The § 3553(a) Factors in a Compassionate Release Motion

By Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., and Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA

What Are the § 3553(a) Factors?

The § 3553(a) factors are seven statutory considerations a federal judge must weigh in choosing a sentence: the offense and the defendant’s history; four purposes of punishment; the kinds of sentences available; the guideline range; policy statements; the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and restitution. In a compassionate release motion they are the second step, applied after eligibility — and a judge may deny on them alone.

Key takeaways on the § 3553(a) factors

• The list is in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and it is short. Seven numbered paragraphs, one of which — (a)(2) — has four subparagraphs. The whole subsection is preceded by a command: “The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.”
• In a sentence-reduction motion, § 3553(a) is step two and only step two. The Supreme Court said so in 2026: “whether a prisoner is eligible depends on whether he can offer ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons that ‘warrant’ compassionate release, not on the §3553(a) factors” (Rutherford v. United States, slip op. at 13–14, citing Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010)).
• A judge may deny on § 3553(a) without ever deciding whether you are eligible. “[W]hen a district court denies a defendant’s motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) in sole reliance on the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors, it need not determine whether the defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons” (United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2021)).
• This is where motions die. In fiscal year 2025, courts cited the § 3553(a) factors 1,260 times as a reason for denial — 24.9% of the 5,067 reasons given across 2,401 denials, more than twice the next most common (USSC FY2025 Compassionate Release Data Report, Table 11). That is a share of reasons, not of cases. In the first half of FY2026 the count was 403, 23.0% of 1,752 reasons (FY2026 Q1–Q2 Report, Table 11).
• The factors do not change when a sentence is reopened. The evidence does. The judge already applied this list to this person once. The second time, there is a prison record, a medical file, a disciplinary history, and a release plan that did not exist at sentencing — and the question is what has changed, not whether the original sentence was right.
• A long record is not the disqualifier families assume. Among those granted relief in FY2025, 35.7% were in criminal history category VI, the highest, and 20.7% were career offenders — shares almost identical to those denied (36.3% and 18.4%) (FY2025 Report, Table 7). Half of those granted were serving original sentences of 20 years or more (Figure 2).
• Rehabilitation cannot open the door, and it is still the most-cited reason for opening it. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) forbids treating it alone as extraordinary and compelling, yet it was cited 95 times among the 631 reasons given for the 394 FY2025 grants — and the Commission notes it was never cited alone (Table 10).

Where § 3553(a) Sits in the Statute, and Why It Is the Second Question a Judge Asks

Section 3553(a) is not an eligibility test. It is the discretionary weighing that happens after a court decides it is allowed to act, and understanding that sequence is the difference between a motion that gets read and one that gets disposed of in three sentences.

The command that comes before the list: “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”

The subsection opens with an instruction, not a factor. Section 3553(a) provides: “The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—” and then the seven paragraphs follow.

Two things follow from that sentence. First, the four purposes at (a)(2) are the target; the other six paragraphs are inputs the court uses to hit it. Second, the phrase practitioners call the parsimony clause — “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” — is an affirmative argument, not a rhetorical flourish. In a sentence-reduction posture it converts into a specific question: is continued imprisonment still necessary to accomplish anything the original sentence was meant to accomplish? A motion that answers that question directly is answering the statute. A motion that recites hardship is not.

Eligibility first, § 3553(a) second

A compassionate release motion is decided in two distinct steps, and the Supreme Court restated the sequence in May 2026. Before reaching the factors, “a court must first ensure that a movant is part of the ‘limited class of prisoners’ who are ‘eligibl[e]’ for such a reduction,” and “whether a prisoner is eligible depends on whether he can offer ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons that ‘warrant’ compassionate release, not on the §3553(a) factors” (Rutherford, slip op. at 13–14, quoting Dillon, 560 U.S. at 825, 827). The gatekeeping step “is not, as petitioners seem to believe, a free-for-all. It is a distinct analytical step that imposes independent and ascertainable limits on access to compassionate release.”

The full anatomy of that two-step ruling — the danger finding under USSG § 1B1.13(a)(2), victim notification, the order the judge actually enters — is covered on what do judges consider when sentencing and, for the dangerousness question specifically, on danger to the community. The eligibility categories themselves — medical, advanced age, family circumstances, abuse in custody, other reasons similar in gravity — are laid out at compassionate release definition. What matters here is the placement: § 3553(a) is downstream of eligibility, which is why a strong § 3553(a) argument cannot rescue a motion with no qualifying ground, and why a strong qualifying ground cannot survive a weak § 3553(a) argument.

The statutory hook is in the text of § 3582(c)(1)(A) itself: the court “may reduce the term of imprisonment … after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that … extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” USSG § 1B1.13(a) repeats it: the court may reduce “if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable, the court determines that” the listed conditions are met. The phrase “to the extent that they are applicable” is doing real work, and it is the reason several of the seven factors carry almost no weight in this posture.

A court may deny on § 3553(a) alone — four circuits say so, and one did it again in 2026

This is the single most important procedural fact on the page, and it explains most short denial orders. Every circuit to address it has held that the required findings are conjunctive and may be resolved in any order, so a judge can assume eligibility without deciding it and deny on the factors.

Court	Case	What it holds
2d Cir.	United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2021)	Denial “in sole reliance on the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors” requires no finding on extraordinary and compelling reasons
6th Cir.	United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516 (2021)	A court may deny when any one prerequisite is lacking and need not address the others
9th Cir.	United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278 (2021)	Same rule, Ninth Circuit
11th Cir.	United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (2021)	The findings are necessary conditions in no mandated order
11th Cir.	United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (2021)	“Because all three conditions—i.e., support in the § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adherence to § 1B1.13’s policy statement—are necessary, the absence of even one would foreclose a sentence reduction”

Tinker explains the grammar with a domestic analogy the Eleventh Circuit wrote into the opinion: “Rose can give Joe a cookie, after Joe walks the dog, if he does the dishes, and takes out the trash.” The order does not matter. Completing all of them does.

The most recent published application of the rule is United States v. White, No. 25-1857 (6th Cir. June 15, 2026). White became a partially blind paraplegic in prison after contracting meningitis. The district court accepted that his physical condition was an extraordinary and compelling circumstance — and denied anyway, on the factors, finding that his medical problems “didn’t nullify the underlying justifications for his sentence” and touched only one of them. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. That is the shape of the problem this page exists to address: proving you are sick enough, or old enough, or needed at home is half the motion.

The rest of § 3553 — what else is in the section people search for

Searchers arriving on “18 U.S.C. § 3553” are often not looking for subsection (a) at all. The section is longer than the factor list, and the other subsections matter to different problems:

• § 3553(b) — the now-largely-historical instruction that a court “shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range” of the guidelines absent an unconsidered aggravating or mitigating circumstance. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), excised the mandatory operation of that provision and made the Guidelines advisory.
• § 3553(c) — the statement-of-reasons duty: the court “shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence,” with added specificity when the sentence is outside the range or the range exceeds 24 months. This is the sentencing-hearing duty; how much explanation a judge owes on a sentence-reduction motion is a separate question, treated below.
• § 3553(e) — the government-motion route to a sentence below a statutory minimum for substantial assistance. Its Rule-based companion is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). See rule 35 and 5k1.
• § 3553(f) — the safety valve, which lets a court sentence certain drug defendants without regard to a mandatory minimum if five conditions are met, including the criminal-history limits Congress rewrote in the First Step Act of 2018. See safety valve federal sentencing.
• § 3553(g) — defines “violent offense” for purposes of the section.

The same seven factors, five different proceedings

Section 3553(a) is not a compassionate release doctrine. It is the general federal sentencing standard, and it is incorporated by reference into most of the ways a federal sentence can change. That is why this page is worth reading even if compassionate release is not your route.

Proceeding	Statutory hook	How § 3553(a) enters
Original sentencing	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)	Directly. The court “shall consider” all seven
Compassionate release / sentence reduction	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)	“[A]fter considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable”
Retroactive guideline amendment reduction	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)	Identical language — “to the extent that they are applicable”
Supervised release modification, early termination, or revocation	18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)	A subset: “(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” Congress deliberately omitted (a)(2)(A) — seriousness, respect for law, just punishment — and (a)(3)
Rule 35(b) substantial-assistance reduction	Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)	Not by cross-reference. The rule requires a government motion and substantial assistance; the reduction is still a sentencing judgment by the same judge, and § 3553(e) supplies the authority to go below a mandatory minimum

The § 3583(e) omission is worth pausing on, because it is the clearest proof that Congress calibrates this list deliberately. When a court decides whether to terminate supervision early or how to sanction a violation, it is not supposed to be re-punishing the underlying offense. In a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion, by contrast, Congress incorporated the entire list — including (a)(2)(A). That is why “the offense was too serious” is a legitimate ground for denying compassionate release and an illegitimate ground for revoking supervision. For the broader map of routes out, see federal sentence reduction and compassionate release attorneys.

Factor by Factor: What Each One Asks, What Proves It, and How Much It Actually Moves a Ruling

This is the table to keep. Left to right: the statutory language, the evidence that speaks to it in a sentence-reduction posture specifically, how courts have actually weighed it, and a plain answer to the question no other page answers — does this factor move rulings, or not?

§ 3553(a) factor	Statutory language	Evidence that answers it in a § 3582(c) motion	How courts have weighed it	Does it move rulings?
(a)(1) Nature and circumstances of the offense; history and characteristics of the defendant	“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”	PSR; judgment and statement of reasons; SENTRY disciplinary printout with incident report numbers and dates; education and vocational transcripts with completion dates; work evaluations; FSA needs-assessment and PATTERN score history; medical record and Care Level; age now versus age at sentencing	The half courts actually re-examine is “history and characteristics,” because that record is years longer. Offense conduct is fixed and already weighed. Criminal history is not the bar people assume: 35.7% of FY2025 grants were category VI (Table 7)	Decisive. This is where the motion lives. It is also the factor most likely to be the real content of a one-line “§ 3553(a) factors” denial
(a)(2)(A) Seriousness, respect for law, just punishment	“to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”	Time served as a share of the sentence; BOP sentence computation and projected release date; the terms of supervision proposed to replace prison; restitution paid; any documented acceptance of responsibility since sentencing	The retributive factor, and the one judges lean on hardest. A district court has “wide latitude to deny compassionate release based on the seriousness of the underlying offense” (White, quoting Wright, 991 F.3d at 719). But there is no categorical bar keyed to offense seriousness (Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th 79 (1st Cir. 2023))	Decisive, and usually adverse. Half of FY2025 grants involved original sentences of 20 years or more (Figure 2) — long sentences leave room to cut and still read as just punishment
(a)(2)(B) Deterrence	“to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”	Years already served; institutional conduct record; age; documented cognitive or physical decline; program completions	Splits in two. General deterrence is largely unaffected by an individualized medical release. Specific deterrence is where clean conduct and decline do work. “Post-sentencing conduct” was cited as a denial reason only 55 times in FY2025, 1.1% of reasons (Table 11)	Moderate. Rarely the stated basis for a denial; frequently part of the reasoning. Bad conduct sinks the motions it sinks decisively
(a)(2)(C) Protecting the public	“to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”	Disciplinary record; PATTERN trajectory; custody classification history; functional limitations documented by ADL assessment; the specific supervision and monitoring proposed	Overlaps almost entirely with the separate danger finding under USSG § 1B1.13(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). “Protection of the public” was cited 143 times among FY2025 denial reasons (Table 11). Disability reduces but does not necessarily eliminate risk (White)	High, and the factor a concrete release plan can actually change
(a)(2)(D) Training, medical care, correctional treatment	“to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”	BOP health record and Care Level designation; referral and consult logs; documented delays or cancellations; outside treating-physician letters; the community care plan with a named provider and an intake date	The only factor in the list that can cut for release on its face — “in the most effective manner” invites a comparison between BOP care and community care. Post-sentencing treatment success cuts the same way (Pepper, 562 U.S. 476 (2011)). BOP failure to provide treatment was cited 12 times among FY2025 grants and 9 times in the first half of FY2026 (Table 10)	Underused. Most motions ignore it. It is the strongest affirmative factor available in a medical case
(a)(3) Kinds of sentences available	“the kinds of sentences available”	The menu the judge actually has: outright release; reduction to time served; conversion of the unserved term to supervised release with conditions; home detention with location monitoring under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19)	Ordinarily thin, because the court is not selecting a sentence from scratch. But it is the textual home of the middle-path ask, and a movant who raises it puts a smaller remedy on the table. Raised and rejected on the record in White	Low on its own; useful as the hook for an alternative ask the judge can grant without releasing outright
(a)(4) The guideline range	“the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for … the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant”	The original guideline calculation from the PSR and statement of reasons; where the sentence fell in or out of that range	Historical context. The range was calculated once, the sentence was imposed against it, and the Guidelines have been advisory since Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). It bears on the extent of a reduction more than on whether to grant one	Low. Genuinely “not applicable” in most § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions
(a)(5) Pertinent policy statements	“any pertinent policy statement … issued by the Sentencing Commission”	USSG § 1B1.13 in its current form, plus the Commission’s application notes	Deceptively large. In a compassionate release motion the pertinent policy statement is § 1B1.13, which the statute separately makes binding through the “consistent with applicable policy statements” clause. That is the clause the Supreme Court used to hold § 1B1.13(b)(6) invalid in relevant part	High, but indirectly — it operates through the eligibility gate rather than as a discretionary makeweight
(a)(6) Unwarranted disparities	“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”	Co-defendant judgments; sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants; USSC national sentencing data for the offense and criminal history category	The most legally delicate factor after 2026. A disparity created by a nonretroactive change in law cannot establish eligibility (Rutherford). Co-defendant and like-defendant disparity are untouched	Contested and narrowed. Still live at step two; dead as an eligibility theory. See the section below
(a)(7) Restitution	“the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense”	Restitution balance and payment history; Inmate Financial Responsibility Program record; the post-release payment schedule; documented employment prospects	The least-litigated factor and the easiest to answer well. Restitution survives a grant untouched; a person earning community wages may pay more than one earning institutional wages, and courts respond to that being said out loud	Low weight, near-zero cost. Cheap to win; conspicuous when ignored

How to read the right-hand column. The Sentencing Commission codes “the § 3553(a) factors” as a single denial category and does not break it out by paragraph — there is no published count of denials attributable to (a)(2)(A) versus (a)(2)(C). The weighting above is a practitioner’s read of the cited appellate authority plus the adjacent categories the Commission does code separately (“protection of the public,” 143; “post-sentencing conduct,” 55; “rehabilitation insufficient,” 524), all from Table 11 of the FY2025 report. It is not a Commission statistic and should not be quoted as one.

Section 3553(a)(1) and the Four Purposes at § 3553(a)(2)

These five provisions carry the argument. Everything else in the list is context.

§ 3553(a)(1) — nature and circumstances of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant

The statute pairs them in a single clause: “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” Judges treat that as one question with two halves — what happened, and who is this person. In a sentence-reduction motion the two halves behave completely differently.

The offense half is closed. The judge already knows the conduct, already resolved the guideline disputes, and in most districts imposed the sentence personally. Re-arguing the facts is the fastest way to lose the reader. It is also, after Fernandez v. United States (2026), the wrong statute: a prisoner attacking the validity of a conviction must proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not § 3582. That is a hard line and it has its own page — see compassionate release vs 2255, the deadline rules at post-conviction deadlines, and the federal 2255 motion lawyer overview.

The history-and-characteristics half is wide open, and Congress said so in a separate statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” That is the authority for putting a decade of institutional record in front of a judge who last saw a presentence report.

The Supreme Court has explained what that record does. In Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011), the Court held that a district court resentencing a defendant after remand may consider evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation, because that evidence “provides the most up-to-date picture of his ‘history and characteristics.’ §3553(a)(1).” Steady employment and completion of a 500-hour drug treatment program also “suggest a diminished need for ‘educational or vocational training … or other correctional treatment.’ §3553(a)(2)(D).”

Three cautions on Pepper and § 3661, and they matter. First, Pepper is a resentencing case — the sentence had been set aside on appeal and the court was starting over. A § 3582(c) motion is not a plenary resentencing; Dillon holds that sentence-modification proceedings are a limited exception to finality, not a do-over. Second, Pepper says nothing about eligibility. It tells you what § 3553(a)(1) is capable of holding; it does not make rehabilitation a qualifying ground. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) forecloses that: “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” Third, § 3661’s breadth is a step-two breadth. The petitioners in Rutherford built their argument on § 3661 and lost; the Court’s response was that they had skipped the eligibility step entirely. Section 3661 tells a judge what may be considered once the judge is deciding. It does not tell the judge what makes a prisoner eligible to be decided about.

What the Commission’s data shows about criminal history is worth repeating because it contradicts the intuition almost everyone brings to this. Among those granted relief in FY2025, 27.5% were in criminal history category I and 35.7% in category VI — the largest single group was the highest category (FY2025 Report, Table 7). Career offenders under USSG § 4B1.1 were 20.7% of grants against 18.4% of denials. A long record does not close the door under (a)(1).

§ 3553(a)(2)(A) — seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, just punishment

The text: “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” This is the retributive purpose, and in a sentence-reduction posture it is the factor that quietly kills the most motions.

The question the judge is actually answering is not whether the offense was serious — that was settled at sentencing. It is whether the time already served, plus whatever supervision would follow, still amounts to just punishment. Framed that way, the motion is arguing about a sentence that would remain, not about a sentence already served. Most denied motions never make that shift.

Appellate law gives district judges very wide room here. A court has “wide latitude to deny compassionate release based on the seriousness of the underlying offense,” and may do so “so long as it considers the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority” (White, quoting United States v. Wright, 991 F.3d 717, 719 (6th Cir. 2021)). Courts “may place great weight” on serious offense conduct. And a movant’s “disagreement with how the district court balanced the § 3553(a) factors, standing alone, is not a sufficient ground for reversal.”

There is one real limit. Offense seriousness is not a categorical bar. The First Circuit vacated a denial in United States v. Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th 79 (1st Cir. 2023), holding that where a denial implies the crime of conviction is a categorical bar, “no such categorical bar currently exists” and that it was error to treat the motion as deniable as a matter of law. A judge may weigh seriousness heavily; a judge may not treat it as a rule.

There is no time-served threshold in the statute for a medical or family-based motion, and no percentage anyone must reach. The 10-year and 75% figures that circulate come from the advanced-age category at USSG § 1B1.13(b)(2) and apply only there; the 18-month prognosis and 50%/75% screens that circulate alongside them come from the Bureau’s former policy, Program Statement 5050.50. Its replacement, BOP Program Statement 5050.51 (Sept. 3, 2026), drops the 18-month figure and the 50% screen and now tracks the guideline’s end-of-life-trajectory and 65-and-older tests (§§ 4.a, 4.c). Either way, BOP policy is the Bureau’s internal filter for whether the Director will file — not the test a court applies to a defendant-filed motion. See who is not eligible for compassionate release for what actually forecloses relief.

The absence of a rule is not the absence of a pattern. Of those granted in FY2025, 50.0% were serving original sentences of 20 years or more and another 25.8% were serving 10 to under 20 years; 0.5% were serving under a year (Figure 2). That is original sentence length, not the size of the reduction — the Commission publishes no reduction amounts. The practical read: long sentences leave room for a cut that still reads as just punishment. Short ones do not.

§ 3553(a)(2)(B) — adequate deterrence to criminal conduct

Deterrence has two halves that behave differently, and briefing them as one thing wastes the factor.

General deterrence — the message the sentence sends to everyone else — is barely touched by an individualized release for terminal illness or an incapacitated caregiver. Courts routinely say so, and a judge who denies relief citing general deterrence is usually really citing (a)(2)(A). In White the district court found the original sentence deterred others and the Sixth Circuit accepted that as one of four factors properly weighed.

Specific deterrence — whether this person needs more prison to be deterred — is where the institutional record does real work. Years of clean conduct, documented physical or cognitive decline, and advanced age are all direct evidence on this question, and all of it post-dates the sentencing.

The Commission’s data gives an indirect but useful read on how much weight courts place here: “post-sentencing conduct” was cited as a denial reason 55 times in FY2025 — 1.1% of the 5,067 reasons (Table 11). Bad institutional conduct is not what usually sinks these motions. It sinks the ones it sinks decisively, and it is worth knowing before filing what is in the record. For how disciplinary findings are made and challenged, see what is a shot in prison.

§ 3553(a)(2)(C) — protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant

This factor and the separate danger finding are close cousins, and most judges analyze them together. The difference is procedural: non-dangerousness under USSG § 1B1.13(a)(2) is a required finding at the eligibility stage, imported wholesale from the pretrial-detention factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); public protection under § 3553(a)(2)(C) is one input among seven at the discretionary stage. A motion has to satisfy both, and the evidence is the same evidence. The full four-factor treatment lives on danger to the community.

“Protection of the public” was cited 143 times among FY2025 denial reasons (Table 11). Read against the 1,260 citations to § 3553(a) generally, that suggests most § 3553(a) denials are not framed as public-safety denials at all — they are framed as “not enough time served for this offense.”

White is the cautionary case on how far a disability argument carries. White was paralyzed and partially blind. The district court found that his disability “lessens the threat he poses to the public,” but that he still posed one — he had run a drug operation by phone, recruited others to commit violence, threatened witnesses, and continued to abuse staff in prison. The Sixth Circuit’s line is memorable and worth taking seriously before filing: “He didn’t use his legs or eyes to commit these crimes. He used only his voice.” Physical incapacity answers (a)(2)(C) only where the offense conduct depended on physical capacity.

§ 3553(a)(2)(D) — needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment

This is the factor most motions skip, and it is the only one in the list that can cut for release on its face. The statute directs the court to consider the need “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”

The last four words are the argument. They invite a comparison: is the care this person needs being delivered in the most effective manner where they are? Where the record shows the Bureau of Prisons is not delivering it — the referral never scheduled, the surgery approved and not performed, the oncology appointment postponed four times — (a)(2)(D) is a direct statutory hook, not an appeal to sympathy.

It pairs with the eligibility ground at USSG § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C), which covers a condition requiring long-term or specialized care “that is not being provided” where the person is at risk of serious deterioration or death. Note what that guideline does not require: proof of deliberate indifference. That is an Eighth Amendment standard from a different body of law, and importing it concedes a burden the guideline does not impose. The evidentiary build for a medical motion is on compassionate release medical condition, and the BOP care-level system that produces the records is explained at medical care levels in federal prison.

The category is small but growing: BOP failure to provide treatment was cited 12 times among the 631 FY2025 grant reasons and 9 times among the 199 reasons in the first half of FY2026 (FY2026 Q1–Q2 Report, Table 10).

Pepper supplies the other half of this factor, the half almost nobody uses. Completion of long-form treatment and sustained employment “suggest a diminished need for ‘educational or vocational training … or other correctional treatment.'” Where a person has completed the RDAP residential drug program, holds a steady work assignment, and has finished the programming identified by the First Step Act needs assessment that drives their First Step Act time credits, the correctional-treatment purpose has been satisfied on the government’s own records.

Applied Insight — Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney: We brief § 3553(a) affirmatively, in the opening motion, before the government has said a word about it. A great many filings — pro se and counseled both — treat § 3553(a) as rebuttal, something to answer if the prosecutor raises it. By then the judge has read a motion that never explained why a shorter sentence still reflects the seriousness of the offense, still deters, and still protects the public. The Commission’s own denial data says that is the argument the court is going to decide the case on. We also brief each paragraph by name and number, including the ones that cut against us, because White and Chavez-Meza between them mean a judge can deny you in three sentences and be affirmed unless the record makes those three sentences impossible to write honestly. Silence on a factor is silence about an argument the court was never asked to reach.

Section 3553(a)(3) Through § 3553(a)(7): The Structural Factors

These five do less work than the first two, and the statute’s own “to the extent that they are applicable” clause is why. Two of them are near-dead letters in this posture. Two are quietly useful. One is the most legally delicate provision on the page and gets its own section below.

§ 3553(a)(3) — the kinds of sentences available

“[T]he kinds of sentences available.” At an original sentencing this means probation versus prison versus a fine. In a sentence-reduction motion the court is not choosing from that menu — it is deciding whether to shorten a term already imposed. So the factor looks empty.

It is not quite empty, and the reason is worth knowing. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes the court to reduce the term of imprisonment “and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment.” That parenthetical is a menu, and (a)(3) is where a movant argues from it. A judge unwilling to release someone outright may be entirely willing to convert the remaining term to supervised release with home detention and location monitoring under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19) — a condition the statute says may be imposed “only as an alternative to incarceration,” which is exactly what a sentence reduction makes it.

A motion that offers a single outcome invites a single answer. In White, the movant did raise (a)(3), arguing he could live with his mother instead; the district court addressed it and the Sixth Circuit found that sufficient. The factor is thin, but it is the textual home of the alternative ask, and it costs one paragraph to raise.

§ 3553(a)(4) — the sentencing range established by the Guidelines

The longest paragraph in the subsection, and the least useful here. It directs the court to consider “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for … the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines,” in the version “in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.”

Three points. First, the Guidelines have been advisory since United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which excised the provision making them binding; a court “may ‘depart’ or ‘vary’ from the Guidelines and select a sentence outside the range.” Second, the paragraph is keyed to the guidelines in effect at sentencing, which is why it does not automatically import later amendments. Third, in a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion the range was calculated once, years ago, and the sentence was imposed against it — the range is historical context, not a live question.

Where (a)(4) does resurface is the extent of a reduction: a judge deciding how far to cut often reaches for the range as a reference point. If your route is a retroactive guideline amendment rather than compassionate release, § 3553(a)(4) becomes central instead of marginal, and the mechanism is § 3582(c)(2), not (c)(1)(A). Background on how ranges are built is on what are federal sentencing guidelines.

§ 3553(a)(5) — any pertinent policy statement

This one looks like boilerplate and is not. The paragraph directs the court to consider “any pertinent policy statement … issued by the Sentencing Commission.” In a compassionate release motion, the pertinent policy statement is USSG § 1B1.13 — the one that defines extraordinary and compelling reasons.

Section 1B1.13 does not reach the court only through (a)(5), though. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) contains a separate, independent requirement that any reduction be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” That clause is what converts the Commission’s categories from guidance into a binding condition — and it is the clause the Supreme Court used in Rutherford to hold § 1B1.13(b)(6) invalid to the extent it counsels a result the statute forecloses. For the decision itself, see rutherford v united states.

One thing readers should be warned about: § 1B1.13(b)(6) is still printed in the 2025 Guidelines Manual, and the Commission has not amended it. The only § 1B1.13 change taking effect November 1, 2026 is nomenclature — “Bureau of Prisons” becomes “Federal Bureau of Prisons” (official amendment text). Anyone who looks the guideline up will read a provision the Supreme Court has held invalid in significant part with nothing on the page to say so. What survives of it is covered at unusually long sentence.

§ 3553(a)(6) — the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

The text: “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Three qualifiers do all the work — unwarranted, similar records, similar conduct. A disparity between people who are not similarly situated is not the kind Congress told judges to worry about. The 2026 law on this factor is subtle enough to need its own section, immediately below.

§ 3553(a)(7) — the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense

The last factor is short, and it is the cheapest one to answer well. A reduced prison term does not disturb restitution, forfeiture, fines, or the conviction — those are separate components of the judgment and they survive a grant intact.

What a judge weighing release will look at is whether restitution has been paid, what the payment schedule looks like after release, and whether releasing the person improves or worsens the prospect of payment. That last point is an affirmative argument and it is regularly left unmade: a person earning community wages can pay materially more than a person earning institutional wages through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Say it, with numbers, rather than leaving the court to infer it. See how do you pay restitution if you are in jail for how the institutional side of that works.

Factor (a)(7) is also where victim participation lands. The Commission “encourages” courts to make a best effort to notify any victim and give an opportunity to be heard before granting (Application Note 2 to § 1B1.13), and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act supplies the underlying rights. Victim input is not a separate finding and not a veto — it enters through (a)(1), (a)(2)(A), and (a)(7).

Section 3553(a)(6) After Rutherford: Which Disparities Still Count, and Where

This is the distinction almost nobody states correctly, and getting it wrong in either direction costs a motion. Rutherford closed a door at step one. It did not close § 3553(a)(6) at step two.

What Rutherford held. Where Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, the resulting disparity cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason — “considered by itself or in combination with other factors” — and USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid to the extent it counsels otherwise (Rutherford, decided May 28, 2026, with Carter v. United States). The Court’s reasoning was that “[s]uch a disparity is an unexceptional feature of a system in which nonretroactivity is the default.” That holding is about eligibility.

The losing argument in Rutherford was a § 3553(a)(6) argument, and it is worth knowing why it lost. The petitioners argued from exactly the sources this page has been describing: 18 U.S.C. § 3661‘s “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information,” and § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s instruction to consider the § 3553(a) factors — pointing specifically to “the kinds of sentences available,” the guideline range, and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities,” §§ 3553(a)(3)–(4), (6). The Court’s answer was four words: “Petitioners skip a step.” The factors are real, § 3661 is real, and neither one gets you past the gate. That is the whole lesson, and it is why a change-in-law argument has to be sequenced rather than merely asserted.

What Rutherford did not hold. It did not decide that only personal circumstances can qualify: “We need not decide whether there are reasons beyond personal circumstances that could qualify as ‘extraordinary and compelling.'” And: “We need not nail down the precise boundaries of the phrase ‘extraordinary and compelling.'” Footnote 3 states that the victim-of-abuse provision at § 1B1.13(b)(4) “is not at issue in today’s cases.” Any page telling you the Court adopted a closed list is telling you more than the Court said.

Where the change-in-law argument still lives. USSG § 1B1.13(c) is a two-sentence provision and both sentences matter:

“Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under this policy statement. However, if a defendant otherwise establishes that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction under this policy statement, a change in the law … may be considered for purposes of determining the extent of any such reduction.”

The first sentence is the eligibility bar Rutherford reinforced. The second sentence is about how much, not whether — and Rutherford’s holding was directed at eligibility. So the operative sequence after 2026 is: establish eligibility on a ground that has nothing to do with a change in law (medical, age, caregiver, abuse in custody), and only then use the change in law, through § 1B1.13(c) and § 3553(a)(6), to argue how far the sentence should come down. Getting that order backwards is what Rutherford forecloses.

Two caveats, stated plainly. First, the circuits have read Rutherford broadly rather than narrowly at step one. In United States v. Hall, No. 24-6094 (6th Cir. June 25, 2026) (published), the Sixth Circuit reversed a grant and held Rutherford’s logic is not confined to § 1B1.13(b)(6) — the catch-all at (b)(5) cannot be used to carry a ground the statute forecloses. In United States v. Chineag, No. 25-10557 (11th Cir. July 2, 2026) (unpublished), the court applied Rutherford to a nonretroactive Controlled Substances Act change. In United States v. Loggins, Nos. 24-1488 and 24-1569 (8th Cir. July 10, 2026), the Eighth Circuit read Rutherford as confirming its own prior rule. Second, we have found no decision holding that § 1B1.13(c)’s second sentence is itself invalid — but the argument should be framed as extent-only, expressly, so that a court reading Rutherford broadly is not invited to treat it as a repackaged eligibility theory.

Two kinds of disparity Rutherford does not touch at all. Neither depends on a nonretroactive statutory change, so neither is affected:

Disparity type	Why it survives	What proves it
Co-defendant disparity	Same conduct, same case, different sentences. This is the paradigm case of “similar records … similar conduct” and it has nothing to do with retroactivity	The co-defendants’ judgments, their guideline calculations, their cooperation status, and the reasons stated on the record for each
Like-defendant disparity across cases	Sentences imposed nationally on defendants with the same offense and criminal history category. Congress wrote (a)(6) to address exactly this	U.S. Sentencing Commission sentencing data for the offense type and criminal history category, drawn from the Commission’s published research

There is a third disparity worth naming honestly because it is real and (a)(6) does not reach it: geography. FY2025 grant rates ran from 31.0% in the Ninth Circuit to 4.9% in the Eighth on identical statutory text (FY2025 Report, Table 3), and district-level variation is wider still. Section 3553(a)(6) speaks to disparities among defendants, not among courthouses. That geographic spread is not an argument; it is a planning fact, and it is broken out at compassionate release grant rate and, for one state’s four districts, at compassionate release texas.

What Changes When the Judge Applies These Factors a Second Time

Here is the reframing this page exists to deliver. At an original sentencing, the judge is choosing a number from a range using a presentence report. On a sentence-reduction motion, the judge is being asked whether the number they already chose should be cut — and the honest question in the room is what has changed.

That is not a rhetorical distinction. It has four concrete consequences.

1. The evidentiary record is different, and almost all of it is new. The presentence report is now the oldest document in the file. Everything that has happened since — the disciplinary record, program completions, work evaluations, medical decline, the death or incapacity of family members, PATTERN score history, the release plan — post-dates it. Section 3661’s “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information” is the authority to put all of it in front of the court, and Pepper is the Supreme Court explaining why it is relevant to (a)(1).

2. The court is measuring a specific shorter sentence, not selecting from a range. This is the shift most denied motions never make. The question is not “does this person deserve mercy.” It is “does the sentence that would remain — time served plus the supervision and conditions proposed — still satisfy § 3553(a)(2)?” Motions that argue the second question read as sentencing arguments. Motions that argue the first read as pleas.

3. Two factors go quiet and one changes character. Factors (a)(3) and (a)(4) do limited work because the court is not picking a sentence type or applying a range — that is precisely what “to the extent that they are applicable” is for. Factor (a)(5) changes character entirely: at sentencing it is a minor cross-reference, and in a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion it points at § 1B1.13, the provision that controls eligibility.

4. Sentence-modification is not resentencing, and the difference is jurisdictional. Dillon, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), holds that § 3582(c) proceedings are a narrow exception to the finality of sentences, not a plenary do-over. Rutherford confined Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), on the same ground: Concepcion “involved sentence-modification proceedings under a different provision of the Act, where eligibility for a sentencing reduction was conceded and the only question was what information the court could consider in modifying a sentence.” Concepcion governs how much. It never governed whether.

The practical consequence of all four points is a single drafting rule: build the § 3553(a) argument around what is different now, tie every difference to a numbered paragraph of the statute, and propose the specific reduced sentence you want the court to compare against the factors. For how the surrounding process runs and how long it takes, see how long does compassionate release take and the exhaustion rules at compassionate release request to warden.

Why § 3553(a) Is the Single Largest Cause of Denial

The Sentencing Commission publishes what federal judges actually did with these motions, twice a year, with the reasons coded. Two cautions before the numbers, both of which the ranking pages on this topic get wrong.

First, courts cite more than one reason per ruling. In FY2025 there were 5,067 reasons across 2,401 denied motions and 631 reasons across 394 grants. Every percentage below is a share of reasons, never of cases. A page telling you “§ 3553(a) was the reason in 25% of denials” has made a category error; the Commission does not publish per-case attribution.

Second, the tables count motions decided, not motions filed. Nationally, FY2025 saw 2,795 decided and 394 granted — 14.1%. The first half of FY2026 ran 894 decided and 125 granted — 14.0%.

The FY2025 denial reasons, in order

Reason the court gave for denying	Citations	Share of the 5,067 reasons
The § 3553(a) factors	1,260	24.9%
Rehabilitation insufficient	524	10.3%
No extraordinary and compelling reason provided	512	10.1%
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies	447	8.8%
Insufficient proof of a serious physical or medical condition	352	6.9%
Able to provide self-care in prison	260	5.1%
Not at risk from COVID-19	191	3.8%
Protection of the public	143	2.8%
Other care available for a minor child	142	2.8%
Fails the § 3559 age and time-served test	120	2.4%
Insufficient proof of deteriorating health	66	1.3%
Post-sentencing conduct	55	1.1%
Mandatory minimum	40	0.8%
Other care available for a spouse or partner	23	0.5%
Insufficient proof of functional or cognitive impairment	15	0.3%
Binding plea agreement	4	0.1%
Other	882	17.4%

Source: USSC FY2025 Compassionate Release Data Report, Table 11, covering 2,401 denied motions and 5,067 coded reasons.

Four things in that table are instructions rather than statistics.

§ 3553(a) at 1,260 dwarfs everything else — nearly two and a half times the next entry — and it is the only reason on the list a court can reach without deciding anything else. That combination is why it deserves the top of the brief rather than the bottom.

“Rehabilitation insufficient” at 524 is the second line, and it is not the same problem. It means the court found rehabilitation present and not enough, which is 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) operating exactly as written. Rehabilitation cannot open the gate; it can carry weight at step two and inside the danger finding.

“Protection of the public” at 143 and “post-sentencing conduct” at 55 are small. Together they are 3.9% of denial reasons. Most § 3553(a) denials are not risk denials — they are seriousness-and-time-served denials.

The first half of FY2026 tracks the same shape: § 3553(a) 403 citations (23.0% of 1,752 reasons), no extraordinary and compelling reason 235 (13.4%), rehabilitation insufficient 207 (11.8%), failure to exhaust 136 (7.8%), insufficient medical proof 118 (6.7%), self-care 107 (6.1%) (FY2026 Q1–Q2 Report, Table 11).

What courts credited when they granted

The grant side is the mirror image and it is more encouraging than the denial table suggests. Among the 631 reasons given for the 394 FY2025 grants, rehabilitation was the most-cited single reason — 95 citations, 15.1% — followed by § 1B1.13(b)(6) unusually long sentence (80, 12.7%), serious physical or medical condition (71, 11.3%), multiple § 924(c) penalties (45, 7.1%), and terminal illness (28, 4.4%) (Table 10). The Commission adds a footnote that matters more than the ranking: “In all cases where the court gave rehabilitation as a reason for the granted motion, the court also gave one or more other reasons.” Rehabilitation was never cited alone. Not once.

Two demographic facts from the same report round out the picture, and both cut against what families expect. Criminal history category VI accounted for 35.7% of grants — the single largest category (Table 7). And 50.0% of those granted were serving original sentences of 20 years or more (Figure 2). A long record and a long sentence are not disqualifiers. They are the modal profile of a granted motion.

One caution on using the FY2024 and FY2025 grant data to estimate today’s odds: the 80 citations to § 1B1.13(b)(6) and the 45 to stacked § 924(c) penalties describe relief granted on a reading of the statute the Supreme Court rejected in May 2026. Roughly a fifth of that grant table describes a theory that is no longer available. See compassionate release grant rate.

The Record That Answers Each Factor — and How to Brief It

Section 3553(a) arguments are lost on evidence far more often than on law. The three largest evidentiary denial categories in FY2025 — insufficient proof of a medical condition (352), able to provide self-care (260), and other care available for a minor child (142) — total 754 citations, and every one is a proof failure rather than a legal defeat. What follows is the document set that answers the factors, and where each piece comes from.

Document	Where it comes from	Which factor it answers
Judgment and commitment order; statement of reasons	The sentencing court’s docket	(a)(1) offense half; (a)(4) the range as imposed; (a)(7) restitution ordered
Presentence report	Defense counsel of record or the court, on motion	(a)(1); (a)(4); baseline for everything that changed
BOP sentence computation (good conduct time, projected release date)	BOP Designation and Sentence Computation Center; unit team	(a)(2)(A) — the time-served proportion the just-punishment argument turns on
SENTRY disciplinary printout with incident report numbers and dates	Unit team; requested through the institution	(a)(1) history; (a)(2)(B) specific deterrence; (a)(2)(C) risk
Education and vocational transcripts, with completion dates	Education department	(a)(1); (a)(2)(D) diminished need for training
Work evaluations and job assignment history	Work supervisor; unit team	(a)(1); (a)(2)(B); (a)(2)(D)
Program completions — RDAP, treatment, cognitive programming	Psychology Services; Education	(a)(2)(D) directly; (a)(1) in combination
FSA risk-and-needs history and PATTERN score trajectory	Unit team; FSA time-credit records	(a)(2)(C) — a documented drop from high to minimum is a government finding about risk
BOP health record, Care Level designation, ADL assessment	Health Services; via signed release	(a)(2)(D); and the § 1B1.13(b)(1) eligibility ground
Referral, consult, and cancellation logs	Health Services record	(a)(2)(D) — “in the most effective manner”
Restitution ledger and IFRP payment history	Trust Fund / unit team	(a)(7)
Co-defendant judgments and guideline calculations	The court’s docket	(a)(6) co-defendant disparity
The release plan — named address, letter from whoever controls it, confirmed medical provider and intake date, insurance or Medicaid/Medicare/VA coverage, income or family support, transportation	Assembled by the family and counsel	(a)(2)(C); (a)(3) the alternative ask; and the § 3142(g) danger finding

The release plan carries more weight than its length suggests, because it is the only exhibit that speaks to the future rather than the past. It is a separate build with its own requirements — see compassionate release plan.

How to brief the factors. Four rules, all of them derived from the case law above rather than from style preference:

1. Address every paragraph by name and number, including the ones that cut against you. Chavez-Meza and White both hold that a court need not walk through each factor — but a court also cannot be faulted for ignoring an argument nobody made. Silence in the motion becomes silence in the order.
2. Argue the sentence that would remain. Name the specific reduction sought, name the supervision and conditions proposed, and measure that package against (a)(2)(A) through (a)(2)(D).
3. Attach the documents; do not summarize them. A fifteen-year clean SENTRY printout reads very differently as an exhibit than as a sentence in a brief.
4. Close off the alternatives affirmatively. For caregiver claims that means proving no one else is available; for medical claims it means proving the care is not being provided. See caregiver compassionate release and compassionate release for elderly inmates for how each ground is built, and victims of sexual abuse lawyer for the § 1B1.13(b)(4) ground.

Applied Insight — Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, Managing Director: The § 3553(a) exhibits are BOP paperwork, and families reliably under-request them. Ask for the full SENTRY disciplinary printout rather than a summary — a judge wants incident report numbers and dates, and a long clean stretch is far more persuasive as a printout than as an assertion. Ask for the custody classification history and the PATTERN score history, because a documented drop from high to minimum over a decade is a risk finding made by the government, which the government then has to argue against. Ask for the work evaluations and the unit team’s progress reports; a letter from a staff member who has supervised someone for six years is a different document from a letter from a cousin. On the medical side, the Care Level designation and the Activities of Daily Living assessment do double duty — they establish the § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) self-care element and answer § 3553(a)(2)(C) at the same time. Records retrieval and the institutional read are our side of the work; the motion, the § 3553(a) argument, and any appeal are handled by Elizabeth and the firm’s attorneys.

How Much a Judge Must Explain, and What Happens on Appeal

A denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. That standard is deferential and it is not empty — but what gets a ruling vacated is almost never the outcome. It is the reasoning, or its absence.

The controlling explanation case. Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109 (2018), was a § 3582(c)(2) reduction in which the district judge granted a partial cut on a form order certifying that he had “considered” the motion and “tak[en] into account” the § 3553(a) factors. The Supreme Court held the explanation adequate: “Because the record as a whole demonstrates the judge had a reasoned basis for his decision, the judge’s explanation for petitioner’s sentence reduction was adequate.”

The Court declined to go as far as the government urged — the government had argued the movant “was not entitled to an explanation at all” because § 3582(c)(2) does not expressly require one, and the Court found it “unnecessary to go as far as the Government urges.” Quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), it restated the standard: a sentencing judge need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority,” and “sometimes a judge simply writes the word ‘granted’ or ‘denied’ on the face of a motion while relying upon context and the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons clear.”

The circuits apply the same idea to compassionate release. A district court “need not specifically articulate its analysis of every single § 3553(a) factor,” and may “be more cursory in their compassionate release decisions if the whole record supplies the judge’s factual reasons” (White, quoting United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1114–16 (6th Cir. 2020)).

Where the limits are. Five appellate decisions mark the edges, and they are the map of what a § 3553(a) denial cannot be.

Decision	Court and date	What was wrong	Precedential status
United States v. Ruffin	6th Cir., 978 F.3d 1000 (2020)	States the underlying principle: a court abuses its discretion by making “a purely legal mistake,” even under deferential review. Also the source of the rule that a reviewing court considers “the entire record, including the court’s balancing of the § 3553(a) factors at the original sentencing”	Published
United States v. Quirós-Morales	1st Cir., 83 F.4th 79 (2023)	The court treated the motion as deniable as a matter of law based on offense seriousness; “no such categorical bar currently exists”	Published; vacated
United States v. Traumann	3d Cir., No. 23-2985 (Oct. 1, 2024)	A brief order left it unclear whether the court had engaged with the medical record filed the same day, making the ruling “essentially unreviewable”	Not precedential; vacated
United States v. Swartz	4th Cir., No. 25-6090 (Nov. 3, 2025)	The denial rested on an erroneous factual premise — that a spouse was still available to care for a disabled adult child, when she had died	Unpublished; vacated
United States v. Handlon	5th Cir., 53 F.4th 348 (2022)	A one-sentence denial of an unopposed, documented motion may be an abuse of discretion	Published — but read with care. Handlon also relied on United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2021), for the premise that § 1B1.13 does not bind defendant-filed motions. That premise was superseded by Guidelines Amendment 814 (Nov. 1, 2023) and by Rutherford‘s treatment of § 1B1.13 as governing. The explanation holding is unaffected; the applicability premise is not current law

The pattern across all five: an appellate court will not second-guess how a judge weighed the factors, but it will act when it cannot tell that the judge weighed them, when the weighing rested on a fact that is not true, or when the judge treated a discretionary question as a legal one. Two of the four vacaturs are non-binding — Traumann is marked not precedential and Swartz is unpublished — and a brief that cites them should cite them for what they are.

Deadlines. A defendant’s notice of appeal is due within 14 days after entry of the order under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A); the government’s is due within 30 days under Rule 4(b)(1)(B). The government does appeal grants and sometimes wins them back — Hall (6th Cir. 2026) reversed a grant on the government’s appeal. What to do after a denial, including when a renewed motion on genuinely changed circumstances beats an appeal, is on compassionate release denial and can you file compassionate release twice. The mechanics of appellate practice generally are on federal appeals lawyer.

Applied Insight — Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney: The appellate standard runs backward into how the district court motion gets built. Chavez-Meza and White together mean a judge can deny in a paragraph and be affirmed — unless the record makes that paragraph impossible to write honestly. So we write to be hard to dispose of summarily. Every factual premise the court might rest on is stated and documented in the motion itself, so a denial resting on a wrong premise is visible on the face of the record, as it was in Swartz. Every § 3553(a) paragraph is briefed by name, so an order silent on one of them is silent about an argument the court was asked to reach, as in Traumann. That is not appellate positioning for its own sake. A motion built that way is also a motion that is harder to deny in the first place, which is the entire point.

Why work with Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C.

Elizabeth Franklin-Best is the founder and Principal Attorney of Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C., a boutique firm devoted to federal criminal appeals and post-conviction relief. Over more than 20 years she has handled more than 330 federal proceedings, over 100 of them appeals, with sixteen published decisions as counsel of record. She is admitted to the U.S. Supreme Court and twelve of the thirteen U.S. Courts of Appeals — every regional circuit (1st–11th) plus the D.C. Circuit — and has appeared pro hac vice in federal courts from Montana to Florida. She is recognized by Best Lawyers in America 2026 for Appellate Practice and by Chambers USA 2026 for Litigation: White-Collar Crime & Government Investigations, and was named South Carolina Public Defender of the Year in 2010. She is the author of Reversing Your Criminal Conviction: Develop Your Winning Strategy (2023) and serves as Board Chair of Justice 360.

Christopher Zoukis, JD, MBA, is the firm’s Managing Director and a nationally recognized federal prison expert. He is the author of the Federal Prison Handbook, Directory of Federal Prisons, Prison Education Guide, and College for Convicts, and serves as Chairman of the Board of the Human Rights Defense Center. He has been quoted as a federal prison expert by outlets including CNN, the Associated Press, and The Washington Post. He earned his J.D. at the University of California, Davis School of Law after serving roughly a decade in the federal Bureau of Prisons, where he became an award-winning incarcerated journalist — a combination of formal training and firsthand knowledge that few in federal defense can offer. He leads the firm’s federal prison consultant work, including the BOP records retrieval and institutional analysis a § 3553(a) argument is built on; the legal work — the motion, the briefing, and any appeal — is handled by Elizabeth Franklin-Best and the firm’s attorneys.

The firm runs a national federal practice on an intentionally small caseload, from offices in Columbia and Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. Sentence-reduction motions are filed in the district that imposed the sentence, wherever in the country that is.

Talk to a Federal Sentence-Reduction Lawyer

If a motion was denied on the § 3553(a) factors, the useful first question is not whether the judge was wrong. It is what the order actually said, what the record in front of the judge contained, and what is different now.

Five documents make a first review productive, and families can usually assemble all of them:

• The order denying the motion, which is often short and is always the starting point — a denial resting only on § 3553(a) leaves eligibility undecided, which changes what a renewed motion has to do.
• The judgment and commitment order, naming the sentencing judge, the district, the counts, the sentence on each, and the supervised release term already imposed.
• The BOP sentence computation, showing time served, good conduct time, and projected release date — the numbers behind the § 3553(a)(2)(A) argument.
• Whatever medical and institutional records the family already has, plus a signed release so the complete BOP health record and disciplinary history can be requested rather than summarized.
• A realistic picture of the release destination — who lives there, whether there is room, what medical care is reachable, and who would be responsible for what.

Call (843) 620-1100 or schedule a consultation directly. We handle federal sentence-reduction and compassionate release motions nationwide, in the district that imposed the sentence. If you are still deciding which route fits — federal compassionate release lawyers, a § 2255 motion, a clemency petition, or a Bureau of Prisons remedy under the first step act — that is a conversation worth having before anything is filed.

Frequently Asked Questions About the § 3553(a) Factors

Reviewed for legal accuracy by Elizabeth Franklin-Best, Esq., Principal Attorney·September 2026