Civil Contempt of Court Commitments

By Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., and Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA

Program Statement	5140.41
Subject	Civil Contempt of Court Commitments
Current edition	April 10, 2015
Change notices	None
Supersedes	P5140.38, Civil Contempt of Court Commitments (7/1/2004)
Governing regulation	28 C.F.R. §§ 522.10–522.15 (part 522, subpart B)
Governing statute	28 U.S.C. § 1826 (recalcitrant witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 401 (power of court)
Related BP forms	None named in this Program Statement
Official PDF	https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5140_041.pdf

Checked against the BOP policy set · 2026-09-07 · How we verify

A civil contempt commitment is not a prison sentence. It is a federal judge holding someone in a Bureau of Prisons facility to make them do something — almost always testify or produce documents — and it ends the moment they do it. Because it is not a sentence, the ordinary rules do not apply: there is no good conduct time, the person is managed as a pretrial detainee rather than as a sentenced prisoner, and if they were already serving a criminal sentence, credit toward that sentence stops while the contempt commitment runs. Most people who land here arrived through a grand jury subpoena — if that is your situation, see federal grand jury subpoenas, which is the closest live companion to this page.

The rule itself: civil contempt commitments

Everything on this page turns on which of two contempt statutes the judge used, because they have different endings. The Program Statement sets them out at pp. 2–3, and the four-way exit list for a § 1826 commitment is the artifact people come here for.

The two statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1826 — recalcitrant witnesses. The Program Statement quotes it in full:

“Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording or other material, the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of–

(1) the court proceeding, or (2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions, before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months.”

Quoted from 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a); the same text appears in Program Statement 5140.41 at p. 2.

18 U.S.C. § 401 — the court’s general contempt power. Also quoted in full by the Program Statement:

“A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as–

(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;

(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;

(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”

Quoted from 18 U.S.C. § 401; the same text appears in Program Statement 5140.41 at p. 3.

The four ways a § 1826 commitment ends

This answers the question nearly everyone arrives with.

“A civil contempt commitment under this section may end in any one of the following four ways; the actual manner dependent upon which circumstance occurs first.

• The person purges him-/herself of contempt by cooperating with the court.
• The court proceedings terminate.
• The period of imprisonment (not to exceed 18 months) expires.
• The term of the grand jury expires.”

Reproduced from Program Statement 5140.41 at p. 3.

Read the framing sentence as carefully as the list. Whichever comes first governs. So an eighteen-month statutory ceiling does not mean eighteen months — it means no more than eighteen months, and a grand jury whose term expires in four months ends the commitment in four months, not eighteen.

And the ending under § 401 is different

“A civil contempt commitment under this section is under the sole jurisdiction of the court and has no time limit. The commitment will not terminate until the inmate purges himself or herself of the contempt or until the court orders the commitment terminated.”

Reproduced from Program Statement 5140.41 at p. 3.

That contrast is the most important thing on this page. If the commitment order rests on § 1826, there is an outer statutory boundary. If it rests on § 401, the Bureau’s own policy says there is none, and only the judge can end it.

The six regulations that govern everything else

The Program Statement reproduces 28 C.F.R. part 522, subpart B. Each section was verified independently against the current eCFR text:

Section	What it governs	The rule
§ 522.10	Purpose	Civil contempt commitments “are not commitments to the custody of the Attorney General for service of terms of imprisonment following criminal convictions.” The Bureau terminates the commitment on notification from the court that the reason has ended or the person is to be released.
§ 522.11	How the person arrives	Two ways only: the U.S. Marshals Service requests a designation “if local jails are not suitable due to medical, security or other reasons”; or the committing court specifies a Bureau institution in its contempt order.
§ 522.12	Existing sentence, new contempt	“If a criminal sentence imposed under the U.S. Code or D.C. Code exists when a civil contempt commitment is ordered, we delay or suspend credit towards service of the criminal sentence for the duration of the civil contempt commitment, unless the committing judge orders otherwise.”
§ 522.13	Existing contempt, new sentence	(a) The criminal sentence “runs consecutively to the commitment order, unless the sentencing judge orders otherwise.” (b) For federal offenses committed before November 1, 1987 under 18 U.S.C. Chapter 227, it “runs concurrent with the commitment order, unless the sentencing judge orders otherwise.”
§ 522.14	How the person is managed	“We treat inmates serving civil contempt commitments in Bureau institutions the same as pretrial inmates. If an inmate is serving a civil contempt commitment and a concurrent criminal sentence, we treat the inmate the same as a person serving a criminal sentence.”
§ 522.15	Good time	“While serving only the civil contempt commitment, an inmate is not entitled to good time sentence credit.”

Regulation text quoted from eCFR; the same sections are reproduced in Program Statement 5140.41 at pp. 1–5. All six verified current as of the eCFR snapshot dated 2026-08-06.

The two credit rules, and why the order of events matters

Sections 522.12 and 522.13 are mirror images, and which one applies depends entirely on which came first. This trips up almost everyone, so it is worth stating both ways.

Sentence first, then contempt (§ 522.12). Someone already serving a federal or D.C. Code sentence is held in civil contempt. The Bureau “delays or suspends” credit toward the criminal sentence for the duration of the contempt commitment. The criminal sentence does not run during that period — unless the committing judge orders otherwise.

Contempt first, then sentence (§ 522.13). Someone already under a civil contempt commitment is sentenced on a criminal case. The new criminal sentence runs consecutively to the commitment order — unless the sentencing judge orders otherwise. The exception in (b) is a narrow old-law one: for federal offenses committed before November 1, 1987, the default flips to concurrent.

Both rules end in the same six words: unless the judge orders otherwise. That is not decoration. It is the Bureau telling its own staff that the default yields to a judicial order, which means the place to address the interaction is in front of the judge, at the time, in the order — not afterward with the Bureau. If the judgment or the commitment order is silent, the defaults above are what the Bureau applies.

We are not going to tell you how any particular sentence will compute or when anyone will be released. Those answers live in the specific orders, the dates, and the Bureau’s computation. If the numbers appear wrong, the route is challenging a BOP sentence computation, and the underlying rules are in the Sentence Computation Manual. For D.C. Code sentences, which this policy repeatedly singles out, see D.C. Code sentence computation.

Applied Insight — Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, Managing Director: The document that decides these cases is the commitment order itself, and the two things we read it for are the statute and the silences. Which section — § 1826 or § 401 — tells you whether there is an outer boundary at all. And because both credit regulations end with “unless the judge orders otherwise,” a silent order is not neutral; it selects the default. That is a point worth raising with the court while the order is still being drafted, rather than litigating the computation a year later.

No good time, and what that actually means

28 C.F.R. § 522.15 is one sentence: “While serving only the civil contempt commitment, an inmate is not entitled to good time sentence credit.”

The logic is straightforward once you see it. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) gives credit to “a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year,” of “up to 54 days for each year of the prisoner’s sentence imposed by the court.” Every operative noun there — term of imprisonment, sentence, imposed by the court — describes something a civil contempt commitment is not. Section 522.10 says as much: these “are not commitments to the custody of the Attorney General for service of terms of imprisonment following criminal convictions.” There is no sentence to shorten, and shortening it would defeat the point: the confinement is meant to last exactly as long as the refusal does.

Note the word only. The regulation withholds good time from a person serving only the contempt commitment. Someone serving a criminal sentence alongside it is in a different position, and § 522.14 says so directly — that person is treated “the same as a person serving a criminal sentence.” How good conduct time is calculated for the criminal sentence is governed by the ordinary rules, not by this policy.

The same reasoning explains why First Step Act earned time credits are not on this page: those credits apply to eligible sentences, and a civil contempt commitment is not one. See First Step Act time credits for what does qualify.

Managed as a pretrial detainee — including the search rule

28 C.F.R. § 522.14 sets the baseline: someone serving only a civil contempt commitment is treated “the same as pretrial inmates.” That routes most day-to-day questions to the pretrial inmates policy rather than to sentenced-prisoner rules — clothing, property, work, programming and privileges all follow the pretrial track.

One specific protection is written into this Program Statement rather than left to cross-reference:

“Inmates charged solely with misdemeanor offenses, or detainees committed for civil contempt, or held as material witnesses, are not visually searched unless there is reasonable suspicion the inmate or detainee is concealing a weapon or other contraband, or the inmate consents, in writing, to being visually searched.”

Reproduced from Program Statement 5140.41 at p. 5. The Program Statement directs readers to the Receiving and Discharge Manual for the detailed procedures — see receiving and discharge.

A visual search is a strip search. The default for this group is that it does not happen absent reasonable suspicion or written consent. Anyone in this category should know that the “consent” the policy contemplates is written consent, so a verbal request at intake is not what the policy describes.

There is also a status-monitoring instruction worth knowing about, at p. 5: “On the inmate’s arrival, institution staff will review the status of all civil contempt cases with the appropriate U.S. Marshal,” covering “The status of criminal sentences being served when the citation for civil contempt occurs” and “The release date status of prisoners held solely for civil contempt.” The Marshals Service, not the Bureau, is the Bureau’s own source of truth on status here.

What a civil contempt commitment means for you

If you are the person inside: which statute commits you

The most useful thing you can establish is which statute your commitment order names. If it is 28 U.S.C. § 1826, the four-way list above applies and there is an outer eighteen-month boundary, with the grand jury’s term or the proceeding’s end capable of ending it sooner. If it is 18 U.S.C. § 401, the Bureau’s policy says there is no time limit and only the court can end it. Those are very different situations and the paperwork will tell you which one you are in.

Understand what the Bureau can and cannot do for you. The Bureau is not your adversary here and it is not your remedy either. Section 522.10 says the Bureau terminates the commitment “when we receive notification from the federal court” — the Bureau is waiting on the judge. An administrative remedy asking the Bureau to release you from a civil contempt commitment asks for something the Bureau cannot give. What administrative remedies are good for is conditions, classification, property, medical care and record accuracy — real issues, and the pretrial-status rules give you a stronger position on several of them than sentenced prisoners have.

The one legal fact worth carrying: you hold the key. Purging the contempt by complying ends a civil commitment. That is a decision with serious consequences that belongs with your lawyer, not with this page and not with anyone on the compound.

If you are the family: the two points that confuse most

Two points cause the most confusion, and both are worth getting straight early.

This is not a criminal sentence and there was no conviction. Your family member has not been found guilty of a crime. A judge is holding them to compel compliance with a court order, usually to testify. That distinction is real, it is written into the regulation, and it matters for how you understand the situation and how you describe it.

Nobody can tell you the release date, and be wary of anyone who does. A § 1826 commitment ends on whichever of four events happens first, and three of the four are outside anyone’s control — the proceeding ending, the grand jury’s term expiring, or the person deciding to comply. The eighteen-month figure is a ceiling, not a term.

Practically, the person will be managed under pretrial rules, which usually means a detention facility rather than a prison, and different visiting and property rules than a sentenced prisoner would have. Direct status questions to the U.S. Marshals Service as well as the facility — the Program Statement tells Bureau staff to review status with the Marshal, which tells you where the information actually sits.

If you are counsel: civil contempt commitments

Three drafting-stage points and one structural one.

Draft around the “unless the judge orders otherwise” clause in both regulations. Sections 522.12 and 522.13 both hand the default back to the court. If your client is serving a sentence and faces a contempt commitment, § 522.12 will suspend credit unless the committing judge says otherwise. If your client is under a commitment and is about to be sentenced, § 522.13(a) will make the new sentence consecutive unless the sentencing judge says otherwise. Both are addressable at the time, on the record, in the order.

Identify the statutory basis on the face of the order. The Bureau administers § 1826 and § 401 commitments differently, and its own policy says § 401 commitments have no time limit. An order that does not name its authority invites the Bureau to guess.

Note the D.C. Code coverage. The 2015 revision exists in part to add D.C. Code provisions, and §§ 522.12 and 522.13 expressly reach sentences “imposed under the U.S. Code or D.C. Code.” For D.C. Code offenders in Bureau custody, that is a live interaction — see D.C. Code sentence computation.

Structurally: the Bureau is the custodian, not the decisionmaker. Under § 522.11 the person is here either because the Marshals Service asked for a designation when local jails were unsuitable, or because the court named a Bureau institution in the order. Under § 522.10 the Bureau terminates on the court’s notification. Relief from the commitment itself runs to the committing court. Relief about conditions runs through the Administrative Remedy Program and, where exhausted, potentially a § 2241 petition. Keep the two tracks separate.

What changed from PS 5140.38

The April 10, 2015 edition rescinded P5140.38 (7/1/2004). The Bureau’s own summary is two sentences, and both are substantive:

“Policy Rescinded P5140.38 Civil Contempt of Court Commitments (7/1/04)

This Program Statement and rules have been revised to include relevant D.C. Code provisions regarding civil contempt commitments and to clarify existing rule provisions. Rules relating solely to internal agency practices and procedures were removed.”

Reproduced from Program Statement 5140.41 at p. 2.

Two things follow that are worth spelling out, because no competitor page carries them.

The D.C. Code language is the substance of the revision. Sections 522.12 and 522.13 as they now read reach criminal sentences “imposed under the U.S. Code or D.C. Code.” That phrase is what the 2015 revision added. D.C. Code felony offenders serve their sentences in Bureau custody, so the interaction between a D.C. sentence and a federal civil contempt commitment needed a stated rule, and now has one.

“Rules relating solely to internal agency practices and procedures were removed” describes a deregulatory step, not a policy change: material that had been in the Code of Federal Regulations was moved out of it and left in the Program Statement. The practical consequence for a reader is that the regulation is now shorter than the Program Statement, and the parts that are only in the Program Statement are staff instruction rather than binding rule.

The regulation itself carries a later date than the Program Statement. All six sections of 28 C.F.R. part 522, subpart B show an effective date of December 29, 2016 in the current eCFR — twenty months after this Program Statement issued. I compared the Program Statement’s reproduction against the current text of each of the six sections and found no substantive divergence; the rules the Bureau printed in 2015 are the rules in force today.

PS 5140.41 was not among the twenty-three Program Statements the Bureau reissued effective 22 June 2026, and nothing for it appears in the superseded set. The April 10, 2015 edition remains current and carries no change notice.

Where people get stuck filing a BP-9 for release

“He filed a BP-9 asking to be let out and it went nowhere.” It went nowhere because the Bureau cannot grant it. Under 28 C.F.R. § 522.10 the Bureau ends the commitment when the court notifies it that the reason has ended — the Bureau is downstream of the judge. Relief from the commitment is a motion in the committing court. The Administrative Remedy Program — informal resolution, then BP-9, BP-10, BP-11 — is the right tool for conditions, classification, property and records, and those are worth pursuing on their own terms.

“His criminal sentence stopped running and nobody warned us.” That is § 522.12 operating as written: credit toward the criminal sentence is delayed or suspended for the duration of the contempt commitment, unless the committing judge ordered otherwise. Whether the order in your case says otherwise is a question about that specific order. If you believe the judge did order otherwise and the Bureau has not applied it, that is a computation dispute — raise it with the Bureau in writing first, then through challenging a BOP sentence computation.

“He is being treated like a sentenced prisoner.” Under 28 C.F.R. § 522.14 someone serving only a civil contempt commitment is treated the same as a pretrial inmate. If he is also serving a criminal sentence, the same regulation says he is treated as a sentenced prisoner — so check that first, because the answer may be correct. If he is held solely on contempt and is being managed under sentenced-prisoner rules, that is a classification error worth raising through an Inmate Request to Staff and then the remedy sequence, citing the regulation by section.

“He was strip searched at intake.” The Program Statement’s rule at p. 5 is that detainees committed for civil contempt “are not visually searched unless there is reasonable suspicion the inmate or detainee is concealing a weapon or other contraband, or the inmate consents, in writing.” If neither condition was present, that is a specific, documentable objection — and note the policy requires consent to be written.

“Eighteen months came and went.” If the commitment rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1826, the statute is explicit that “in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months.” If it rests on 18 U.S.C. § 401 instead, the Bureau’s policy says there is no time limit. Establishing which statute the order names is the first step, and if the answer is § 1826 and the ceiling has passed, that is a matter for the committing court and for counsel immediately.

Related BOP policy on civil contempt commitments

• Pretrial inmates — the management rules § 522.14 routes civil contempt detainees to. PS 7331 is named in this Program Statement’s References.
• Receiving and discharge — named in this Program Statement for visual-search procedures for this group.
• Sentence Computation Manual, old-law sentence computation and D.C. Code sentence computation — all three are named in this Program Statement’s References, and the § 522.13(b) old-law exception and the D.C. Code additions route to the second and third.
• Good conduct time and First Step Act time credits — the credits § 522.15 withholds from a person serving only a contempt commitment.
• State writs and transfers (PS 5875.13) and transfer to state custody before release (PS 5140.44) — the other situations where someone sits in a Bureau facility on an authority other than a federal criminal judgment.
• International prisoner transfer — PS 5140.40, Transfer of Offenders to or From Foreign Countries, is the first entry in this Program Statement’s References block.
• Federal grand jury subpoenas — where most § 1826 commitments begin.
• § 2241 petitions — the judicial remedy for custody and computation issues once administrative remedies are exhausted.

Frequently Asked Questions About Civil Contempt Commitments

Reviewed for legal accuracy by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney·September 2026