Program Statement 5800.15 at a glance
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Program Statement | 5800.15 CN-1 |
| Subject | Correctional Systems Manual — Chapter 6: Detainers, Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Foreign Detainers and Writs |
| Effective / current edition date | Change Notice CN-1 dated September 23, 2016, sitting in front of base Program Statement 5800.15 dated January 1, 2009. CN-1 changes Section 606 only. |
| Change notice | CN-1 (9/23/2016) — implements the BOP–ICE Memorandum of Understanding and rewrites the pre-release notification section |
| Supersedes / rescinds | Base PS 5800.15 rescinded Program Statement 5800.14, Inmate Systems Management Manual (12/30/2006) |
| Governing statute | Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Pub. L. No. 91-538, § 2, Dec. 9, 1970, 84 Stat. 1397, printed in the appendix to Title 18 and cited as 18 U.S.C. App. § 2; the federal-receiving-State supplement at 18 U.S.C. App. § 9; 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (speedy trial, cited by the policy for federal detainers) |
| Governing regulation (28 C.F.R.) | None. Chapter 6 contains no blue regulatory text and cites no C.F.R. section; the binding law here is the Agreement itself, which is a federal statute. |
| Related BP forms | BP-A0236, IAD — Place of Imprisonment (the request for final disposition); BP-A235; BP-A238; BP-A239; BP-A564; BP-A565; BP-A566; BP-A567; BP-A568; BP-A394 (Detainer Action Letter) |
| Official PDF | PS 5800.15 CN-1 (bop.gov) |
Checked against the BOP policy set · 2026-09-06.
A detainer is a formal notice from another jurisdiction telling the Bureau of Prisons “hold this person for us when the federal sentence ends,” and Chapter 6 of the Correctional Systems Manual is the Bureau’s internal instruction for lodging one, recording it, notifying the person, and processing a request to resolve the charges behind it. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers — a federal statute, not agency policy — is what gives a person with an untried state charge the ability to force that charge to trial within 180 days instead of waiting years for it.
Read this page together with Interstate Agreement on Detainers representation, which is where an actual detainer problem gets worked — filing the request, tracking the clock, and dealing with a jurisdiction that ignores it — and with state writs and transfers (PS 5875.13), which covers being produced in state court on a writ rather than under the Agreement. This page is the policy and the statute: what the Bureau does, what the Agreement requires, and which form starts which clock.
On this page
The rule itself: the IAD form set, the notification chain, and the time limits
Two different sources supply the operative rules here, and keeping them apart is the whole game. The Bureau’s Program Statement supplies the paperwork and the internal notification chain. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers supplies the deadlines and the consequence for missing them — and the Agreement is law, enacted by Congress, while the Program Statement is the Bureau’s instruction to its own staff for administering it.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers — the statutory clocks
| Provision | What it requires | Verbatim text |
|---|---|---|
| Article III(a) — the prisoner’s request | Trial within 180 days of delivery of the written notice and request to the prosecutor and the court | “he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint: Provided, That, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” |
| Article III(d) — anti-shuttling, prisoner-initiated | Return before trial voids the charge | “If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” |
| Article IV(a) — the prosecutor’s request | A 30-day window before the request is honored, in which the Governor of the sending State may disapprove it | “there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the Governor of the sending State may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.” |
| Article IV(c) — the prosecutor’s clock | Trial within 120 days of arrival in the receiving State | “In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” |
| Article IV(e) — anti-shuttling, prosecutor-initiated | Return before trial voids the charge | “If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” |
| Article V(c) — the remedy | Refusal to accept custody, or a missed Article III or Article IV deadline, requires dismissal with prejudice | “If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.” |
| 18 U.S.C. App. § 9 — the federal carve-out | When the United States is the receiving State, dismissal may be with or without prejudice | “any order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: The seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement on detainers and on the administration of justice.” |
Source: Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Pub. L. No. 91-538, § 2, 84 Stat. 1397 (Dec. 9, 1970), printed as 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, and 18 U.S.C. App. § 9. Text verified through the firm’s primary-law research connector on 2026-09-06.
Two definitional points from Article II that decide who is covered. “‘State’ shall mean a State of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” And “‘Sending State’ shall mean a State in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to article IV hereof.”
The Bureau’s own Chapter 6 adds the practical footnote: the Agreement “applies to all detainers based on pending charges lodged against an inmate by a ‘party state’ no matter when the detainer was lodged,” and “[t]he states of Louisiana, Mississippi, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories or possessions have not joined the IADA to date” (PS 5800.15 at p. 37).
The IAD form set — which form does what
| Form | Title | Who prepares it | What it does |
|---|---|---|---|
| BP-A394 | Detainer Action Letter (DAL) | Correctional Systems staff | The Bureau’s all-purpose detainer correspondence: inquiring about possible pending charges, acknowledging a lodged detainer, acknowledging a notify request, and confirming removal of a detainer |
| BP-A235 | IAD — Notice of Untried Indictment | Correctional Systems staff | The notice that satisfies Article III(c). The person signs it acknowledging the detainer has been lodged and that they were advised of their rights under the Agreement; it goes to the Warden or designee for signature and the original comes back to the person |
| BP-A236 | IAD — Place of Imprisonment | The person in custody | The Article III request for final disposition. This is the form that starts the 180-day clock. It is also where counsel is named or the court is asked to appoint counsel |
| BP-A238 | IAD — Certificate of Inmate Status | Correctional Systems staff | Accompanies the request; states term, time served, good time, and parole status |
| BP-A239 | IAD — Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody | Correctional Systems staff | The Bureau’s offer of temporary custody. The Program Statement warns that its first and second paragraphs contain two different request types — inmate request and prosecutor request — and staff “must ensure that clarification is made as to the appropriate request” |
| BP-A568 | IAD Form V — Request for Temporary Custody | The prosecutor | The Article IV prosecutor-initiated request |
| BP-A564 | IAD Form VI — Evidence of Agents’ Authority | The prosecutor | The offer of temporary custody is “contingent upon receiving a properly executed copy” of this form |
| BP-A566 | IAD Form VII — Prosecutor’s Acceptance of Temporary Custody | The prosecutor | Returned in the Article III packet |
| BP-A565 | IAD/State Writ — Prosecutor’s Certification | The prosecutor | A blank copy must be included in the IADA packet sent to the prosecutor |
| BP-A567 | IAD/State Writ — Acknowledgment | Correctional Systems staff, signed by the person | Presented and explained before release under Article III or Article IV. It requires the person to call a Warden-designated contact immediately if they are improperly released to the community or improperly transferred while under the IAD process |
Source: PS 5800.15 at pp. 38, 43–48.
The Bureau’s own time frames in Chapter 6
| Step | Time frame | What the Program Statement says |
|---|---|---|
| Initial inquiry | On arrival at initial designation | Correctional Systems staff “must review the FBI RAP sheet and the PSI to learn the existence of any possible pending charges or sentences” and, where charges are indicated, send a DAL to the Sheriff or Prosecuting Attorney |
| Second inquiry | Within one year of release | “If no response was received, a second and final DAL will be sent within one year of release.” |
| Return-receipt follow-up | Two weeks after mailing | Staff “will determine, two weeks after mailing, whether the IAD packet has arrived at the proper destinations and the institution has received the return receipts.” |
| No-reply follow-up | 90 days with no reply | Staff “will send a letter to the prosecutor and the IADA Compact Administrator in the receiving state to learn the state’s intent for assuming temporary custody.” |
| 180-day lapse letter | After 180 days from receipt of the packet | “If the inmate has not been brought to trial within 180 days from the date prosecuting officials received the IAD packet, CSD staff will correspond with the prosecutor … calling attention to the lapse of the 180-day period.” |
| Warden’s Article IV decision | Up to 30 days | “Under the provisions of Article IV(a) the Warden has up to 30 days to approve or disapprove the state’s request for temporary custody… The 30-day period begins on the date the prosecutor’s request is received at the institution.” |
| Follow-up while out on IAD or writ | Every 60 calendar days | Staff “will contact the authorities who have custody of the inmate at 60 calendar day intervals to learn the inmate’s status,” documenting date, name, telephone number, current status, current location, and the staff member making contact |
| Pre-release notification to the detaining agency | No later than 90 calendar days before release | “CS staff will notify the agency that placed a detainer or notification, usually via a DAL or letter, of the inmate’s projected release date.” |
| Notification to ICE | At least 90 days before the projected release date | “CS staff will notify ICE of all inmates who have an immigration detainer at least ninety (90) days prior to the inmate’s projected release date, or as soon as staff becomes aware of the detainer.” |
| ICE’s answer | 60 days before the projected release date | “ICE will notify CS staff 60 days prior to the PRD, or as soon as possible, of its decision to assume or decline custody of the inmate.” |
Source: PS 5800.15 at pp. 38–41 and pp. 45–50.
One custody-order rule from the same chapter is worth stating plainly because it governs who takes a person at the gate: “If multiple detainers have been filed, with the exception of federal detainers, custody will be offered first to the earliest lodged detainer,” and, as CN-1 rewrote it, “Federal detainers, excluding ICE deportation matters, will take priority over non-Federal detainers.” Where there is both a federal and an immigration detainer, “custody will be given to the federal law enforcement agency first”; where there is an immigration detainer and a non-federal detainer, “ICE will be offered custody first” (PS 5800.15 at pp. 40–41, as amended by CN-1 at pp. 1–2).
What a detainer means for you
If you are the person inside: what a detainer does
A detainer is not a sentence and it is not a conviction. It is a hold. But it does real damage while it sits there: it can affect custody classification, it is a routine obstacle to halfway house and home confinement placement, and it hangs over release planning until it is resolved. The Agreement exists precisely because Congress recognized that.
If the detainer is based on an untried charge from a party State, you can force the issue. The form is the BP-A236, IAD — Place of Imprisonment, and the Program Statement directs that “[i]f the inmate needs assistance to complete the form, institution staff must assist” (PS 5800.15 at p. 43). Before you sign it, understand exactly what you are giving up, because the form says it in its own words: the request “shall be deemed to be my waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceedings contemplated hereby or included herein, and a waiver of extradition to your state to serve any sentence there imposed upon me, after completion of my term of imprisonment in this state.” The Agreement itself adds that a request for final disposition “shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged” from that State. You cannot pick one charge and leave the others.
Two more things. Fill in the counsel block. The form warns that “[f]ailure to list the name and address of counsel will be construed to indicate the Inmate’s consent to the appointment of counsel by the appropriate court in the receiving state.” And keep your copy, with the certified-mail return receipts — the 180 days runs from delivery to the prosecuting officer and the court, so proof of delivery is the proof of your clock.
Filing a request for final disposition is a legal decision with consequences for both cases. Talk to counsel before you file, not after.
If you are a family member: identifying the detainer
The most useful thing you can do is find out what the detainer actually is. Chapter 6 defines it broadly: “A formal request from a Federal, state, or local jurisdiction for an inmate’s custody upon completion of a term of imprisonment. This definition includes requests for criminal and non-criminal charges (e.g., material witnesses, deportation, probation/parole violator warrants, child support, etc.)” (PS 5800.15 at p. 37). Those categories are treated very differently. Only a detainer based on an untried indictment, information or complaint from a party State engages the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. A probation- or parole-violation warrant does not — the Supreme Court held so in Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985), reasoning that a probation-violation charge “does not accuse an individual with having committed a criminal offense in the sense of initiating a prosecution” and so “does not come within the terms of Art. III.”
An immigration detainer is different again, and it is on a different clock. Under CN-1, the Bureau notifies ICE at least 90 days before the projected release date and ICE answers 60 days out. If ICE declines custody, the Bureau “may transfer custody of the inmate to the law enforcement agency who lodged a detainer, or release the inmate if no other detainer is on file.”
There is also a route for detainers that should not be there at all. Chapter 6 provides that a detainer or notification is removed when the requesting agency asks for removal in writing, staff verify the correspondence, and a DAL is sent confirming the removal (PS 5800.15 at p. 39). If the underlying charge has been dismissed or the warrant recalled, the fix usually starts with the agency that filed it, not with the prison.
If you are counsel: detainers
Four points that matter in practice.
The United States is a party to the Agreement as both sending and receiving State. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978), settled it: the Court concluded, “as have all of the Courts of Appeals that have considered the question, that the United States is a party to the Agreement as both a sending and a receiving State.”
A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer — until a detainer has already been lodged. Mauro held that “such a writ issued by a federal court to state authorities, directing the production of a state prisoner for trial on criminal charges, is not a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement and thus does not trigger the application of the Agreement.” But the Court also held that “[o]nce the Federal Government lodges a detainer against a prisoner with state prison officials, the Agreement by its express terms becomes applicable and the United States must comply with its provisions,” and that in that posture the writ functions as a “written request for temporary custody” under Article IV. The Bureau’s Chapter 6 tracks the same distinction from the operational side: “If the state wishes to issue a writ to request temporary custody and does not file a detainer, the inmate may be released via state writ” (PS 5800.15 at p. 48), and where a detainer is on file and another jurisdiction in the same party State files a state writ, “the state writ will be treated as an Article IV IAD request and the inmate must go out ‘IAD’ on all” (PS 5800.15 at p. 45).
The anti-shuttling rule is absolute, and one day is enough. In Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001), the defendant was taken to the receiving State for arraignment and returned the same day. The Court held that Article IV(e) “does bar further proceedings, despite the fact that the interruption of the initial imprisonment lasted for only one” day, because “the language of the Agreement … is absolute” and “‘[t]he word “shall” is ordinarily “the language of command.”‘” The Court rejected a de minimis exception: “we must assume that every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)’s ‘no return’ requirement.” It preserved one door: the decision “does not bar a receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his rights under Article IV(e).”
When the receiving State is the United States, the remedy changes. Bozeman pointed to it and the statute confirms it: 18 U.S.C. App. § 9(1) provides that where the United States is the receiving State, “any order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice,” on the three enumerated factors, and § 9(2) provides that “it shall not be a violation of the agreement on detainers if prior to trial the prisoner is returned to the custody of the sending State pursuant to an order of the appropriate court issued after reasonable notice to the prisoner and the United States and an opportunity for a hearing.” Bozeman was careful about this: the Court noted the provision “governs only when ‘the United States is a receiving State.’ And here the United States is not the receiving State.” An IAD violation in a federal prosecution is therefore not automatically fatal to the indictment the way it is in a State prosecution.
One last operational note for counsel: the Bureau does not adjudicate IAD violations. Chapter 6 is explicit — “If an inmate says that his or her rights have been violated under the IAD, the inmate will be advised to contact the state authorities or his or her attorney. The Bureau does not decide the validity of the detainer or violation of any IAD provision,” and “[t]he inmate must address any request regarding a possible violation of the IADA to the appropriate state court” (PS 5800.15 at pp. 45, 47). An administrative remedy filed against the Bureau will not fix a missed 180 days. The motion goes to the court where the charge is pending.
What changed in the detainers chapter
The document behind this page has two dates and it matters which one you are reading.
The base Program Statement is dated January 1, 2009, approved by Director Harley G. Lappin. It rescinded Program Statement 5800.14, Inmate Systems Management Manual (12/30/2006), and its stated changes were largely structural — adding duties for the newly created Correctional Systems Officer position, which consolidated the old Legal Instruments Examiner and Inmate Systems Officer roles, and updating mandatory training modules. Every page of Chapter 6 still carries the running footer “P5800.15 1/1/2009.” The IAD procedure you read in Chapter 6 is, in substance, seventeen years old.
Change Notice CN-1 is dated September 23, 2016, approved by Acting Director Thomas R. Kane. Its scope is narrow and it says so: “This Change Notice (CN) implements the following change to Program Statement 5800.15, Correctional Systems Manual, dated January 1, 2009. This CN provides guidance pertaining to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).” It rewrites Section 606, Pre-Release Notification and nothing else. The substantive changes it made:
- Added the carve-out “excluding ICE deportation matters” to the federal-detainer priority rule.
- Added: “Normally, ICE will not accept custody of an inmate until all state and Federal criminal matters have been satisfied.”
- Added the 90-day ICE notification requirement, the PERC email routing, the medical and mental-health care-level transmission for Care Level 3 and 4 individuals, the encrypted medical-record provision, and ICE’s 60-day answer deadline.
- Added: telephonic verification is accepted where the filing authority cannot provide written documentation that it will decline custody.
Nothing in CN-1 touched the Interstate Agreement on Detainers sections. Sections 601 through 605 and 607 through 619 — the definitions, the lodging requirements, the IAD notification and request procedures, the form set, the 180-day and 30-day handling, extradition, foreign detainers and writs — all read as they did on January 1, 2009.
That is the divergence worth knowing. The Agreement itself has not changed since 1970, so the statutory clocks in the table above are current. But the Bureau’s implementing chapter predates a decade of practice, and its own cross-references show it: it cites the Program Statement on Transfer of Inmates to State Agents for Production on State Writs without an edition, and its ICE contact routing has been superseded once already. Chapter 6 remains the Bureau’s operative instruction — but where it and the Agreement diverge, the Agreement is the law and the Program Statement is the instruction.
Where people get stuck when the 180 days run
The 180 days ran and nothing happened
The Bureau’s role here is limited by design. Chapter 6 directs staff to write the prosecutor “calling attention to the lapse of the 180-day period,” and then states two hard limits: “Only the state may authorize the removal of its detainer,” and “[t]he inmate must address any request regarding a possible violation of the IADA to the appropriate state court” (PS 5800.15 at p. 45). So the lapse letter is real but it is not relief. Relief is a motion in the court where the charge is pending, and under Article V(c) the remedy there is dismissal with prejudice — except where the United States is the receiving State, in which case 18 U.S.C. App. § 9(1) lets the court choose. Whether a particular delay was excused by a continuance “for good cause shown in open court” is a question for that court on that record. This is a consult, and it is one to have early: the 180 days runs from delivery to the prosecutor and the court, and the delivery proof is in the return receipts the institution files.
The request was never actually delivered
This is the most common failure mode, and it is a records problem before it is a legal one. Chapter 6 directs staff to send the packet to the Clerk of the Court and the Prosecuting Officer by “Certified Mail, Return Receipt,” to the IADA Compact Administrator by First-Class Mail, to place the return receipts in the J&C file, and to “set up a retrieval system for tracking the two-week follow-up date” (PS 5800.15 at pp. 44–45). Ask for those receipts in writing on an Inmate Request to Staff (BP-A0148) to Correctional Systems. If the copies do not come, the Administrative Remedy Program is the escalation path for the records failure — a BP-9 within 20 calendar days of the event, a BP-10 to the Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the Warden’s signed response, a BP-11 to the General Counsel within 30 calendar days of the Regional Director’s, and, under 28 C.F.R. § 542.18, no response inside the deadline “may [be considered] a denial at that level.” Use the remedy program to get the paper; use the court to enforce the Agreement.
The detainer is stopping halfway house or home confinement
A detainer does not automatically disqualify anyone from anything, but as a practical matter it constrains community placement, and it feeds into security designation and custody classification. The productive question is usually not “can I get placement anyway” but “can the detainer be resolved or removed.” Chapter 6 gives two routes: resolution through the Agreement, for an untried charge from a party State, and removal, where the filing agency withdraws it in writing and staff verify and send a DAL confirming removal. Whether either is available in a given case depends entirely on what the detainer is based on and which jurisdiction filed it — a fact question, not a rule question. That is what Interstate Agreement on Detainers representation is for.
The state took custody, then sent the person back before trial
Stop and get counsel involved immediately, because this is the scenario Bozeman governs and the clock on preserving it is short. Under Article IV(e), if trial “is not had” before the return to the original place of imprisonment, the charge “shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice,” and Bozeman held that a single day’s return triggers it with no de minimis exception. Two things can defeat the claim: a waiver, which Bozeman expressly preserved, and — where the receiving jurisdiction is the United States rather than a State — 18 U.S.C. App. § 9(2), which provides that a pre-trial return “pursuant to an order of the appropriate court issued after reasonable notice to the prisoner and the United States and an opportunity for a hearing” is not a violation at all. Preserve the dates, the transport records, and any signed BP-A567, and raise it in the court where the charge is pending.
Related BOP policy on detainers
| Page | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Interstate Agreement on Detainers representation | Working an actual detainer — filing, tracking, and enforcing the Agreement |
| State writs and transfers (PS 5875.13) | Production in state court on a writ rather than under the Agreement |
| Transfer to state custody before release (PS 5140.44) | Moving to state custody before the federal sentence ends |
| Nunc pro tunc / state designation (PS 5160.05) | Designating a state institution for service of a federal sentence |
| Institution Hearing Program — immigration (PS 5111.04) | Removal proceedings conducted inside a federal institution |
| Release notification requirements (PS 5110.17) | Who the Bureau must notify before a release |
| Central file and records (PS 5800.17) | The Inmate Central File and the J&C file where detainer paperwork lives |
| Sentence computation manual (PS 5880.28) | Computation issues that a period out on a writ or IAD can create |
| Receiving and discharge (PS 5800.19) | Release-day processing, including transfer to a detaining authority |
| Administrative remedy program (PS 1330.18) | BP-8 through BP-11, for records failures the Bureau can fix |
| Voluntary surrender and unescorted transfers (PS 5140.43) | The companion chapter of Correctional Systems practice |
Frequently Asked Questions About Detainers
What is a detainer, exactly?
It is a formal request from another jurisdiction to hold someone for it at the end of the current sentence. The Bureau’s own definition is broad: “A formal request from a Federal, state, or local jurisdiction for an inmate’s custody upon completion of a term of imprisonment. This definition includes requests for criminal and non-criminal charges (e.g., material witnesses, deportation, probation/parole violator warrants, child support, etc.)” (PS 5800.15 at p. 37). A detainer is not a conviction, not a sentence, and not itself a charge.
How do I make a state charge behind a detainer go to trial?
By filing an Article III request for final disposition on BP-A236, IAD — Place of Imprisonment, after you have been notified of the detainer and have arrived at the institution designated for service of your sentence. Once the written notice and request are delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court, Article III(a) provides that “he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days,” subject to continuances “for good cause shown in open court.” Filing it waives extradition on those charges and operates as a request for disposition of every untried charge from that State on which a detainer has been lodged — so speak to counsel first.
What is the difference between the 180 days and the 120 days?
Who started it. The 180-day clock in Article III(a) runs when the person in custody delivers a request for final disposition to the prosecutor and the court. The 120-day clock in Article IV(c) runs when the prosecutor requests temporary custody and the person arrives in the receiving State: “trial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State.” Both are subject to reasonable continuances granted for good cause in open court.
What is the anti-shuttling rule?
It is the rule that a person taken out under the Agreement may not be sent back before trial. Articles III(d) and IV(e) both provide that if trial “is not had” before the return to the original place of imprisonment, the charge “shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” In Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001), the Supreme Court applied it to a one-day return for arraignment and rejected any de minimis exception, holding that “every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay … triggers IV(e)’s ‘no return’ requirement.”
Does the Agreement apply to a probation or parole violation warrant?
No. In Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985), the Supreme Court held that “a detainer based on a probation-violation charge is not a detainer based on ‘any untried indictment, information or complaint,’ within the meaning of Art. III.” The Bureau’s Chapter 6 cites Carchman for exactly that point (PS 5800.15 at p. 37). A violation warrant is still a detainer for BOP purposes — it just does not carry the Agreement’s clocks.
Is a federal writ the same as a detainer?
No. In United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum “is not a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement and thus does not trigger the application of the Agreement.” But if a detainer has already been lodged, the Agreement applies, and Mauro held that in that posture the writ functions as a “written request for temporary custody” under Article IV — which starts the 120-day clock and brings the anti-shuttling rule with it.
Does the Bureau of Prisons decide whether my IAD rights were violated?
No, and it says so. “The Bureau does not decide the validity of the detainer or violation of any IAD provision,” and a person claiming a violation “will be advised to contact the state authorities or his or her attorney” (PS 5800.15 at p. 47). The Bureau’s job is the paperwork and the notifications. The remedy is a motion in the court where the charge is pending.
If a deadline is missed in a federal prosecution, is the case dismissed with prejudice?
Not automatically. 18 U.S.C. App. § 9(1) provides that where the United States is the receiving State, “any order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice,” and directs the court to weigh “[t]he seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement on detainers and on the administration of justice.” That federal carve-out is why an IAD violation plays very differently in federal court than in state court.
Applied Insight — Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, Managing Director: The detainer file is built out of delivery proof. Article III’s clock does not run from the day you sign the BP-A236; it runs from delivery to the prosecuting officer and the court, and the only record of that is the certified-mail return receipts the institution is directed to file in the J&C file. When we open a detainer matter the first request is always the same — the BP-A235, the executed BP-A236, the BP-A238 and BP-A239, and every return receipt, with dates. What that packet shows determines whether there is anything to enforce.
This page is general information about Bureau of Prisons policy and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Legal representation is provided by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq. To discuss a detainer, call (843) 620-1100.
Reviewed for legal accuracy by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney·September 2026