3161(h) excludes a great deal of time from those computations. No one should read the 70-day figure as a promise about when a trial will happen.
5. Arraignment and pretrial litigation. Rule 10 requires that an arraignment be conducted in open court and consist of giving the defendant a copy of the charging document, reading it or stating the substance of the charge, and asking the defendant to plead. The rule sets no deadline for when the arraignment must occur. Discovery, motions practice and plea negotiation follow. See pretrial and plea agreements.
6. Trial or plea. In the small share of cases that are tried, the government carries the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant is presumed innocent, need not testify, and need not present any evidence. See trial.
7. Presentence report and sentencing. A United States Probation Officer prepares a presentence report. Sentencing follows, with the court calculating the Guidelines range and then weighing the § 3553(a) factors. See the presentence report and sentencing basics.
8. After sentencing. Direct appeal, and in some cases a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, follow on their own deadlines. See after sentencing, federal appeals and § 2255 motions.
Federal Court Conviction Rates: Statistics, Trends, and What They Mean
Federal conviction rates are high, and the number is real — but almost every way it gets presented is misleading, so start with what the reliable data actually measures.
What the Sentencing Commission counts. The Commission’s Sourcebook reports individuals sentenced, and it reports how their cases were resolved. In fiscal year 2025, of the 66,662 individuals sentenced in the federal courts, 65,099 (97.7%) were convicted by guilty plea and 1,563 (2.3%) were convicted at trial. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2025 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, tbl. 11.
What that number does not measure. The denominator is people who were sentenced. Anyone acquitted at trial, anyone whose case was dismissed, and anyone who was investigated and never charged is not in it. So the 97.7 percent figure is not a conviction rate in the sense a defendant fears — it is a disposition split among the people who were convicted. It says that among federal convictions, almost all come from pleas. It says nothing at all about the odds of acquittal, and anyone using it to compute a “98 percent conviction rate” or a “1 percent acquittal rate” is doing arithmetic the dataset cannot support.
Why federal conviction rates are high
The honest explanation has three parts, and only one of them is about what happens in a courtroom.
One: charging is filtered before an indictment ever issues. Department of Justice policy in the Principles of Federal Prosecution provides that “The attorney for the government should commence or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” JM 9-27.220. The accompanying comment states the threshold more plainly still: a prosecutor “may commence or recommend federal prosecution only if he/she believes that the person will more likely than not be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by an unbiased trier of fact and that the conviction will be upheld on appeal.” This is Department policy, not law — it guides federal prosecutors internally, and it does not create a right a defendant can enforce in court. But it is the single best explanation for the number. A system that declines the cases it does not expect to prove will report a high conviction rate.
Two: federal investigations are long and documentary. By the time a white-collar or narcotics case is charged, the government usually holds bank records, wire intercepts, electronic communications, and one or more cooperating witnesses. That is not a fair fight in the abstract; it is an evidentiary posture that makes a great many cases genuinely hard to try.
Three: almost everyone pleads, and the system is built for that. USSG §3E1.1 provides a 2-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a third level on the government’s motion where the offense level before the reduction is 16 or greater. Substantial assistance under § 3553(e) and §5K1.1 requires a government motion. The structural result is that a plea has a measurable value and a trial has a measurable cost.
How a defense lawyer actually reads these numbers
Not as a prediction, and not as a reason for despair. Three readings are useful and the rest are noise.
- The filtering cuts both ways. If a case was charged, the government believes it can prove it — which is a reason to take the evidence seriously rather than to assume a defense will materialize. But the corollary is that the cases where the government’s filter failed are the cases worth trying, and identifying them is the job.
- The variance by offense type is the informative part. Twenty-five percent of murder cases and 23 percent of individual-rights cases went to trial in FY2025; 0.3 percent of immigration cases did. Where the government’s proof is documentary and the exposure is modest, cases resolve. Where the proof depends on contested testimony and the exposure is life, they do not.
- Most of the outcome is decided at sentencing, not at trial. In a system where 97.7 percent of convictions come from pleas, the difference between a good result and a bad one is usually made in the Guidelines calculation, the presentence report objections, and the § 3553(a) presentation — not in a closing argument.
Nothing in these figures predicts anything about a particular case, and no lawyer can honestly tell you what your odds are from a national dataset.
What to Do if You Are Charged with a Federal Crime
If you have been charged, or if you have reason to think you are under federal investigation, the following are the steps that preserve options. They are deliberately short — the detail belongs to the stage pages linked from each one.
- Stop talking to investigators. You are not required to answer questions. Say clearly that you are exercising your right to remain silent and that you want a lawyer, and then stop. This is not a technicality: 18 U.S.C. § 1001 makes a materially false statement in a matter within federal jurisdiction a separate 5-year felony, and it is regularly charged against people who were not going to be charged with anything else. There is no exception for a false denial.
- Ask for a lawyer out loud, and get one immediately. The request has to be unambiguous. Then retain counsel who practices in federal court — the rules, the Guidelines, the norms of the district and the practices of the individual United States Attorney’s Office are all specific to this system. See what a federal criminal defense attorney does.
- Do not consent to a search. You may decline consent. If agents have a warrant, do not obstruct them — read it, note what it authorizes, and call counsel. Do not destroy, delete, or move anything; obstruction and § 1512 charges arise from exactly that conduct and can be more provable than the underlying offense.
- Preserve everything and write down what happened. Dates, times, who was present, what was said, what was taken. Preserve emails, messages and documents. Give it to your lawyer, not to anyone else.
- Do not discuss the case with anyone but your lawyer. Not co-defendants, not friends, not family who may be witnesses. Jail calls are recorded, and so are visits. The privilege protects communications with counsel; nothing protects a conversation with a co-defendant.
- Understand what stage you are at. A target letter is not a charge. A grand jury subpoena is not a charge. An indictment is a charge but not a conviction. Each stage has different options, and the earliest ones are the widest — pre-indictment engagement with the prosecutor can sometimes affect what is charged, or whether anything is.
- Prepare for the conditions of release. If released, comply exactly with every condition. Violations are the fastest route to detention, and failure to appear is its own federal offense.
- Get the personal logistics handled early. Employment, finances, dependents, health care and any substance-use or mental-health treatment. This is not fatalism; documented, voluntary treatment is a legitimate part of a mitigation record, and it is far more persuasive when it began before sentencing was imminent.
- Learn the sequence. Knowing what happens next, and roughly when, is the difference between making decisions and reacting to them. Start at the federal court process and, if the vocabulary is unfamiliar, at our glossary of federal criminal terms.
- Evaluate every option honestly with counsel. Trial and plea are both real options and the right one depends on the record. That evaluation requires the discovery, the Guidelines calculation, and a candid assessment of the government’s proof — not a rule of thumb.
If your family is trying to understand what happens if a custodial sentence follows, our orientation for families is at what families should know about federal prison.
Defense Strategies for Federal Charges
Federal defense is not a menu of tactics; it is a sequence of decisions, each of which forecloses or preserves later ones. Six areas of work do most of the good.
Getting there early. The widest options exist before an indictment. Pre-indictment, counsel can engage with the Assistant United States Attorney about the theory of the case, present exculpatory material the agents never saw, argue that a proposed charge does not fit the statute, or negotiate a resolution that avoids the count carrying a mandatory minimum. Once a grand jury has returned an indictment, the charging decision has hardened.
Testing the elements, one at a time. Federal statutes are drafted in elements, and each element is a place the government can fail. Does the fraud statute’s “scheme to defraud” reach what actually happened? Was there an interstate wire? Did the defendant know he belonged to a category prohibited from possessing a firearm — the element Rehaif added? Does the § 666 transaction reach $5,000, and did the entity receive more than $10,000 in federal benefits? These are not technicalities. They are the statute.
Attacking the drug quantity or the loss amount. In the two largest federal categories, one number drives the entire sentence. In a drug case, quantity decides whether § 841(b)(1)(A)’s 10-year floor, § 841(b)(1)(B)’s 5-year floor, or no floor at all applies. In a fraud case, loss drives the Guidelines offense level and the § 3571(d) fine exposure. Contesting those figures — in the presentence report and at the sentencing hearing — is frequently worth more real time than any other single piece of work in the case. See presentence report and PSR objections.
Suppression and the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Where evidence was obtained by an unlawful search, an un-Mirandized custodial interrogation, or in violation of the right to counsel, a motion to suppress can remove the center of the government’s case. Suppression practice belongs to the trial stage and is developed there. Worth knowing here: filing a suppression motion does not by itself forfeit the third acceptance-of-responsibility level, because the current §3E1.1 commentary says pretrial litigation of that kind is “ordinarily … not considered ‘preparing for trial.'”
Negotiating the charge, not just the sentence. The most valuable concession in many federal cases is not a sentencing recommendation but a charging one — dropping the § 924(c) count that carries a mandatory consecutive term, or the quantity allegation that triggers a floor, or the count that makes an offense an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. Because a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) recommendation does not bind the court, a change in what is charged is often worth more than a promise about what will be recommended. See plea agreements.
Building the sentencing record from day one. Mitigation is not a closing speech. It is documentation — employment history, medical and mental-health records, treatment participation, family responsibilities, restitution paid — assembled over months and presented against the specific § 3553(a) factors. Guidelines objections and role reductions under Chapter 3 Part B live here.
One thing has changed about how the rest of that argument is framed, and it is recent enough that most published material has not caught up. Amendment 836, effective 1 November 2025, deleted the Guidelines’ general departure provisions — §§5K2.0 through 5K2.24, all of Chapter Five Part H (§§5H1.1–5H1.12, the specific-offender-characteristic policy statements), and §4A1.3 — and cut §1B1.1’s application instructions from three steps to two. What remains in Part K is §5K1.1 substantial assistance, which requires a government motion. Mitigation that was once presented as a departure on one of the enumerated grounds is now presented as a variance argument under § 3553(a). The evidence a lawyer gathers is the same; the provision it is argued under is not. See downward departure, role reduction and minor participant and federal sentence reduction, and sentencing basics, which sets out the current calculation in full.
Applied Insight — Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney: The first question we ask about a new federal case is not “can we win at trial.” It is “what is the mandatory minimum, and is there a lawful route below it.” That answer determines everything downstream — whether the Guidelines argument matters, whether a cooperation discussion is worth having, whether the charge itself has to be renegotiated. A defense built without that answer is a defense built on a guess.
Facing Federal Criminal Charges? Get Experienced Help Now
Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C. is a boutique federal criminal defense and appellate firm founded in 2019, with a national federal practice run on an intentionally small caseload. Elizabeth Franklin-Best has more than 20 years of federal and appellate criminal defense experience, has handled more than 330 federal proceedings — over 100 of them appeals — with sixteen published decisions as counsel of record, and is admitted to the U.S. Supreme Court and twelve of the thirteen U.S. Courts of Appeals: every regional circuit (1st–11th) plus the D.C. Circuit. She has been admitted pro hac vice in federal courts from Montana to Florida.
The firm handles federal cases at every stage: pre-indictment representation and target-letter response, trial defense, sentencing and mitigation, direct appeals, § 2255 motions and other post-conviction relief, compassionate release, and Bureau of Prisons matters. Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, the firm’s Managing Director, leads the prison-consulting side — designation, sentence computation, First Step Act time credits, RDAP and reentry planning. Legal representation is provided by Elizabeth Franklin-Best.
We can tell you what the statutes charged in your case authorize, what the Guidelines are likely to produce, and what the realistic range of outcomes looks like on the record as it stands. We cannot and will not tell you what your sentence will be, and no lawyer who does should be believed. What we can say is that the earliest decisions in a federal case are the ones with the widest consequences, and that they are easier to make with the statute in front of you.
Offices in Columbia and Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, serving clients nationwide. Call (843) 620-1100, contact the firm, or book a consultation. Our fee structure for post-conviction work is set out at federal criminal defense and post-conviction fees, and our sourcing standards are described at how we verify.
This page is general information about federal criminal law. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship.
Frequently Asked Questions About Federal Offenses and Charges
What is the difference between a Class A felony and a Class E felony in federal court?
The class is set by the maximum term of imprisonment the statute authorizes, under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a). A Class A felony is one where the maximum is life imprisonment, or where the maximum penalty is death. A Class E felony is one where the maximum is less than five years but more than one year. The practical consequences differ sharply: an individual convicted of a Class A or Class B felony is not eligible for probation under § 3561(a)(1), while probation remains statutorily authorized for Class C, D and E felonies. Supervised release is up to five years for a Class A or B felony, up to three years for a Class C or D felony, and up to one year for a Class E felony under § 3583(b). The default fine ceiling for an individual is the same — $250,000 — for every felony class under § 3571(b)(3).
How do I find out what class my federal charge is?
Find the statute cited in the indictment, read its penalty sentence, and apply § 3559(a) to the maximum term. If the statute says “imprisoned not more than 20 years,” the offense is a Class C felony, because 20 years is less than 25 but 10 or more. If it says “not more than 5 years,” it is a Class D felony. If it says “not more than 3 years,” it is a Class E felony. Two cautions: a statute often has tiers, and the applicable tier depends on facts the indictment alleges — drug quantity, prior convictions, whether serious bodily injury resulted. And multiple counts mean multiple maximums. The class of the most serious count is not the whole exposure.
What is the difference between a mandatory minimum and the sentencing guidelines?
A mandatory minimum is a floor written by Congress into a criminal statute. The judge cannot sentence below it unless the government moves under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for substantial assistance, or the court finds all five safety-valve criteria in § 3553(f) are met in a qualifying drug case. The Sentencing Guidelines are an advisory framework: the judge must calculate the range correctly under USSG §1B1.1 and then may sentence inside or outside it after weighing the § 3553(a) factors. In short, a Guidelines figure is arguable and a statutory minimum generally is not. In fiscal year 2025, 21 percent of federal cases involved an offense carrying a mandatory minimum, and 67 percent of the people convicted of such an offense received no relief from it. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Quick Facts: Mandatory Minimum Penalties (FY 2025).
What is the federal safety valve and who can use it?
The safety valve is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). It allows a court to sentence “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence” in a defined set of drug cases — offenses under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 and 846, 21 U.S.C. §§ 960 and 963, and 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 and 70506 — if the court finds five things: that the defendant’s criminal history does not exceed the points limits in § 3553(f)(1); that the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the offense; that the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury; that the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise; and that the defendant has truthfully provided the government all information concerning the offense by the time of sentencing. It does not require a government motion — but it does require findings by the court, and whether they can be made in a particular case is a question for the sentencing judge on the record.
Does pleading guilty automatically reduce a federal sentence?
No. USSG §3E1.1(a) provides a 2-level decrease where “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense” — that is a finding for the court, not an automatic consequence of a plea. The third level under §3E1.1(b) requires three things together: qualification under (a), an offense level of 16 or greater before the (a) reduction, and a motion by the government stating that the defendant timely notified authorities of an intention to plead guilty. And a reduction in offense level is not a reduction in sentence if a statutory minimum sits above the resulting range.
Is there parole in the federal system?
No, not for offenses committed on or after 1 November 1987. What exists instead is a determinate sentence, a term of supervised release served after the prison term, good conduct time of up to 54 days for each year of the sentence imposed by the court under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), and First Step Act earned time credits of 10 days per 30 days of successful programming — plus 5 more per 30 days for a person assessed minimum or low risk over two consecutive assessments — under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), applied toward prerelease custody or supervised release. Good conduct time and earned time credits are different mechanisms with different eligibility rules, and neither one produces a release date that anyone outside the Bureau of Prisons can compute for you.
What federal crimes carry mandatory minimum sentences?
Mandatory minimums are concentrated in four areas. Drugs: 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) sets a 10-year floor and § 841(b)(1)(B) a 5-year floor at defined quantity thresholds, with higher floors for qualifying prior convictions and where death or serious bodily injury results. Firearms: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sets consecutive floors of 5, 7 or 10 years for possessing, brandishing or discharging a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, 10 or 30 years for particular weapon types, and 25 years for a second or subsequent conviction. Child exploitation: § 2251(e) requires not less than 15 years for a production offense and § 2252(b)(1) not less than 5 years for transportation, receipt or distribution. Failure to register combined with a crime of violence: § 2250(d) adds a consecutive term of not less than 5 nor more than 30 years. In FY2025, 68 percent of all federal cases carrying a mandatory minimum were drug trafficking cases.
Can the same act be charged in both federal and state court?
Yes. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, a single act that violates both a federal and a state statute can be prosecuted by both sovereigns. In practice this is uncommon: the Department of Justice restricts successive federal prosecution through its internal dual-and-successive-prosecution policy, which is Department policy guiding its own attorneys rather than law a defendant can enforce. The far more common pattern is that a case investigated locally is charged federally instead — which changes the sentencing system, the custody system, and the collateral consequences all at once.
What is the maximum sentence for wire fraud or mail fraud?
Both 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) authorize “not more than 20 years” of imprisonment. Both increase to “not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both” where the violation “occurs in relation to … a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency … or affects a financial institution.” A 20-year maximum makes the base offense a Class C felony under § 3559(a)(3); the 30-year enhanced tier makes it a Class B felony. Note also the alternative fine at § 3571(d), which permits a fine of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss.
If federal conviction rates are over 90 percent, is there any point in fighting the case?
The premise deserves correcting before the question can be answered. The Sentencing Commission’s data reports how convictions were obtained, not the odds of acquittal: in FY2025, 97.7 percent of the 66,662 individuals sentenced in federal court were convicted by plea and 2.3 percent at trial. People who were acquitted, whose charges were dismissed, or who were never charged are not in that denominator. What the data does show is that the federal system filters cases hard before charging — Department policy in JM 9-27.220 directs prosecutors to charge only where they believe admissible evidence “will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction” — and that almost all federal convictions come from pleas. The practical consequence is that most of the work, and most of the difference between outcomes, happens in the charge negotiation, the Guidelines calculation and the sentencing record, not in a closing argument. Whether a particular case should be tried is a question about that case’s evidence, not about a national percentage.
Reviewed for legal accuracy by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney·September 2026